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Abstract 
This dissertation is constituted of three distinct chapters. The first chapter seeks to resolve a recent 
debate on whether sovereign wealth funds(SWFs) have non-financial objectives and politically distort 
firm performance. I find that, once stake size is considered, previous belief that SWFs would affect firm 
performance should be reformulated. SWFs rarely seek an influential stake in listed firms. Even in firms 
where they take significant stake size, SWFs do not affect firm global performance. But at the plant 
level, this chapter provides case-study evidence that hints at the influence of SWFs on firm choices of 
business location. Overall, findings of this chapter indicate that SWFs do not affect economic gain 
accrued to global investors, but it awaits to be examined how SWFs and other stakeholders split 
economic gain in terms of technology transfer, employment, and tax revenue. 
The second chapter examines if financial bidders exploit underpricing as a motive in acquisitions by 
studying acquisition bids that fail to complete.1 Any revaluation remaining after failure should be 
unrelated to the value creation envisioned by the acquisition attempt, and in that light, could be driven 
by underpricing. We find a 30-percent cumulative abnormal return from bid offer to bid failure to firms 
that are targeted by financial bidders and subject to severe information asymmetry. Compared to 
financial bidders, we further find that strategic bidders have other motives behind acquisitions and fall 
short to reap underpricing as a driver in choosing target firms. These results indicate that financial 
bidders specialize or are more skilled in identifying and exploiting mispricing opportunities. This work 
successfully tackles a long-standing empirical challenge to separate value-selection versus value-
creation motives for acquisitions and provides evidence that one of the motives for financial investors 
to acquire firms is to benefit from mispricing. 
The third chapter takes the perspective of acquisition process and focuses on cross-border vertical 
acquisitions. I show that target country-level productivity in global value chains is important in 
explaining the extent of control transferred from targets to foreign acquirers. Foreign control is less 
common in target countries with higher relative productivity. This finding is robust to alternative 
determinants of cross-border acquisition decisions. These results suggest that one pertinent source of 
bargaining power for targets vis-à-vis foreign acquirers in the negotiation process of cross-border 
acquisitions is target countries’ relative position in global value chains. 
Key words: Sovereign wealth fund, Government ownership, Real effect, Undervaluation, 
Mispricing, Acquisitions, Financial acquirers, Revaluation, Cross-border, Global value chains, Bargain, 
Integration.
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Résumé 
Cette dissertation est constituée de trois chapitres distincts. Le premier chapitre vise à résoudre un 
récent débat sur la question de savoir si les fonds souverains(SWFs) ont des objectifs non financiers et 
faussent politiquement la performance des entreprises. Je trouve que, après avoir examiné la taille de la 
participation détenue par SWFs, la croyance antérieure que SWFs affecteraient la performance de 
l'entreprise devrait être reformulée. SWFs cherchent rarement une participation influente dans les 
sociétés cotées. Même dans les entreprises où SWFs detiennent une participation significative, SWFs 
n'affectent pas la performance globale de l'entreprise. Mais au niveau de l'usine, ce chapitre fournit deux 
études de cas qui font une allusion à l'influence des SWFs sur les choix du lieu de l'usine des entreprises. 
Dans l'ensemble, les conclusions de ce chapitre indiquent que SWFs n'affectent pas le gain économique 
des investisseurs mondiaux. Elles indiquent également qu’il est intéressant à voir comment SWFs et les 
autres parties prenantes répartissent les gains économiques en termes de transfert de technologie, 
d'emploi et de recettes fiscales. 
Le deuxième chapitre examine si les acquéreurs financiers exploitent la sous-évaluation comme 
motif des acquisitions en étudiant les échecs d’acquisition, c'est-à-dire les offres d'acquisition qui ne 
parviennent pas à se terminer.2 Toute réévaluation subsistante après un échec d’acquisition ne devrait 
pas être liée à la création de valeur envisagée par la tentative d'acquisition. Dans cette optique, elle 
pourrait s'explique par une sous-évaluation. Nous constatons un rendement anormal cumulatif de 30% 
de l'offre d'achat à l'échec de l’acquisition aux entreprises qui sont ciblées par les acquéreurs financiers 
et souffrent d’une asymétrie d'information sévère. Par rapport aux acquéreurs financiers, nous 
constatons en outre que les acquéreurs stratégiques ont d'autres motifs des acquisitions et ne parviennent 
pas à tirer profit de la sous-évaluation en tant que facteur déterminant dans le choix des entreprises cibles. 
Ces résultats indiquent que les acquéreurs financiers se spécialisent ou sont plus compétents dans 
l'identification et l'exploitation de la sous-évaluation. Ce travail aborde avec succès un défi empirique 
de longue date consistant à séparer la sélection de valeur et de la création de valeur dans les acquisitions, 
en fournissant la preuve que l'un des motifs pour les acquéreurs financiers est de profiter de la sous-
évaluation. 
Le troisième chapitre prend la perspective du processus d'acquisition et se concentre sur les 
acquisitions verticales transfrontalières. Je montre que la productivité au niveau des pays cibles dans les 
chaînes de valeur mondiales est importante pour expliquer l'étendue du contrôle transféré des cibles aux 
acquéreurs étrangers. Le contrôle étranger est moins courant dans les pays cibles où la productivité 
relative est plus élevée. Cette conclusion est robuste aux déterminants alternatifs des décisions 
d'acquisition transfrontalières. Ces résultats suggèrent que la position relative des pays cibles dans les 
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chaînes de valeur mondiales constitue une source pertinente de pouvoir de négociation pour les cibles 
vis-à-vis des acquéreurs étrangers dans le processus de négociation des acquisitions transfrontalières. 
Mots clés : Fonds souverains, Propriété publique, Effet réel, Sous-évaluation, Erreur d'évaluation du 
prix, Acquisitions, Acquéreurs financiers, Réévaluation, Transfrontalier, Chaînes de valeur mondiales, 
Négociation, Intégration. 
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Introduction 
In recent years, we witness the rise of global ownership. It is reflected by the increasing acquisitions 
of controlling and non-controlling stake in foreign firms. What are the motives and impacts in buying 
foreign ownership? What is the best timing to launch a purchase? What are major determinants of a 
successful purchase? These questions receive growing research interest but await deeper investigation.  
Existing literature uncovers four main motives. The first motive is to avoid tax (Huizinga and Voget, 
2009).  If tax in the host destination is lower, firms that merge enjoy a drop in effective tax rate and an 
increase in firm value (Col, Liao, and Zeume, 2016). The second motive is to take advantage of 
regulatory arbitrage. For example, banks buy financial institutions located in weaker regimes to execute 
profitable investment opportunities which are not allowed in their home countries (Karolyi and Taboada, 
2015). The third motive is to extend the usage of superior special knowledge over immobile assets 
located in foreign countries (Frésard, Hege, and Phillips, 2017). Acquirers that act on this motive 
experience higher acquisition gain and post-deal better operation performance. The fourth motive is to 
gain additional value from improving target corporate governance (Rossi and Volpin, 2004). In deals 
where acquirers are better governed than targets, both targets and acquirers experience positive 
acquisition gain (Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar, 2010). However, the literature has 
mixed views on the motive and impact of a major global investor type: government-related acquirers. 
Some believe that government-controlled acquirers (state-owned enterprises) and government-backed 
institutional investors (sovereign wealth funds) are profit partakers in foreign firms (Kotter and Lel, 
2011; Karolyi and Liao, 2017). Others argue that they aim to advance political agenda through foreign 
investment and distort foreign firm performance (Dewenter, Han, and Malatesta, 2010; Bortolotti, Fotak, 
Megginson, 2015).  This discrepancy calls for better understanding whether government investors buy 
global ownership for profit or politics.  
The timing of a foreign acquisition is shown to be affected by difference in stock market valuation 
and currency appreciation between acquirer and target countries (Baker, Foley, and Wurgler, 2009; Erel, 
Liao, and Weisbach, 2012). An undervaluation in targets can motivate acquirers to set an acquisition in 
motion which might be too costly in absence of target undervaluation (Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang, 
2012). It is unclear, however, whether the observed valuation gap in cross-border settings reflects a 
temporary bidding opportunity or systematic underperformance of foreign targets. Therefore, there is a 
need to disentangle the value-creation and value-selection motives.  
Compared to previous two aspects, the process of obtaining global ownership receives surprisingly 
scant research attention. In fact, cross-country differences provide interesting features that can reshape 
cross-border procedures and cannot be examined in a domestic setting. For instance, unlike domestic 
deals, to choose to pay in cash is not so much at acquirers’ discretion but a necessary response to foreign 
target demand (Faccio and Masulis, 2005). Another feature that is specific to cross-border settings is 
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government protectionism. Government intervention in foreign bids is shown to deter foreign capital 
(Dinc and Erel, 2013). There is much about the purchase process of global ownership that we do not 
fully understand, including determinants of bargaining outcome between foreign acquirers and local 
targets.  
Taken together, the globalization of firm ownership has high potential for further exploration. To 
advance knowledge in this field, my dissertation aims to dedicate first two chapters to motives and 
impact, and the third chapter to the process of obtaining global ownership.  
The first chapter reconciles a recent debate on whether sovereign wealth funds(SWFs) have non-
financial social objectives and politically distort firm performance. I provide two remedies to major 
causes of inconsistency in the existing literature by: (1) identifying target firms where SWFs take 
substantial stake and (2) searching for evidence of real effects. The findings of this chapter suggest that 
the previous belief that SWFs worsen or improve firm performance should be reformulated once stake 
size is considered. SWFs rarely seek an influential stake in listed firms. This investment strategy does 
not, in turn, cause political distortion of firm operations at the global level. Yet, at the plant level, I show 
case-study evidence that hints at the influence of SWFs on firm choices of business location. Altogether, 
the results of this work suggest that SWFs do not affect economic gain accrued to global investors. 
Future research should focus on conflicts between SWFs and other stakeholders in splitting economic 
gain in terms of technology transfer, employment, and tax revenue. To advance research in this direction, 
private firms and subsidiaries of global firms are suitable subjects for future study.  
In the second chapter, I work together with Carolina Salva and examine if financial bidders exploit 
underpricing as a motive in acquisitions in the international setting. To this end, we study acquisition 
bids that fail to complete. Any revaluation remaining after failure should be unrelated to the value 
creation envisioned by the acquisition attempt and could be driven by underpricing. We compute the 
market reaction from bid offer to bid failure, and we find a 30-percent cumulative abnormal return to 
firms that are targeted by financial bidders and subject to severe information asymmetry. This 
revaluation effect does not revert to prior-bid price level. After a battery of tests, we interpret this finding 
as suggesting that mispricing is a relevant acquisition motive for financial bidders and, in some cases, 
the ripped benefits can be substantial. We compare these results to revaluation effects around failed bids 
issued by strategic bidders. We find that strategic bidders have other motives behind acquisitions and 
fall short to reap underpricing as a driver in choosing target firms. Furthermore, we find that geographic 
proximity does not add additional advantage to identify mispricing targets.  Overall, our results indicate 
that financial bidders seem to specialize or are more skilled in identifying and exploiting mispricing 
opportunities. This work successfully tackles a long-standing empirical challenge to separate value-
selection versus value-creation motives for acquisitions and provides evidence that one of the motives 
for financial investors to acquire firms is to benefit from mispricing.  
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The third chapter takes the perspective of acquisition process and investigates the role of country-
level productivity in vertical acquisitions across borders. In this chapter, I propose and provide new 
evidence that higher target-country productivity in global value chains lends targets more bargaining 
power in negotiation with foreign acquirers. Targets from countries with higher productivity can 
leverage their exclusive access to sources of productivity and charge a higher price for a transfer of 
ownership. If foreign acquirers do not want to overpay, they would settle for a non-controlling stake or 
switch to the next best target country. I find that, indeed, controlling acquisitions are less common in 
target countries with higher productivity in global value chains. This result is robust to alternative 
explanations for the choice between controlling and non-controlling acquisition. Findings of this chapter 
suggest that countries’ relative position in international product market reshapes bargaining outcome of 
cross-border acquisitions.  
Overall, this thesis sheds new light on the motives and impacts as well as the process of obtaining 
global ownership. In that light, I believe that valuable insights provided by this thesis help advance 
knowledge on the globalization of firm ownership. 
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Chapter 1: Do sovereign wealth funds (really) affect firm performance? 
1.1. Introduction 
Sovereign wealth funds(SWFs) have become increasingly important in the global capital market 
since their sudden rise in 2007.3 By the end of 2014, assets managed by SWFs were estimated to be 
worth USD 7.1 trillion, far exceeding private equity (USD 4.1 trillion) and hedge funds (USD 2.7 
trillion).4 Do these government-controlled funds have political agendas and cause political distortion in 
firms in which they invest? This is a multi-trillion-dollar question, the answer to which can affect how 
policy makers in host countries address this new form of governmental investor. However, there is no 
clear answer. From the perspective of other global shareholders investing in the same firm as SWFs, the 
literature presents four different views on the role of SWFs. They are (1) passive shareholders (Kotter 
and Lel, 2011), (2) governmental friend (Sojli and Tham, 2011; Fernandes, 2014; Bertoni and Lugo, 
2014); (3) governmental enemy (Bortolotti, Fotak, Megginson, 2015); and (4) peer shareholders with a 
possible political agenda, yet the damage of which awaits to be verified (Dewenter, Han, Malatesta, 
2010; Dyck and Morse, 2011; Knill, Lee, Mauck, 2012; Calluzzo, Dong, Godsell, 2017). Since to get a 
clear view on SWFs not only concerns academia but also has real-world consequences, I aim to resolve 
the debate on whether SWFs politically distort firm performance by providing two remedies to major 
causes of inconsistency in existing studies. 
The first remedy is to spot listed firms in which SWFs take a substantial stake. Given the 
proliferation of studies on the investment motives and strategies of SWFs, one might presume that there 
has been careful treatment on stake size, a crucial indicator for SWFs' intention and power to intervene. 
Surprisingly, this is not so. In fact, there is large discrepancy in the mean (median) stake size documented 
in existing literature: 27.5 (20) percent in Dewenter et al. (2010); 5.61 (0.08) percent in Dyck and Morse 
(2011); 12.7 (0.05) percent in Kotter and Lel (2011); 8.45 (1.23) percent in Bortolotti et al. (2015); and 
1.13 (0.61) percent in Calluzzo et al. (2017). Apparently, the first step towards reconciliation is to have 
a sample in which SWFs truly have intention and power to impose political agenda. To do so, I focus 
on firms where SWFs invest no less than five percent, a minimum threshold for any hidden impact of 
SWFs to appear. 
The second remedy is to search for evidence of real effects. Most of previous studies draw 
conclusion from revealed target preferences and stock market reaction. In other words, speculation over 
political motives of SWFs is intense, but evidence of real consequences is scant and unclear. If perceived 
non-financial motives are truly and largely at work in target firms, we should eventually see distortion 
on firm operation. However, other than univariate analysis and inconclusive results (Kotter and Lel, 
2011; Sojli and Tham, 2011; Fernandes, 2014), only Bortolotti et al. (2015) conduct multivariate 
                                                          
3 See for example, the Sovereign Wealth Funds Explosion, November 1st, 2007, Wall Street Journal. 
4 TheCityUK Fund Management Report, September 2015. 
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analysis on sales growth and operation efficiency. But Bortolotti et al. overlooked real investment, a key 
firm policy also likely to be exposed to political influence. For example, if a firm already runs at full 
capacity before SWFs becoming shareholders, new business in home countries of SWFs obtained 
through political connections (Dewenter et al., 2010; Fernandes, 2014) would lead to an upscale in firm 
capital expenditures and a temporary decrease in operation efficiency. Therefore, to have a better view 
on changes in firm operation, we need to test, in parallel, real investment, sales growth, and operation 
efficiency. 
With those two remedies in mind, I construct a sample of listed firms invested in by SWFs from 
1989 to 2012 and run pooled OLS regressions on an event window of three years before and five years 
after SWF investment events. I use three separate variables to measure, respectively, (1) average 
difference in operation performance between SWF target firms and control groups before SWFs 
investment, (2) average difference in operation performance of control groups before and after the year 
of SWFs investment, and (3) post-event incremental effect of SWFs on target operation performance. 
By design, this model easily accommodates various ways of forming control groups and sensitivity 
analysis on different thresholds of stake size. 
This chapter presents several important empirical findings. First, a detailed analysis on stake size 
distribution reveals that SWFs rarely seek an influential stake in listed firms. Second, I find little 
evidence supporting either positive or negative political effects of SWFs on real investment, sales 
growth, or operation efficiency. This absence of incremental change is persistent across various 
thresholds of influential block size, control groups based on different matching specifications, and 
alternative proxies of operating performance. Put together, the findings are consistent with Kotter and 
Lel (2011), who conclude that SWFs do not impact firm performance globally. 
Next, I reconcile my findings with Bortolotti et al. (2015) who show that SWFs damage firm 
operation performance. To start with, I follow Bortolotti et al. and construct a benchmark of non-
government financial investors. I find a sharp contrast in investment patterns of SWFs and this 
benchmark. SWFs typically buy a non-influential stake in firms via cross-border transactions, whereas 
benchmark investors mostly seek influential stakes in domestic firms. Here, two major discrepancies 
emerge: stake size and geographic proximity. The two can jointly lead to misinterpretation. To illustrate 
with an extreme case, a 0.05 percent allocation of Asian SWFs in an American bank might be forced 
into comparison with (1) domestic investment by a private financial investor with better access to private 
information or (2) a merger between two American banks. As a result, SWFs that are worse at picking 
stock due to informational disadvantage or having less influence might be misinterpreted as SWFs 
damaging firm performance relative to the benchmark. For this reason, I keep deals where SWFs invest 
no less than five percent of shares. In this way, I preserve firms in which SWFs should have, relative to 
benchmark investors, either comparable private information to make large investments or similar 
7 
 
intention and power to intervene. It turns out that target firms of both types of investors perform similarly 
after investment events. The finding is robust to fund-specific characteristics such as a subgroup of 
SWFs more likely to be subject to political interference. Taken together, the conclusion of Bortolotti et 
al. seems to suffer from a motive-mismatched bias built into their benchmark formation. 
Furthermore, I re-examine why Fernandes (2014) concludes that SWFs improve firm value. 
Fernandes uses Tobin's q to measure firm value and apply a one-percent threshold to identifying 
influential stake size. I analyze the association of Tobin's q and SWF investment events at various stake 
size thresholds. Again, I do not find evidence of incremental change in Tobin's q of firms targeted by 
SWFs after SWF investment. Furthermore, I find that, for the subsample of firms in which SWFs buy a 
stake size below five percent, target firms of SWFs have on average a higher Tobin's q than control 
groups defined by Fernandes before SWFs becoming shareholders. This suggests that a one-percent 
threshold adopted by Fernandes is insufficient to filter out firms that have, in general, a higher value 
than control groups before SWFs invest. And a stake size less than five percent is found to account for 
80 percent of the SWFs investment sample. That means results of Fernandes (2014) might be driven by 
over-proportionate presence of cases where SWFs select themselves into firms with higher valuation. 
Thus far, I have only show evidence of listed firms that, once stake size is considered, previous 
belief that SWFs worsen or improve firm performance should be reformulated. While I can conclude 
that SWFs do not impact the economic gain accrued to global shareholders, I cannot exclude the 
possibility that SWFs may affect how the economic gain accrued to government is redistributed. Neither 
can I generalize the no-impact conclusion to other asset classes of SWFs, such as unlisted firms. 
Unfortunately, data limitation makes it more difficult to conduct deep empirical analysis in that regard. 
Therefore, I resort to two brief case studies of two Middle East SWFs. These two SWFs have similar 
political agendas to diversify industrial structure but adopt different approaches to execute it. In the first 
case, Mubadala, an Abu Dhabi SWF that bought 8 percent of Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) in 2007, 
participates in AMD's multi-year plan to divest its manufacturing arm. Mubadala eventually owned the 
entire manufacturing business of AMD globally. However, so far Mubadala has not shifted any existing 
plant to Abu Dhabi or launched any new plant in the Middle East region. The opposite case concerns 
Oman SWF, which clearly aims to immediately transfer foreign technology to its homeland and create 
local employment by setting up manufacturing branches after investing in unlisted foreign firms in the 
high-tech sector. These two distinct cases hint that, even though SWFs do have political agendas, it is 
not global shareholders whose interests are at risk. Rather, it is the other stakeholders of target firms 
who may have conflicts of interests with SWFs. More precisely, SWFs might come into conflict with 
the governments of host countries who want to retain technological innovation, employment, and tax 
revenue at home. This type of conflict among country players is a promising direction for future research, 
in which private firms and subsidiaries of multinational firms serve as a valid topic of study. 
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This chapter mainly contributes to the literature on SWFs. First, I offer new evidence to resolve the 
debate on the motives and real impact of SWFs. Among the studies on the real effect of SWFs, only the 
conclusion of Kotter and Lel (2011) continues to hold across the various tests proposed in this chapter. 
That is, SWFs do not affect the global performance of listed firms. I further explain the divergence of 
this study from Bortolotti et al. (2015) by identifying a motive-mismatched bias built into their sample 
construction and in turn an over-proportionate presence of an incomparable benchmark with different 
incentives. I also provide an explanation to opposing conclusion of Sojli and Tham (2011) and Fernandes 
(2014), in that his results may be driven by a disproportionately large sub-sample in which SWFs select 
firms with better growth prospect than the benchmark. Second, this work adds to the literature by 
proposing a simpler yet more reliable method to gauge the real effect of SWFs. Results of this study 
suggests that, given the heterogeneous background of SWFs, stake size should be the primary filter to 
effectively detect SWFs' intention and power to intervene. Furthermore, due to the lack of consensus on 
SWFs' investment motive, we must use matching techniques with great caution. Otherwise, ad hoc 
model specification might lead us to unstable and incomparable results. My empirical design 
circumvents such obstacles without compromising rigorousness in distinguishing selection and real 
effects. 
This chapter sheds light on the broader literature on government-firm connection by revealing that 
SWFs, as a new form of governmental investor, deviate from conventional wisdom about the role of 
government in firms. A largely held belief is that government always intends to keep control (Bortolotti 
and Faccio, 2009) or execute political agenda against firm profit maximization (Faccio, Masulis, and 
McConnell, 2006); Claessens, Feijen and Laeven, 2008). On the contrary, this work provides systematic 
evidence supporting the idea that SWFs rarely seek an influential stake in listed firms and do not impact 
profit accrued to global shareholders. Furthermore, using the illustration of case-study evidence, this 
work notes a new direction for future research on the interplay between politics and the economy. An 
overlooked form of conflict is arising – a conflict of how the pie is split among difference country 
players. While SWFs want to transfer technology and create jobs to their own countries, policy-makers 
of host countries want to retain local technological innovation, employment, and tax revenue.  
1.2. Data and methodology 
1.2.1. SWFs equity investment 
The event of SWFs becoming shareholders is defined as SWFs completing a purchase of existing 
common shares. I do not consider new shares purchase, including subscribing to seasonal equity offering, 
private placement, and convertibles. That is because in these transactions it is companies that motivate 
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investors to invest in company prospect, which introduces self-selection bias into my exploration for a 
causal effect of SWFs on companies.5 
I start to collect SWFs investment from SDC Merger & Acquisitions(SDC) database from the first 
record towards 2012 December 31. I keep records that satisfy the following criteria: (1) transactions that 
are flagged as "Y" for "Buyside: sovereign wealth funds Involvement"; (2) the deal status is marked 
"Completed". Next, I exclude privatization, repurchases, self-tenders, exchange offer, recapitalization, 
spinoffs. To ensure comparability of firm performance before and after SWFs investment, I require 
available accounting data prior and post to SWFs investment. Hence, I drop leveraged buyout and 
transactions involving unlisted targets. In addition, I drop transactions in which deal terms or acquirers 
are not disclosed, i.e. information on SWFs' names and stake size is unavailable.6 Two reasons motivate 
this filter. First, SWFs are shown to conduct heterogeneous investment strategies, which implies that an 
across-the-board analysis might underestimate real influence of subgroups (Dyck and Morse, 2011). 
Second, stake size is a key variable that determines SWFs' incentive and power to affect firm 
management. To precisely detect potential impact of SWFs, I must know their identity and stake of 
interest. From SDC, I collect 724 SWFs investment events with complete deal information. 
Then I go to the transaction database provided by Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute and add to my 
initial sample the transactions that satisfy the following criteria: (1) the summary does not contain key 
words indicating purchase of new shares, such as "new shares", "new ordinary shares", "preferred 
shares", "subscribe", and "subscription"; (2) deal term and acquirer name are disclosed; (3) the 
investment type is marked as "Listed Equity"; (4) transactions contain target name and target country 
different from those records in my initial sample from SDC.  Till now, my raw deal sample contains 
3578 SWFs transactions.7 
If a single firm receives multiple SWF investments, either from the same fund or other SWFs, in the 
same year, I count once. By doing so, I do not imply homogeneous investment objectives among SWFs. 
Yet investing in the same firm in the same year, that firm must attract those SWFs for common reasons. 
By further controlling stake size, I can assume similar objectives of SWFs in that specific. But if a firm 
receives SWF investment in different years, either from the same fund or another SWF, that firm is 
counted by the number of events.  
Key variables collected at this step include announcement date, effective date, target company name, 
country where target companies are primarily listed, the home country of SWF country, SWF name, 
transaction amount in U.S. dollars, stake purchased, and stake owned post transaction. 
                                                          
5 I double check both SDC Global New Issues database and SWF Institute transaction database. SWFs are involved in only 55 purchases of 
new shares. 
6 Prior to this filter, I extensively search for complementary information on SWF name and stake size in SDC synopsis and news. 
7 25 transactions involve a group of several SWFs as buyer. 
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1.2.2. Stake size as a key indicator for SWFs motive and influence 
I use five-percent stake size as a minimum threshold for SWFs influential investment. There is no 
one-size-fit-all threshold to indicate a shareholder's effective power in a firm. In studies focused on U.S. 
data, five percent is widely used. SEC considers five percent as the starting point for a shareholder to be 
influential and in turn requires firms to disclose the identify and intention of shareholders in SEC 13-
Filings. Probably because of this, five percent is a commonly applied threshold in previous studies on 
blockholder and corporate governance. Five percent is also found to be the effective average holding of 
top five institutional investors (see for example, Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 2009; Michaely and 
Vincent, 2012). The cut-off level outside U.S. is much less clear, probably lower than the five percent 
threshold. As Ferreira and Matos (2008) shows, holding a 2.7 percent is already ranked as the top one 
shareholder in large non-U.S. international firms. Thus, by employing five percent as the minimum 
threshold for influential stake, I might put a stricter standard on non-U.S. target firms. 
[Insert Table 1.1 Here] 
Table 1.1 reports the stake size distribution of SWFs equity investment. To put in perspective, I 
compare it with that of non-government financial investors who share the same home and host countries 
with SWFs.8 Panel A presents the mean stake size taken by SWFs is 4.09 percent, whereas that of non-
government financial investors is 16.28 percent. The contrast is even more striking under the measure 
of median. While non-government financial investors seek a large stake of 10 percent, SWFs typically 
purchase as small as 0.5 percent. The upper part of Panel B decomposes the sample by national border. 
SWFs typically buy non-influential stake overseas, while non-government financial investors have a 
clear focus at home but seek influential stake size regardless where they invest. In terms of industry 
(lower part of Panel B), SWFs and non-government financial investors investment share similar 
frequency in each industry, but again with distinct interest in firm stake size. To sum up, SWFs do not 
seem to intend to seek for influence in target firms as opposed to non-government financial investors. 
This serves as a first evidence that SWFs are more of profit partakers than delegates with political 
mission. 
1.2.2. Firm operation performance 
To measure operating performance, I collect firm-level accounting data from Worldscope. To 
identify firms that receive SWFs investment, I match firm name and country to those in my transaction 
sample described above. Next, I drop observations with negative book equity or missing values on total 
assets. Till now, 2143 SWFs investment events are matched to accounting data.  
                                                          
8 Due to this matching, the sample size reported here is smaller than that of the main sample used in empirical analysis, except for reconciliation 
with Bortolotti et al. (2015) in Table 1.5. 
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The relevant metric of operating performance for this study are real investment level, sales growth, 
and operation efficiency. These three aspects are predicted by prior theories to reflect political impact 
(see, e.g., Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980; Pfeffer, 1978; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). As a friend to target 
firms, SWFs may help management to communicate more efficiently with regulators, to obtain private 
information, to reduce political uncertainty, and ultimately to optimize operation. As a foe, SWFs could 
attempt to impose political agenda by altering product mix, changing choices of technology, or thrust 
requirement for plant location and employment. Either role being in action would lead to changes in 
aforementioned three accounting measures. To investigate real investment, sales growth, and efficiency 
in parallel allow me to cover the following scenarios. If SWFs invest in firms that have idle production 
capacity prior to SWF investment, network transactions on product market, as mentioned by Dewenter 
et al. (2010) and Fernandes (2014), might boost the firm sales in a short run but not necessarily the 
capital expenditure. This scenario would be reflected in an increase in 1-year sales growth and operation 
efficiency. However, if a firm already runs at full capacity before SWF investment, a new long-term 
government procurement contract, as accentuated in Sojli and Tham (2011), would lead to increase in 
firm investment level and a decrease in operation efficiency in the short run. 
I also include other key firm variables as alternative proxies for performance and control variables. 
They are Tobin's q for market valuation, operating cash flow to total assets for efficiency, cash to total 
assets and leverage for financial health, total assets and market capitalization for firm size, paid 
dividends to total assets for dividend policy in place. 
1.2.3. Benchmarks 
I use five benchmarks. The first benchmark is simply all listed firms in Worldscope that have never 
been invested by SWFs, i.e. the universe average. The advantage of using this universe average is that I 
do not have to decide a prior determinants of target selection. Existing literature does not provide 
consensus on whether and how different investment strategies translate into different criteria for firm 
selection. For example, Kotter and Lel (2011) use the whole Worldscope universe as the candidate pool 
to analyze determinants of SWF target selection but do not find consistent predictors for subgroups of 
SWFs investment classified by stake size.9  
The next three benchmarks are matched control groups. Previous studies use ad hoc combinations 
of firm-level variables to construct matched control group probably because literature has no consensus 
on determinants of SWFs target selection. Nevertheless, for robustness purpose, I matched control firms 
to target firms by 2-digit SIC industry and host country and thereby my second benchmark. To build the 
third one, I match by 2-digit SIC industry, host country, and firm size. My fourth control group is 
composed by firms matched to targets by 2-digit SIC industry, host country, and a firm performance 
                                                          
9 See Table IA1. in internet appendix of Kotter and Lel (2011). 
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measure. Specifically, when operating efficiency (sales growth, real investment level) is the variable to 
be tested, then the matching criterion for firm performance is Tobin's q (operating efficiency).  
The last benchmark is proposed by Bortolotti et al. (2015): firms invested by non-government 
financial investors. Compared to control groups solely matched by firm-side characteristics, this 
approach incorporates shareholder-side characteristics in benchmark and help single out political 
influence of SWFs on firm operation. Though primary evidence in Section 1.2.2 shows that SWFs are 
far less likely than non-government financial investors to seek non-influential stake, I still consider this 
benchmark in a more rigorous regression setting. 
In following empirical analysis, I exclude target firms that fall in SIC codes between 6000 and 6999. 
This is the economics of financial service firms are different from regular firms. Take capital expenditure 
as an example, investment activities of financial service firms are not clearly defined (Damodaran, 2013).  
1.2.3. Model 
 I assess incremental effect of SWFs on firm operation using an event study approach. More 
specifically, I consider a time frame of three years before a SWF investment and five years after it. This 
approach is motivated by two important reasons. First, it mitigates potential inflation in estimation errors. 
After merging transaction and firm accounting data, my sample becomes a panel that comprises firms 
invested by SWFs or paired private financial investors. This panel is highly unbalanced because the 
earliest tractable investment of SWFs takes place in 1989 and not all international data is available 
throughout such long period.  The attrition of international data is unlikely to be random. Thus, to 
estimate impact on a long historical window can inflate estimation errors (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010), 
Second, it makes more economic sense to focus on a shortened sample window because the further into 
a firm's historical operation performance, the less relevant to its future performance and to an investor's 
investment decision. The purpose to extend prior-event window to three years is to incorporate the 
possibility that investors start to affect target operation before their investment is disclosed to the public, 
i.e. acquisition announcement. I keep deals that have non-missing accounting information at least one 
year before and one year after investment events. The controlled regression setting is as follows. 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑊𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑊𝐹𝑖 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝜹𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡      (1.1) 
where i indexes firms and t indexes fiscal years. The dependent variable of interest, yi,t, is one of the 
following three measures: capital expenditure over year-start net book value of property, plants and 
equipment (CapexPPE), one-year sales growth (SalesGrowth) measured by the yearly change of net 
revenue, and operation efficiency measured by operating income over year-start book value of total 
assets (ROA). SWFi is a time-invariant dummy variable that equals one for firms that are going to be 
invested by SWFs at some point in my sample period and equals zero for benchmark firms. Aftert is a 
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dummy that equals one for both SWF target firms and benchmark firms during the [+1Year,+5Year] 
event window period. β1 captures average difference in operation performance between SWFs target 
firms and control groups before SWFs investment, i.e. [-3Year, 0]. β2  captures average difference in 
operation performance of control groups between the two event windows, i.e. [-3Year, 0] versus 
[+1Year,+5Year]. The coefficients of interest, β3 , capture post-event incremental effect of SWFs on yi,t. 
By construction, this model easily accommodates various ways of forming control groups and sensitivity 
analysis on different thresholds of stake size. As explained in Section 1.2.2,  SWFs' potential roles as 
friends versus foes contrast one another. Thus, at this step, I do not give prediction on the sign of β3.  
Xi,t-1 is a vector of time-varying firm- and industry-level control variables. All control variables here 
are with one-year lag, unless stated otherwise. When yi,t is capital expenditure, I include in the vector 
Xi,t-1 operating cash flow over total assets, Tobin's q, firm size, and 2-digit SIC industry average of 
Tobin's q. When yi,t is one-year sales growth, I include in the vector Xi,t-1 sales growth, capital 
expenditure, cash over total assets, firm size, and 2-digit SIC industry average of Tobin's q. When yi,t is 
operating efficiency, I include in the vector Xi,t-1 sales growth, capital expenditure, firm size, and 2-digit 
SIC industry average of Tobin's q. 
Regarding possible presence of a fixed effect, I do not consider year fixed effect because Aftert 
already controls for changes in macroeconomic environment that affect all firms.  Furthermore, I do not 
consider country, industry or firm fixed effects primarily because they are embedded in fixed effects of 
SWFs investment strategies. A fund decides which country and industry to invest simultaneously with 
which firm to pick. All relevant information to SWFs investment decisions, either at country-, industry-, 
or firm-level, are observable to SWFs. Thus, the ultimate unobservable fixed effects that may bias my 
estimation derive from heterogeneous fund investment strategies. Statistically, I confirm my belief by 
following the diagnosis procedures suggested by Petersen (2009) and Cameron and Miller (2015). That 
is, while I add fixed effect one dimension after another, fund fixed effect leads to the largest variation 
in standard errors of β3. Ideally, I should control for investment strategy fixed effect. Unfortunately, as 
investment strategies are driven by different investment goals, it is infeasible to clearly classify them 
unless all investment goals are observable. SWF fund-level fixed effect is not an appropriate alternative 
because a fund can implement multiple strategies simultaneously (Dyck and Morse, 2011). Alternatively, 
I use various stake size thresholds to mitigate fund-related unobservable effects because stake size 
sought by SWFs determines not only the intention but also the ability of SWFs to affect firm operation. 
And in following estimations, I use the sample where SWFs buy no less than five percent of common 
shares, unless otherwise mentioned. 
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1.3. Empirical results 
1.3.1. Univariate results 
Table 1.2 Panel A presents summary statistics of key firm characteristics. Compared to universe 
average, target firms of SWFs have a distinct profile. They spend more in real investment (CapexPPE), 
generate cash flow more efficiently (CfTA), pay more dividends (DvdTA) and have larger in firm size 
(TA, MktCap). However, they have less sales growth (SalesGrowth) and lower operation efficiency 
(ROA). Despite these two groups of opposing features, target firms of SWFs have a higher market 
valuation (Q).  
To better understand the difference between SWFs targets and the universe, Table 1.2 Panel B 
decompose firm operating performance by event year and stake size. Each performance measure is 
defined as the difference between its value and the average value of all firms in Worldscope (Universe) 
from the same SIC 2-digit industry classification. I also include Tobin's q (Q) in my examination. Having 
been adjusted for industry average, the profile of SWFs targets becomes clearer. These firms seem to 
systematically upscale fixed asset or production capacity to maintain their sales level and experience a 
lower operation efficiency. Their market valuation is largely consistent with industry average except for 
the year when SWFs place investment (t). Overall, target firms present little evidence on incremental 
improvement or deterioration after SWFs become shareholders.  
It is worth noting that the majority interest group (50%-100%) normally contains no more than 10 
observations per year. Such small sample size does not allow me to draw reliable inference on the few 
values that are significantly different from zero. In addition, there appears to be an increase in market 
valuation from the year of SWFs investment and to two years afterward. However, it is difficult to tell 
whether SWFs improve firm value or select into higher value. Therefore, I am going to investigate into 
this short dynamic around SWFs investment year in a controlled regression.  
[Insert Table 1.2 Here] 
1.3.2. Multivariate results 
Table 1.3 reports estimates of Model (1.1). Panel A display results for the dependent variable 
CapexPPE, Panel B for SalesGrowth, and Panel C for ROA. Column 1 presents the results obtained 
from Model (1.1) benchmarked to the universe average. In line with descriptive statistics of firm 
characteristics in Table 1.2, before SWFs investment, target firms of SWFs have similar sales growth to 
universe average, but invest more in real investment and experience lower operation efficiency. The 
variable of interest, SWFAfter, does not indicate any incremental change resulted from the presence of 
SWFs as shareholders. And this is the case for all three operation measures.  
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Column 2-4 adopt more refined control groups to account for omitted variables at country, industry, 
and firm levels. Colum 2 uses a control group matched by 2-digit SIC code and host country. Compared 
to this industry-country-adjusted benchmark, SWFs targets have similar sales growth and operating 
efficiency before SWFs become shareholders, while SWFs targets continue to have a higher real 
investment level. Again, the coefficient of SWFAfter is still insignificant from zero. Column 3 adopts a 
stricter matching metric. To account for unobservable firm characteristics that vary slowly with time, I 
construct a control group matched by 2-digit SIC, host country, and firm total assets. Estimates of key 
coefficients stays largely the same, except for a reappearance of lower operating efficiency for SWFs 
targets before investment event. Column 4 imposes an additional matching criterion: a firm-level 
variable shown by previous studies to be related to each of the three operation measures. For real 
investment and sales growth, I choose one-year lagged ROA. When ROA is the dependent variable, I 
use Tobin’s q. Even benchmarked to such strictly matching pair,  I do not find any evidence that SWFs 
improve or damage firm operating performance.  
Column 5 examines year-to-year changes in the operation of SWFs targets around SWFs investment 
event. It could be that governments intervene by investing in firms to stabilize short-term volatility in 
operation, trigger a short-term adjustment, or discontinue a change in operation policy that is just 
launched by management and against political interest. To detect whether there is any dynamic effect of 
SWFs investment on firm, I interact the indicator variable for SWFs targets and time dummies to 
explicitly account for year-to-year additional change in SWFs targets relative to the benchmark average 
over [-3Year, 5Year] period. Before-2 is a dummy variable that equals one for the second year prior to 
SWFs investment. Before-1 is a dummy variable that equals one for the year prior to SWF investment. 
After1 is a dummy that equals one for the year after SWFs investment. After2 is a dummy that equals 
one for the second year after SWFs investment. I use the same benchmark as in Column (1).  
I observe same patterns as in Column (1). As for real investment and operation efficiency, SWFs 
target firms are on average different from universe. But there is no evident change emerge along the 
four timepoints for SWFs targets. As suggested by p-value of F-test at the table bottom, the four 
coefficients are not statistically different.  
In sum, there are two important messages from this baseline estimation. First, the absence of 
incremental change for SWFs targets prevails through various empirical settings. Second, I obtain new 
insight on how SWFs select target firms. Using the whole Worldscope stock universe as the pool for 
candidates, Kotter and Lel (2011) discover that SWFs select past losers measured by negative operating 
efficiency. Using the same benchmark, I also find a strong negative sign on SWF in Panel C (ROA), 
which captures the average difference between SWFs target firms and universe before SWFs investment 
event. However, this difference diminishes, when I use industry-country-adjusted benchmarks. This 
suggests SWFs do not necessarily select past losers. Furthermore, the real investment of target firms 
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maintains its higher level regardless the choices of benchmark. This extends the conclusion drawn by 
Karolyi and Liao (2017) that only firm size matters for SWFs target selection. The persistently positive 
coefficient on SWF indicates the scale of capital expenditure is a key determinant of target selection, 
not firm size by its very nature. 
[Insert Table 1.3 Here] 
1.3.3. Sensitivity to stake size thresholds 
So far I obtain consistent evidences that SWFs do not cause major change in firm operation. 
However, it could be that my baseline threshold of five percent is too low to detect the sub-sample where 
SWFs are willing and able to be active. Thus, I test the sensitivity of my conclusion to multiple stake 
thresholds. As SWFs do not easily take influential block of shares, the number of transactions drops 
sharply when I increase stake cut-off level. Accordingly, I remove all benchmarks and only examine 
whether there is any incremental effect on a SWFs target operation after a certain SWF becomes 
shareholders with respect to that target firm's average over the sample period. Table 1.4 summarizes the 
results. I enhance the threshold by five percent at a time until the number of remaining observations falls 
below 30. No subgroup generates any incremental change in firm operation after SWFs become 
shareholders, except for a slightly significant negative sign on ROA shown in Column 9. However, this 
negative effect disappears when I re-estimate the subgroup of stake no less than 10 percent in the strict 
regression setting as in Table 1.3 Panel C.10 
[Insert Table 1.4 Here] 
1.3.4. Reconcile with Bortolotti, Fotak, and Megginson (2015) 
In this section, I re-examine the effect of political SWFs documented in Bortolotti et al. (2015). 
Instead of strictly replicating their regression, I directly use Model (1.1) as described in Section 1.2.3. 
That is because I do not obtain the same propensity score matching result as reported by Bortolotti et al. 
and thus unable to continue to replicate their benchmark in regression. 
Results are displayed in Table 1.5. Panel A examines effects on sales growth, Panel B on operation 
efficiency, and Panel C on market valuation. The variable of interest, SWFAfterPolitical, captures 
potential incremental effect of SWFs that are subject to political interference. Column 1-3 cover the 
event window three years before investment and five years after it. Column 4-6 strictly follow Bortolotti 
et al. and estimate operation performance only for the third year after investment events. Column 2 and 
5 contain target firms where SWFs or benchmarked private financial investor purchase no less than 5 
percent, in Column 3 and 6 no less than 10 percent. 
                                                          
10 Re-estimated results are not reported here. 
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Overall, there is no evidence suggesting political SWFs harm firm operating performance. But there 
are some results worth elaboration. In Panel A, the coefficient on  SWFAfterPolitical is even positive 
and statistically significant in Column (1). If it is political SWFs that cause an acceleration in sales 
growth, the effect should be more pronounced in cases where SWFs have higher incentive and power. 
Yet this effect immediately disappears once I impose a minimum stake size threshold. A 
disproportionate effect of non-influential deals seems to impact the coefficient estimation. In Column 6, 
the highly significant coefficient should also be interpreted with caution. As sample size drops sharply, 
Column 6 only contain five investment transaction by political SWFs and thus do not provide sensible 
analysis results. 
As for operation efficiency, in Panel B Column 1, the coefficient of SWFAfterPolitical is negative 
but insignificant. When I enhance the stake size threshold, its coefficient gradually turns from negative 
to positive both for full period or Year 3. This finding is at odds with the conclusion of Bortolotti et al. 
that political SWFs negatively affect firm operation efficiency. Note that the stake size distribution 
presented in Table 1.1 shows that SWFs typically buy a non-influential stake in firms via cross-border 
transactions, whereas private financial investors mostly seek influential stakes in domestic firms. Here, 
two major discrepancies emerge: stake size and geographic proximity. It is therefore important to impose 
a minimum threshold for stake size to make the two investor groups truly comparable. Absent of it, a 
"stake-motive mismatch" bias might have been built into the sample used by Bortolotti et al.. For this 
reason, the negative association between SWFs investment and firm operation efficiency found by the 
Bortolotti et al. may be alternatively driven by an over-proportionate presence of target firms in which 
SWFs buy a non-influential stake. SWFs that are worse at picking stock due to informational 
disadvantage or having less influence might be misinterpreted as SWFs damaging firm performance 
relative to the benchmark.  
[Insert Table 1.5 Here] 
1.3.5. Reconcile with Sojli and Tham (2011) and Fernandes (2014) 
Thus far, all my evidences suggest SWFs neither improve firm performance nor cause any economic 
ill. Yet this finding contradicts to conclusion drawn in Sojli and Tham (2011) and Fernandes (2014), 
which find that SWFs improve firm value, measured by Q via channels of new growth opportunities in 
the home country of SWFs. 
To further understand this discrepancy, I use Model (1.1) to re-examine whether SWFs lead to any 
incremental increase in Q compared to a control group matched by 2-digit SIC, host country, and ROA, 
a similar control group used by aforementioned two papers. Table 1.6 reports the results. In Column 1 
and 2, I maintain the five percent cut-off level. I neither observe any incremental change indicated by 
SWFAfter nor any prior-investment difference in average between SWFs target firms and control group 
18 
 
indicated by SWF. Next, I lower the threshold to one percent, which is employed by Fernandes (2014). 
SWF becomes positive and statistically significant, but there is still no support for any improvement 
resulted from SWFs investment. Similar pattern emerges once I fully relax stake threshold. While mean 
stake size decreases, the statistical significance grows for indicators that capture SWF-related difference 
of firm operation prior to the presence of SWFs as shareholders, i.e. SWFBefore-2 and SWFBefore-1.  
These findings reveal two characteristics with respect to SWFs' investment strategies. First, different 
target selection criteria are applied to purchases of large block size (≥ five percent) and purchases of tiny 
stake (< fiver percent) but in a wider range of equities. Second, in the latter type of purchase, SWFs 
select target firms that have high growth prospective prior to their investment, which introduces a self-
selection bias into the estimation of aforementioned two studies.  Fernandes (2014) used Heckman 
selection model and two-stage regressions to address this self-selection issue. This technique might have 
not fully addressed the disproportionately presence of large sub-sample of firms where SWFs lack 
incentive or power to play any active role. Regarding Sojli and Tham (2011), their usage of SEC 13-
Filings does not rule out the possibility that SWFs accumulate their holding via very small but frequent 
allocation. Thus, it is challenging to distinguish whether SWFs select firms with good market valuation 
or SWFs actively improve target firm performance. 
[Insert Table 1.6 Here] 
1.4. Discussion 
1.4.1. Do no-change results mean shirking from monitoring? 
The absence of significant impact does not mean SWFs shirk their responsibility to monitor when 
they are entitled to. Note that the type of firms preferred by SWFs are large firms listed in developed 
financial markets that pay high dividend. The existing ownership structure of these well-established 
firms implies their stock shares are not always readily available in large amount for potential investors. 
As predicted by Dhillon and Rossetto (2015), initial control shareholder or active block holders do not 
easily put their right for sell only if their slice of firm profit offsets active monitoring cost. Thus, SWFs 
may only be able to obtain stock shares from liquid shareholders on open market or through private 
negotiation, unless the initially pivot shareholder, being a single majority holder or multiple 
blockholders, agrees to tender new shares or put their control right for sale. If SWFs buy shares from 
liquid shareholders, it is just a switch of hands of non-influential shareholders.11 If SWFs obtain shares 
from a former blockholder though private negotiation, SWFs are likely to monitor only to the extend the 
slice of profit compensates the cost of monitoring. 
 
                                                          
11 I do not exclude the mechanism of governance through trading Edmans and Manso (2011) 
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1.4.2. Reconcile with small but positive valuation effect of SWFs investment 
Up to this point, I find that SWFs do not cause major change in firm operation. It seems they aim to 
just partake stable profit from well-established firms, where the cost of monitoring is affordable to SWFs. 
In fact, this motive is logically reconciled to the positive yet small market reaction towards SWFs 
investment (Dewenter et al. 2010; Kotter and Lel, 2011; Bortolotti et al., 2015; Karolyi and Liao, 2017). 
A plausible yet unverified driver for this valuation effect could be undervaluation. Through investing in 
a firm, SWFs signals to the market that the firm is underpriced, which, if recognized by the market, 
would lead to upward price correction. This adjustment is however small because investors rationally 
anticipate SWFs' limited role in making any big change in those firms. This explanation differs from the 
view of Dewenter et al. (2010) that the observed net valuation effect is a trade-off between an actively 
harmful and an actively beneficial role of SWFs. 
1.4.3. Do we take the right perspective to understand SWFs' motives and impacts? 
Most of studies on SWFs' motives and impacts, including the present work, have only looked at 
listed firms. While I can conclude that SWFs do not impact the economic gain accrued to global 
shareholders, I cannot exclude the possibility that SWFs may affect how the economic gain accrued to 
government is split among different country players. Neither can I generalize the no-impact conclusion 
to other asset classes of SWFs, such as private firms. Unfortunately, data limitation makes it more 
difficult to conduct deep empirical analysis in that regard. Therefore, I resort to two mini case-studies 
of Middle East SWFs, who have similar political agendas to diversify the economy beyond oil and gas 
exports but adopt different approaches to execute it. 
The first case concerns Mubadala, a wholly-owned subsidiary located in Abu Dhabi and controlled 
by the SWF of the United Arab Emirates, and its investment in Advanced Micro Devices (AMD). On 
November 16 of 2007, AMD announced that Mubadala took an 8.1 percent stake in AMD. Mubadala 
CEO and Managing Director, Khaldoon Khalifa Al Mubarak, stated that investing in AMD fit 
Mubadala's investment goal to seek for long-term growth and value creation. AMD Chairman and CEO 
Hector Ruiz stressed that this was a non-controlling, minority investment and Mubadala would not 
receive any board representation as part of the deal. Nonetheless, this investment made Mubadala the 
single largest shareholder of AMD. In subsequent years, Mubadala participated in AMD's multi-year 
plan to divest its manufacturing arm. In 2009, a partnership between AMD and the technology unite of 
Mubadala launched Globalfoundries, a leading full-service semiconductor design, development, 
fabrication and innovation company. Since 2012, Globalfoundries is 100 percent owned by Mubadala. 
Though Mubadala owns the entire manufacturing business of AMD globally, till 2015 Mubadala has 
not shifted any existing plant to Abu Dhabi or launched any new plant in the Middle East at large. 
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The other case concerns the Omani State General Reserve Fund (SGRF) and its serial investments 
in high-tech private firms. On October 31 of 2016, SGRF acquired a 32.2 percent stake in Mecanizados 
Escribano, a Madrid-based private firm specializing in the manufacture of precision mechanical 
components and develops its own systems for the aerospace and defense sectors. Abdulsalam al 
Murshidi, the executive president of SGRF, openly stated that "(the agreement) is to replicate 
Mecanizados Escribano's business model in Oman, with respect to machining capabilities and 
technologies, but encompassing it to the startup of the local business. This will no doubt help create a 
lot of job opportunities and train our national cadres to work in this booming sector.".12 This invest-and-
replicate approach has been adopted in earlier investments of SGRF. For example, in August 2011, 
SGRF invested in GlassPoint, a California-based firm specializing in solar steam generators for the oil 
and gas industry. Soon after that, a plant was built in South Oman. In February 2012, regional 
headquarters of GlassPoint were set up in Oman. 
These two distinct cases indicate that, even though SWFs do have political agendas, it is not global 
shareholders whose interests are at risk. Rather, it is the other stakeholders of target firms with whom 
SWFs may have conflicts of interests. More precisely, SWFs may encounter conflict with the 
governments of host countries who want to retain technological innovation, employment, and tax 
revenue at home. This type of conflict among country players is a promising direction for future research, 
in which private firms and subsidiaries of multinational firms serve as a valid topic of study. 
1.5. Conclusion 
This chapter seeks to resolve the debate on whether SWFs politically distort firm performance by 
focusing on firms in which SWFs take a substantial stake and searching for evidence of real effects. 
Previous beliefs that SWFs harm or improve firm performance should be reformulated once stake size 
is carefully considered. SWFs rarely seek controlling or influential stakes in a firm. I find no evidence 
that SWFs as shareholders affect firm' real investment level, sales growth, or operation efficiency at a 
consolidated accounting level. To wit, SWFs do not affect economic gain accrued to global investors. 
Since my primary goal is to reconcile the existing debate on the motives and real effect of SWFs, 
this work is subject to three limitations. The first limitation is that systematic evidence is limited to listed 
firms. Thus, the no-impact conclusion should not be generalized to other asset classes invested by SWFs, 
such as private firms and subsidiaries of multinational firms. As a remedy, I provide case-study evidence 
that reflects the influence of SWFs on firm choices of business location. Based on that, I propose that 
future research should focus on the conflicts of interest between SWFs and other country players in 
terms of technology transfer, employment, and tax revenue. To advance research in this direction, 
private firms and subsidiaries of global firms are suitable subjects for future study. The second limitation 
                                                          
12 Source: October 31, 2016, "Oman sovereign wealth fund buys into Spanish manufacturer Escribano", www.reuters.com. 
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is that this work is unable to conduct analysis with respect to actual portfolios of SWFs due to the lack 
of data. I relied on absolute stake size thresholds to spot firms where hidden impact of SWFs can appear. 
Alternatively, SWFs would be more inclined to impact target firms not because their stake size is larger 
but because the deal value represents a larger share of their own portfolios. This caveat is hard to 
overcome unless SWFs are obliged to continuously disclose their detailed asset allocation. The third 
limitation is that I do not consider firm payout policy, as I focus on the metric of operating performance 
predicted by prior theories to reflect political impact. In fact, there is a possibility that SWFs intend to 
push firms to return more cash to shareholders to partake more profit from listed firms, though this is an 
issue best left for future research. 
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Table 1.1: Stake size distribution 
This table compares the distribution of stake size taken by SWFs to that of non-government financial investors who share the 
same home and host countries with SWFs. The sample period of investment deals is from 1989 to 2012. Panel A reports the 
overall descriptive statistics for stake bought in the deal. The upper part of Panel B decomposes sample by national border: 
deals where target firms locate in the same country as the investor(Domestic), where targets firms locate in a different country 
from the investor(Cross-border). The lower part of Panel B decompose stake bought by 1-digit SIC industries. *, **, and *** 
indicate variable mean is significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
Panel A.       
  N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
SWFs 577 4.09 0.50 9.20 0.00 100.00 
Non-government 
financial investors 1720 16.28 10.00 17.32 0.02 100.00 
    Mean difference t-stat -20.95*** 
    Median rank z-stat -27.73*** 
 
Panel B.          
  SWFs   Non-government financial investors 
  N % of N Mean Median   N % of N Mean Median 
Domestic 34 6.34% 16.66 11.34  1436 83.49% 15.79 9.78 
Cross-border 502 93.66% 3.57 0.56  284 16.51% 18.75 12.38 
          
By one-digit SIC code classification        
          
Agriculture, forest, fishing 5 0.87% 3.59 0.58  22 1.27% 10.75 7.63 
Construction 18 3.12% 3.69 1.59  70 4.03% 18.09 12.69 
Finance, insurance, and real estate 102 17.68% 5.8 0.64  213 12.27% 21.33 12.91 
Manufacturing 211 36.57% 2.46 0.25  574 33.06% 16.08 10 
Mining 35 6.07% 4.71 0.63  401 23.10% 13.68 9.37 
Public administration 2 0.35% 1.7 1.7      
Retail trade 36 6.24% 5.25 0.55  59 3.40% 15.49 8.8 
Services 68 11.79% 2.53 0.38  225 12.96% 15.44 9.79 
Transportation and public utility 87 15.08% 5.57 0.26  101 5.82% 18.19 10.28 
Wholesale trade 13 2.25% 9.26 3.32   71 4.09% 18.46 10.15 
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics and univariate results of firm operation performance 
This table reports summary statistics of key accounting variables in Panel A and univariate test results of firm operation 
performance in Panel B. In Panel A, SWFs are target firms invested by SWFs. Universe are the rest of firms in Worldscope. 
The sample period of investment deals is from 1989 to 2012. Accounting data is aggregated under event window three years 
before and five years after the investment event. CapexPPE is capital expenditures scaled by the net balance of property, plants 
and equipment at year start. ROA is operating income over total assets at year end. SalesGrowth is yearly change in net sales. 
Q is Tobin's q, computed as the sum (total assets-book equity + market capitalization) divided by total assets at year end. CfTA, 
DebtTA and DvdTA are net operating cash flow, paid dividend and financial debt scaled by total assets at year start. TA and 
MktCap are natural logarithm of total assets and market capitalization at year end. All are winsorized at the 5th and 95th 
percentiles throughout the analysis. Relevant variables are converted into U.S. dollar. Panel B reports the industry-adjusted 
CapexPPE, SalesGrowth, ROA, and Q of target companies from three years prior to the year of SWFs investment (t) to three 
years afterwards (t+3). Each performance measure is defined as the difference between its value and the average value of 
Universe from the same SIC 2-digit industry classification. The first row shows results for my full sample. The second row is 
for majority interest purchase. The third row is for purchases of influential stake size between 5% and 50%. *, **, and *** 
indicate variable mean is significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
Panel A           
  SWFs   Universe SWFs-Universe 
t-stat   N Mean Median Std. Dev.   N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
CapexPPE 565 0.57 0.3 0.71  290,744 0.43 0.19 0.61 0.227*** 
SalesGrowth 387 0.12 0.1 0.28  140,816 0.14 0.08 0.4 -0.039*** 
ROA 481 0.22 0.17 0.18  305,907 0.29 0.17 0.35 -0.089*** 
Q 529 1.55 1.18 1.28  299,694 1.47 0.92 1.48 0.082*** 
CfTA 524 0.12 0.1 0.12  277,025 0.11 0.06 0.27 0.005*** 
DebtTA 534 0.2 0.17 0.17  303,983 0.31 0.13 0.29 -0.123 
TA 565 11.5 11.5 2.62  319,755 9.05 9.63 3.39 3.648*** 
MktCap 529 11.43 11.46 2.49  292,775 8.68 9.3 3.36 3.670*** 
DvdTA 349 0.01 0.01 0.01   365,402 0 0 0.02 0.008*** 
 
Panel B          
  Before   After   Before - After 
  t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3    
CapexPPE          
Full sample 0.41*** 0.46*** 0.51*** 0.41*** 0.32*** 0.29*** 0.22***  -0.13 
50%-100% 0.76* 0.54** 0.61** 0.50* 0.26** 0.18 -0.04  -0.41 
5%-50% 0.37*** 0.42*** 0.46*** 0.40*** 0.38*** 0.31*** 0.23***  -0.13 
          
SalesGrowth          
Full sample -0.03 0.03 0.08 -0.11 -0.04 -0.01 0.06  0.05 
50%-100% -0.13*** 0.13 -0-02 -0.35** 0.03 -0.14* 0.27***  0.17*** 
5%-50% -0.03 0.03 0.09 -0.07 -0.05 -0.08 0.05  0.00 
          
ROA          
Full sample -0.07***   -0.12***   -0.13***   -0.14***   -0.13***   -0.13***   -0.15***    0.00 
50%-100% -0.08 -0.05 -0.11** -0.12** -0.17*** -0.06 -0.1  0.00 
5%-50% -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.15***  0.00 
          
Q          
Full sample -0.38* 0.1 0.15 -0.34*** 0.13 0.17 0.12  0.00 
50%-100% -0.46* -0.51* -0.54 -0.41 -0.36 -0.29 -0.37  0.00 
5%-50% -0.17* -0.1 -0.15 -0.32*** -0.12 -0.17 -0.12   0.00 
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Table 1.3: Do SWFs affect firm performance? Baseline regression results 
 (Continued) 
This table reports estimation results of Model (1.1) for an event window [-3year,+5year] around SWFs investment events from 
1989 to 2012. The sample only include firms in which SWFs invest no less than five percent and their benchmarks. SWF is a 
time-invariant dummy that equals one for firms that are going to be invested by SWFs at some point in the sample period and 
equals zero for benchmark firms. After is a dummy that equals one for both SWF target firms and benchmark firms during the 
[+1Year,+5Year] event window period. SWFAfter is an interaction term of the former two. Panel A display results for the 
dependent variable CapexPPE, Panel B for SalesGrowth, Panel C for ROA. In Column 1, I benchmark results against an 
average of all firms from Worldscope that have not been invested by SWFs. In Column 2, I use a control group of firms matched 
by 2-digit SIC number and host country. In Column 3, I use a control group of firms matched by total assets. In Column 4, the 
control group is built by matching firms to previous two criteria plus a third factor, i.e. one of firm-level performance measures. 
In Panel A (CapexPPE), this third matching factor is ROA, in Panel B (SalesGrowth) ROA, and in Panel C (ROA) Q. Column 
5 uses the same benchmark as in Column 1 and tests explicitly changes at time points -2year, -1year, 1year, and 2year. The 
standard errors are in brackets and adjusted for heteroscedasticity and within-firm clustering. *, **, and *** indicate coefficients 
are significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
Panel A: CapexPPE     
  Baseline 
SIC 
& 
Country 
Size ROA Short dynamics 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SWF 0.461*** 0.414*** 0.444*** 0.430***  
 [0.073] [0.082] [0.081] [0.088]  
After -0.022*** 0.006 0.002 -0.006  
 [0.004] [0.011] [0.026] [0.030]  
SWFAfter -0.007 -0.064 -0.059 -0.031  
 [0.070] [0.079] [0.077] [0.084]  
SWFBefore-2 (1)     0.439* 
     [0.088] 
SWFBefore-1 (2)     0.531* 
     [0.090] 
SWFAfter1 (3)     0.526* 
     [0.084] 
SWFAfter2 (4)     0.467* 
     [0.089] 
CfTAt-1 0.278*** 0.114* 0.560* 0.628* 0.248* 
 [0.013] [0.049] [0.216] [0.217] [0.013] 
Qt-1 0.050*** 0.082*** 0.051* 0.078* 0.058* 
 [0.002] [0.006] [0.023] [0.028] [0.002] 
TAt-1 -0.015*** -0.017***  -0.013 -0.018* 
 [0.001] [0.002]  [0.012] [0.001] 
IndustryQt-1 0.166*** 0.117*** 0.143*** 0.132*** 0.166*** 
 [0.008] [0.009] [0.021] [0.022] [0.008] 
Constant 0.227*** 0.549*** 0.284*** 0.443* 0.471* 
  [0.015] [0.026] [0.037] [0.154] [0.010] 
Observations 188637 21080 2360 2356 188637 
adj-R2 0.064 0.047 0.085 0.08 0.056 
p:(1)=(3)     0.361 
p:(1)=(4)     0.799 
p:(2)=(3)     0.952 
p:(2)=(4)         0.515 
 
  
28 
 
Table 1.3: Do SWFs affect firm performance? Baseline regression results 
(Continued) 
Panel B: SalesGrowth     
  Baseline 
SIC 
& 
Country 
Size ROA Short dynamics 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SWF -0.066 0.041 0.027 0.031  
 [0.035] [0.031] [0.040] [0.046]  
After -0.066*** 0.029*** 0.030 0.042  
 [0.003] [0.007] [0.026] [0.032]  
SWFAfter 0.070 -0.057 -0.070 -0.071  
 [0.046] [0.041] [0.050] [0.056]  
SWFBefore-2 (1)     0.071 
     [0.067] 
SWFBefore-1 (2)     0.075 
     [0.074] 
SWFAfter1 (3)     -0.024 
     [0.052] 
SWFAfter2 (4)     -0.106 
     [0.067] 
SalesGrowtht-1 0.017*** 0.050*** -0.194*** -0.204*** 0.023*** 
 [0.005] [0.015] [0.045] [0.044] [0.005] 
CapexPPEt-1 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.027 0.010 0.060*** 
 [0.003] [0.007] [0.023] [0.018] [0.003] 
CashTAt-1 0.111*** 0.131*** 0.195** 0.253** 0.110*** 
 [0.006] [0.018] [0.074] [0.080] [0.006] 
TAt-1 -0.000 -0.002**  -0.006 -0.001** 
 [0.000] [0.001]  [0.004] [0.000] 
IndustryQt-1 0.071*** 0.028*** 0.077*** 0.115*** 0.075*** 
 [0.004] [0.005] [0.021] [0.028] [0.004] 
Constant 0.023** -0.008 -0.064 -0.042 -0.028*** 
  [0.008] [0.017] [0.060] [0.067] [0.007] 
Observations 89430 9010 1105 1022 89430 
adj-R2 0.033 0.044 0.048 0.065 0.027 
p:(1)=(3)     0.310 
p:(1)=(4)     0.059 
p:(2)=(3)     0.247 
p:(2)=(4)         0.059 
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Table 1.3: Do SWFs affect firm performance? Baseline regression results 
Panel C: ROA      
  Baseline 
SIC 
& 
Country 
Size Q Short dynamics 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SWF -0.108*** -0.044 -0.060* -0.054  
 [0.025] [0.024] [0.025] [0.032]  
After 0.004 0.027*** -0.014 0.030  
 [0.003] [0.006] [0.012] [0.017]  
SWFAfter -0.009 -0.026 0.021 -0.017  
 [0.020] [0.019] [0.021] [0.027]  
SWFBefore-2 (1)     -0.108*** 
     [0.028] 
SWFBefore-1 (2)     -0.115*** 
     [0.025] 
SWFAfter1 (3)     -0.116*** 
     [0.025] 
SWFAfter2 (4)     -0.102*** 
     [0.024] 
SalesGrowtht-1 -0.023*** 0.014 0.011 0.014 -0.024*** 
 [0.003] [0.009] [0.011] [0.017] [0.003] 
CapexPPEt-1 0.064*** 0.023* -0.004 0.026 0.064*** 
 [0.006] [0.008] [0.019] [0.025] [0.006] 
TAt-1 -0.016*** -0.021***  -0.010* -0.016*** 
 [0.001] [0.001]  [0.004] [0.001] 
IndustryQt-1 0.036*** 0.063*** 0.122*** 0.143*** 0.036*** 
 [0.007] [0.005] [0.022] [0.021] [0.007] 
Constant 0.377*** 0.350*** 0.191* 0.117 0.380*** 
  [0.014] [0.016] [0.062] [0.060] [0.013] 
Observations 84440 8325 1056 987 84440 
adj-R2 0.055 0.195 0.123 0.230 0.055 
p:(1)=(3)     0.715 
p:(1)=(4)     0.845 
p:(2)=(3)     0.956 
p:(2)=(4)         0.645 
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Table 1.4: Do SWFs affect firm performance? Sensitivity to stake size thresholds 
This table reports estimation results at different stake thresholds of Model (1.1) for an event window [-3year,+5year] around SWFs investment events from 1989 to 2012. Only target firms of 
SWFs are included in the model. After is a dummy that equals one for both SWF target firms during the [+1Year,+5Year] event window period. Column 1-4 display results for the dependent 
variable CapexPPE, Column 5-7 for SalesGrowth, Column 8-10 for ROA. For each dependent variable, I start with all target firms in which SWFs invest no less than five percent, Then I increase 
the threshold by five percent at a step the number of target firms drop under 30. The standard errors are in brackets and adjusted for heteroscedasticity and within-firm clustering. *, **, and *** 
indicate coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
 CapexPPE  SalesGrowth  ROA 
  Stake ≥ 5% Stake ≥ 10% Stake ≥ 15% Stake ≥ 20%  Stake ≥ 5% Stake ≥ 10% Stake ≥ 15%  Stake ≥ 5% Stake ≥ 10% Stake ≥ 15% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) (10) 
After -0.022 0 -0.039 -0.086  -0.023 -0.043 -0.106  -0.004 -0.035* -0.02 
 [0.072] [0.103] [0.115] [0.132]  [0.049] [0.053] [0.057]  [0.019] [0.014] [0.015] 
CfTAt-1 0.603 0.263 -0.097 0.236         
 [0.315] [0.474] [0.650] [0.918]         
Qt-1 0.072 0.1 0.045 -0.058         
 [0.037] [0.056] [0.089] [0.105]         
SalesGrowtht-1      -0.250** -0.387*** -0.315*  -0.003 0.009 0.021* 
      [0.084] [0.103] [0.126]  [0.017] [0.013] [0.010] 
CapexPPEt-1      0.039 -0.039 -0.101*  -0.031* -0.007 -0.01 
      [0.041] [0.044] [0.040]  [0.014] [0.012] [0.016] 
CashTAt-1      0.408* 0.307 0.36     
      [0.177] [0.191] [0.207]     
TAt-1 0.014 0.019 0.032 -0.005  -0.007 0.001 0.003  -0.022 -0.001 -0.004 
 [0.019] [0.029] [0.035] [0.041]  [0.011] [0.016] [0.023]  [0.013] [0.005] [0.006] 
IndustryQt-1 0.070 0.306 0.595* 0.896  -0.064 0.016 0.178  0.100* 0.031 0.032 
 [0.149] [0.239] [0.261] [0.557]  [0.074] [0.125] [0.147]  [0.049] [0.027] [0.037] 
Constant 0.414 0.038 -0.44 -0.322  0.262 0.146 -0.025  0.320* 0.103 0.13 
  [0.352] [0.488] [0.572] [0.958]   [0.211] [0.279] [0.291]   [0.137] [0.069] [0.094] 
Observations 565 300 183 110  282 137 94  278 140 97 
adj-R2 0.018 0.02 0.03 0.026  0.071 0.115 0.082  0.214 0.057 0.029 
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Table 1.5: Do political SWFs harm firm performance? Multivariate results  
(Continued) 
This table reports estimation results of Model (1.1) for an event window [-3year,+5year] around SWFs investment events from 
1989 to 2012. The sample include target firms in real sectors invested by SWFs and benchmarked non-government financial 
investors.  SWF is a time-invariant dummy that equals one for firms that are going to be invested by SWFs at some point in 
the sample period and equals zero for benchmark firms. After is a dummy that equals one for both SWF target firms and 
benchmark firms during the [+1Year,+5Year] event window period. Political is a dummy that equals one for firms, the investors 
of which are from countries where political interference is likely, according to Table 2 of Bortolotti, Fotak, and 
Megginson(2015). Panel A display results for the dependent variable SalesGrowth, Panel B for ROA, Panel C for Q. Column 
(1)-(3) cover an event window [-3year,+5year] around SWFs investment events. Column (4)-(6) only keep the third year after 
SWFs investment. Column (2) and (5) contain target firms where SWFs or benchmarked private financial investor purchase no 
less than 5 percent, in Column (3) and (6) no less than 10 percent. The standard errors are in brackets and adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity and within-firm clustering. *, **, and *** indicate coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 
0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
Panel A. SalesGrowth      
  
[-3Year, +5Year] [-3Year, +5Year] 
stake ≥ 5% 
[-3Year, +5Year] 
stake ≥ 10% 
Year 3 Year 3 
stake ≥ 5% 
Year 3 
stake ≥ 10% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SWF 0.015 -0.034 -0.034 0.134* 0.035 0.014 
 [0.037] [0.066] [0.109] [0.064] [0.075] [0.084] 
After 0.001 -0.009 -0.03    
 [0.044] [0.048] [0.064]    
SWFAfter -0.01 -0.071 -0.073    
 [0.046] [0.065] [0.075]    
SWFAfterPolitical 0.071* 0.134 0.089 -0.055 -0.01 0.534** 
 [0.031] [0.086] [0.055] [0.045] [0.139] [0.177] 
SalesGrowtht-1 -0.127*** -0.168** -0.221*** -0.071 -0.084 -0.252*** 
 [0.029] [0.052] [0.057] [0.070] [0.084] [0.055] 
CapexPPEt-1 0.024 0.033 0.023 0.002 -0.008 -0.146*** 
 [0.013] [0.024] [0.036] [0.032] [0.044] [0.029] 
CashTAt-1 0.131** 0.108 0.108 -0.078 0.026 0.361** 
 [0.042] [0.065] [0.070] [0.113] [0.127] [0.109] 
TAt-1 0 0.008 0.016 0.023* 0.03 0.042* 
 [0.006] [0.012] [0.020] [0.011] [0.016] [0.019] 
Constant 0.064 -0.207 -0.053 -0.121 0.003 0.011 
  [0.089] [0.186] [0.236] [0.182] [0.276] [0.284] 
Observations 358748 88507 48002 26118 8508 5130 
adj-R2 0.047 0.074 0.105 0.47 0.568 0.815 
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Table 1.5: Do political SWFs harm firm performance? Multivariate results 
Panel B. ROA       
  
[-3Year, +5Year] [-3Year, +5Year] 
stake ≥ 5% 
[-3Year, +5Year] 
stake ≥ 10% 
Year 3 Year 3 
stake ≥ 5% 
Year 3 
stake ≥ 10% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SWF 0.073** -0.013 -0.057 0.099** 0.115 -0.02 
 [0.027] [0.030] [0.054] [0.037] [0.060] [0.091] 
After 0.02 0.011 0.016    
 [0.015] [0.015] [0.019]    
SWFAfter -0.022 -0.003 -0.007    
 [0.015] [0.025] [0.036]    
SWFAfterPolitical -0.035 -0.018 0.002 -0.013 -0.081 0.155 
 [0.029] [0.033] [0.031] [0.041] [0.068] [0.117] 
SalesGrowtht-1 0.02 0.033** 0.028 0.004 0.014 0.092 
 [0.011] [0.016] [0.018] [0.053] [0.075] [0.056] 
CapexPPEt-1 -0.015 -0.026** -0.022 -0.011 -0.036 -0.062** 
 [0.008] [0.011] [0.012] [0.025] [0.032] [0.023] 
TAt-1 -0.024*** -0.01 -0.030** -0.042*** -0.044** -0.040** 
 [0.006] [0.008] [0.012] [0.011] [0.015] [0.019] 
Constant 0.440*** 0.406** 0.588** 0.610*** 0.327 0.447 
 [0.099] [0.151] [0.189] [0.144] [0.267] [0.235] 
Observations 340795 91462 50472 24797 8500 5132 
adj-R2 0.369 0.236 0.343 0.485 0.494 0.754 
 
Panel C. Tobin’s q       
  
[-3Year, +5Year] [-3Year, +5Year] 
stake ≥ 5% 
[-3Year, +5Year] 
stake ≥ 10% 
Year 3 Year 3 
stake ≥ 5% 
Year 3 
stake ≥ 10% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SWF 0.239 0.206 -0.013 0.141 0.253 0.344 
 [0.195] [0.317] [0.572] [0.177] [0.235] [0.271] 
After -0.122 -0.079 -0.055    
 [0.115] [0.119] [0.164]    
SWFAfter 0.143 0.031 -0.013    
 [0.121] [0.152] [0.200]    
SWFAfterPolitical 0.036 0.18 0.46 -0.383 -0.59 0.115 
 [0.175] [0.240] [0.309] [0.252] [0.404] [0.628] 
SalesGrowtht-1 -0.058 -0.182 -0.069 0.501** 0.306 0.924** 
 [0.080] [0.105] [0.125] [0.233] [0.350] [0.220] 
ROAt-1 1.636** 0.6 -0.81 2.426** 1.971** 0.611 
 [0.291] [0.575] [0.705] [0.562] [0.595] [0.383] 
DebtTAt-1 -0.127 0.16 0.459 -0.32 -1.462** 0.738 
 [0.211] [0.519] [0.970] [0.370] [0.736] [0.443] 
TAt-1 -0.208** -0.226** -0.331** -0.017 0.037 -0.169** 
 [0.035] [0.056] [0.105] [0.048] [0.053] [0.048] 
Constant 3.938** 4.213** 5.672** 1.801** 0.388 2.161** 
 [0.548] [0.838] [1.342] [0.657] [0.855] [0.702] 
Observations 339944 91447 50325 24795 8499 5001 
adj-R2 0.295 0.25 0.313 0.5 0.59 0.825 
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Table 1.6: Do SWFs create or select value? Multivariate results 
This table reports estimation results of the association between Tobin's q and SWFs becoming shareholders based on Model 
(1.1) for an event window [-3year,+5year] around SWFs investment events between 1989 and 2012. The dependent variable is 
$Q$. In Column 1-2, I keep target firms in which SWFs invest more than five percent. In Column 3-4, the stake threshold is 
decreased to one percent. In Column 5-6, I use the full sample. The benchmark is a control group matched by 2-digit SIC, host 
country, and ROA. The standard errors are in brackets and adjusted for heteroscedasticity and within-firm clustering. *, **, 
and *** indicate coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
  Stake ≥ 5% Stake ≥ 5% Stake ≥ 1% Stake ≥ 1% All stake All stake 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SWF 0.079  0.215**  0.350***  
 [0.138]  [0.093]  [0.060]  
After -0.123  -0.076  0.011  
 [0.074]  [0.053]  [0.028]  
SWFAfter 0.109  0.069  -0.009  
 [0.125]  [0.098]  [0.057]  
SWFBefore-2 (1)  0.374  0.348**  0.333*** 
  [0.208]  [0.120]  [0.068] 
SWFBefore-1 (2)  0.102  0.270**  0.301*** 
  [0.150]  [0.106]  [0.062] 
SWFAfter1 (3)  0.112  0.277**  0.342*** 
  [0.129]  [0.101]  [0.063] 
SWFAfter2 (4)  0.156  0.213  0.324*** 
  [0.125]  [0.110]  [0.068] 
SalesGrowtht-1 0.058 0.056 0.067 0.064 0.160*** 0.158*** 
 [0.067] [0.067] [0.049] [0.049] [0.036] [0.036] 
DebtTAt-1 -0.242 -0.241 -0.057 -0.066 -0.125 -0.127** 
 [0.201] [0.200] [0.142] [0.141] [0.064] [0.064] 
TAt-1 -0.086*** -0.086*** -0.092*** -0.089*** -0.067*** -0.060*** 
 [0.016] [0.016] [0.013] [0.013] [0.008] [0.007] 
Constant 2.158*** 2.104*** 2.226*** 2.184*** 1.816*** 1.784*** 
 [0.205] [0.207] [0.167] [0.168] [0.079] [0.078] 
Observations 1041 1041 2268 2268 5872 5872 
adj-R2 0.067 0.066 0.06 0.058 0.049 0.044 
p:(1)=(3)  0.238  0.558  0.888 
p:(1)=(4)  0.311  0.312  0.904 
p:(2)=(3)  0.941  0.947  0.506 
p:(2)=(4)   0.713   0.673   0.737 
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Chapter 2: Do financial bidders exploit underpricing as a motive in acquisitions? 
2.1. Introduction 
Financial bidders pay an average premium of about 35 percent in acquisitions even though they do 
not benefit from operational synergies with target firms.13 How do they justify such premiums? Their 
ability to unlock significant value is typically attributed to two main factors. First, to the operational 
improvements that financial acquirers can implement after the acquisition. Existing studies show that 
financial bidders are especially good at acquiring mismanaged firms and improving their operations and 
governance (Gorbenko and Malenko, 2014; Hege, Lovo, Solvin, and Sushka, 2013). And second, to the 
benefit they obtain from the heavy use of debt financing at favorable terms (Axelson, Jenkinson, 
Strömberg, and Weisbach, 2013; Guo, Hotchkiss, and Song, 2011; Martos-Vila, Rhodes-Kropf, and 
Harford, 2013). An alternative plausible hypothesis is that financial bidders are skilled at identifying 
mispriced targets whose prospects are not clearly understood by the market. Under this hypothesis, 
mispricing creates a profit opportunity and financial acquirers can benefit by acquiring firms whose 
market value is below its fundamental value. 14,15 Although theoretically appealing, in practice, it is not 
clear whether such opportunities exist, whether they can be successfully exploited and if so, whether 
financial acquirers are the smart investors. In this study, we aim to explore these questions. 
Profit opportunities may exist to the extent that market values deviate from intrinsic values. Market 
values should reflect intrinsic values; however, there can be moments where the two are misaligned and 
watchful investors can benefit from that. In this respect, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf 
and Viswanathan (2004) develop theories where stock market misvaluation, interpreted as mispricing 
or valuation errors, drives acquisition activity. Several other papers provide empirical support (see, e.g. 
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan, 2005; Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh, 2006; and 
Edmans et al., 2012). Even if valuation errors may affect the stock price of any firm, deviations from 
intrinsic values may be more prevalent in less efficient markets or when information asymmetries are 
particularly important. Thus, if acquirers can successfully benefit from mispricing, we would expect that 
they do so especially in acquisitions where the target is subject to larger information asymmetries. 
To the extent that profits opportunities can be successfully exploited, we hypothesize that the 
identity of the acquirer may matter. In the absence of synergistic gains, financial bidders may specialize 
or may be more skilled at exploiting mispricing. Dittmar, Li, and Nain (2012) suggest that financial 
bidders are particularly skilled at identifying undervalued targets. That financial acquirers are good at 
                                                          
13 For instance, both Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter (2008) and Gorbenko and Malenko (2014) document a premium of 35 percent 
offered by financial bidders. 
14 In this study, acquirer refers indistinctively to bidder who fails or succeeds in completing a takeover bid. Undervaluation refers indistinctively 
to mismanagement and/or mispricing.  
15 Gaughan (2014) in Chapter 8 “Private equity market” explain that “Privat equity funds seek out investments that are undervalued”. 
Damodaran (2001) in Chapter 25 “Motives for acquisitions” refers to undervaluation as a motive driving acquisitions by financial acquirers.  
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identifying undervalued targets is also prevalent in professional circles. 16  Alternatively, financial 
bidders may enjoy an information advantage that makes them be better placed to benefit from price 
deviations. In contrast, strategic acquirers focusing on synergistic gains may neglect other sources of 
gains or simply may not be so skilled at detecting mispricing. Both under the view that each type of 
bidder specializes in different sources of gains (Gorbenko and Malenko, 2014) or that it has differential 
skills (Dittmar et al., 2012), financial bidders are more likely to exploit and reveal mispricing.  
Testing our hypothesis is challenging because measuring mispricing is not straightforward. To date, 
existing studies have used different approaches to measure mispricing.  Some studies relate valuation 
ratios such as the market-to-book ratio to takeover premiums or the likelihood of being acquired to 
evaluate whether undervaluation motivates acquisition activity. Renneboog, Simons, and Wright (2007) 
show financial acquirers offer higher premiums for firms with low market-to-book ratios.17 With these 
findings, existing studies conclude that undervaluation is one of the motives behind acquisitions and a 
source of gains for financial acquirers. However, their main limitation is the use of valuation ratios that 
are both correlated to poor management and mispricing and therefore make a vague use of the term 
undervaluation to refer indistinctively to mispricing and mismanagement. Other studies have the goal 
of testing whether misevaluation, interpreted as mispricing, drives acquisition activity and use valuation 
ratios (Dong et al., 2006) or a decomposition of them (Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005) that depend on the 
estimation of fundamental values. These papers estimate fundamental values by using accounting-based 
valuation models to predict mispricing errors. With this approach, any interpretation critically rests on 
the estimation of fundamental values and the adequate integration of growth options and of managerial 
efficiency. Their main challenge rests on disentangling mispricing from other sources driving valuations 
such as the inefficient running of the firm or variation in growth options. Last, Edmans et al. (2012) use 
non-fundamental shocks to stock prices to infer valuation errors. 
To circumvent the above difficulties, we study acquisition bids that fail to complete. We estimate 
the market reaction from the announcement of the offer to the failure of the bid to evaluate whether the 
target price upon failure fully reverts to the pre-announcement price level or whether a revaluation effect 
remains. By construction, a potential revaluation should be unrelated to value-creation hypothesis 
because any value to be added by the envisioned takeover becomes invalid once the takeover attempt 
fails. Therefore, any potential revaluation can be read as a reassessment of the stand-alone value of the 
target and interpreted as ex-ante mispricing. 18 To further evaluate whether a potential revaluation is 
related to the identity of the acquirer, we compare the revaluation effect around failed bids by financial 
bidders to that of strategic bidders. In this set-up, according to our hypothesis, we would expect a larger 
                                                          
16 For example, The Strategic Secret of Private Equity, Harvard Business Review, September 2007. 
17 Dittmar et al. (2012) infer target undervaluation while examining bidder wealth effects. This approach does not distinguish either between a 
reassessment of value or value creation by the acquisition. 
18 We may not observe any revaluation effect even if mispricing is motivating an acquisition. This is when the announcement of the acquisition 
does not convey information to the market about the sources of gains. 
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revaluation effect for financial bidders. Since we posit that informational effects drive revaluation, we 
would also expect that the revaluation attached to financial bidders is more relevant when informational 
asymmetries are more likely to be at play. 
Our dataset includes a panel of 789 acquisition bids that failed over the period 1980-2015, of which, 
258 bids are initiated by financial acquirers and 531 by strategic acquirers. To start with we conduct an 
event study on target firm stock returns from the announcement of the bid to the announcement of the 
failure and evaluate whether there is any revaluation effect. Consistent with previous studies, we find 
that the target price upon failure does not fully revert to the pre-announcement price level and a positive 
revaluation remains. This revaluation is mostly associated to the identity of the bidder and it is 
significantly larger for failed bids initiated by financial bidders and when target firms are small. We 
interpret this finding as evidence that financial bidders seem to exploit mispricing opportunities to a 
larger extent than strategic bidders. Though, this profit opportunity seems to motivate acquisition bids 
only when information asymmetries are significant or in the presence of information advantage.  
Although our approach circumvents the need to estimate fundamental values, it is still subject to 
some challenges because the revaluation effect could be the product of other forces and not just a 
reflection of mispricing. First, we should be concerned with the possibility that selection into bid failure 
is different for deals involving financial bidders and targets with large information asymmetries from 
other failed deals. If an unobservable variable correlated with the type of bidder leads to failure, and 
simultaneously impacts the stock price, our findings may be biased. To address this concern, we collect 
and identify failure reasons and classify bids in two subgroups. Subgroup one includes bids whose 
failure reason may be correlated to target stock prices and the second subgroup includes bids that failed 
due to exogenous reasons and bid failures for which no relevant information was disclosed over the 
event window. In instances where new information is not conveyed to the market from the 
announcement of the offer to the announcement of the failure, we presume that failure itself is unlikely 
to be correlated to an abnormal price run up. We then re-do our analysis for the second subgroup and 
find a significantly larger revaluation effect for failed bids initiated by financial bidders and targeting 
small firms event when bids failed for exogenous reasons or in circumstances where no information was 
disclosed to the market. Furthermore, we also evaluate the distribution of failure reasons for bids 
launched by financial bidders for small firms and compare it to that of bids launched by strategic bidders.  
We do not find significant differences or that certain reasons appear more frequently for bids involving 
a given type of acquirer. We conclude that our findings are not driven by the possibility that selection 
into bid failure depends on the type of acquirer. 
Second, the revaluation effect could be the outcome of anticipation effects. Bradley, Desai, and Kim 
(1983) show that the revaluation effect could reflect the anticipation of future takeovers and thus target 
firms subject to failed bids may have a higher probability of being acquired in the future. In our set-up, 
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this would imply that the revaluation effect around unsuccessful bids by financial bidders for small 
target simply reflects that those targets are more likely to be acquired in the future, or be acquired at a 
higher speed or at a higher premium than other targets subject to unsuccessful bids. We perform a 
survival analysis and we also evaluate if a higher revaluation predicts a higher offer price and we do not 
find evidence supporting this conjecture. 
Alternatively, the revaluation effect could simply reflect the anticipation of future operational 
improvements by current management (Hirshleifer and Titman, 1990; Safieddine and Titman, 1999). 
To deal with this concern, we drop from the sample failed bids where targets are presumably more likely 
to have a margin for operational improvements such as hostile bids and bids that failed due to a rejection 
by the board of directors of the target firm. Our results remain unchanged. All in all, we do not find 
evidence that calls for an alternative interpretation of our findings. 
Our analysis contributes to several strands of the literature. First, we add to the literature that 
explores the motives driving acquisitions and the sources of acquisition gains and, in particular, to the 
literature that studies how financial acquirers justify their acquisition premiums. Previous studies 
document acquisition gains that emanate from improvements in sales and operating margin (Acharya, 
Gottschalg, Hahn, and Kehoe, 2013), from favorable debt financing terms (Axelson et al., 2013; Martos-
Vila et al., 2013), or from realized tax benefits and sector returns (Guo et al., 2011). Other studies show 
that misvaluation also drives acquisition activity (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2004, 
2005; Dong et al., 2006). This work shows that particularly underpricing motivates acquisitions 
especially when bidders are financial acquirers that target small firms. And as such, the identity of the 
bidder conveys information to the market about the stand-alone value of the target firm. 
We also contribute to the literature that evaluates the rational of the revaluation effect around 
unsuccessful takeovers (Bradley et al.,1983; Safieddine and Titman, 1999; Savor and Lu, 2009; 
Malmendier et al., 2016). More precisely, this work complements the findings in Malmendier et al. 
(2016) who show that revaluations are partly related to the information embedded in the medium of 
exchange. We show that revaluations are also and importantly related to the type of acquirer and the 
size of the target. Thus, the revaluation effect seems to be partly due to purely informational effects 
related to the identity of the acquirer and, to a lower extent, the medium of exchange. The informational 
effects conveyed by the identity of the acquirer seem to be more relevant than those conveyed by the 
medium of exchange when information asymmetries about the value of the target are significant or in 
the presence of an informational advantage.19 
                                                          
19 Our results also strengthen the role of informational effects as opposed to Bradley et al. (1983). Contrary to the results of their study, the 
informational effects seem to be larger than the synergy effects. If synergies would be the main driver of the revaluation effects, then we should 
have observed stronger revaluation for strategic acquirers. 
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Last, our results add some insights to studies that examine the differences between financial and 
strategic bidders (see, e.g., Gorbenko and Malenko, 2014; Dittmar et al., 2012; Bargeron et al., 2008).20 
In particular, Gorbenko and Malenko (2014) show that the two types of acquirers target different firms 
in auctions, suggesting that they are driven by different motives in acquisitions. To our knowledge, our 
study is the first to study informational effects attached to the identity of the buyer in the context of 
failed bids. By doing so, it reveals that underpricing seems to motivate financial bidders to engage in 
acquisitions and in the business of fishing underpriced firms. That is not the case for strategic bidders 
that are moved by other drivers when acquiring target firms.   
2.2. Review of the literature, contribution and hypothesis development 
2.2.1. Undervaluation as a motive in mergers 
We build on the idea that mispricing is, among others, a motive in acquisitions (Shleifer and Vishny, 
2003; Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2004, 2005; Dong et al., 2006). That stock market misvaluation encourages 
acquisitions is at the heart of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2004) models. While 
Shleifer and Vishny’s model generates a set of predictions, their prediction that undervalued firms 
become natural targets is the most relevant in our context.21 Thus, potential bidders are more likely to 
bid when they perceive that the target firm is underpriced by the market. This incentive is explained by 
information differences between bidders and outside investors. Consequently, outside investors 
observing that will bid up the target stock price.  
In this study, we propose that underpricing is especially a driving motive in the case of financial 
bidders. That is, bidder identity matters when it comes to exploiting inefficient valuation in the context 
of acquisitions. This is for two reasons: first, financial bidders need to exploit sources of value other 
than synergies and as such spotting underpricing may be at the center of their activities and second, they 
specialize and develop skills that they use to profit from buying underpriced targets. Thus, financial 
bidders may have both an incentive to specialize is exploiting pricing errors and an information 
advantage and those together will be more rewarding when target firms are exposed to larger information 
asymmetries. 
Various studies have attempted to empirically evaluate the predictions of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) 
and Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2004) models. For that, they have tackled the task of measuring mispricing. 
One approach uses valuation ratios such as the price-to-book or the price-to-residual value (Dong et al., 
2006) or their decomposition (Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005) to measure mispricing. For that, they need to 
estimate fundamental values and do so by using accounting-based valuation models to predict 
                                                          
20 Papers that study differences between financial and strategic bidders often evaluate announcement returns and related them to the identity of 
the acquirer (see, e.g., Bargeron et al. 2008; Dittmar et al. 2012; Hege et al. 2013). From a different perspective, Gorbenko and Malenko (2014) 
studies competition and bids within each auction and Fidrmuc et al (2012) compare the selling process of firms acquired by strategic acquirers 
to that of financial acquirers. 
21 They also predict that cash acquisitions are more likely when targets are undervalued. 
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mispricing errors. With this approach, any interpretation critically rests on the estimation of fundamental 
values and the adequate integration of growth options and of managerial efficiency. Their main 
challenge rests on disentangling mispricing from other sources driving valuations such as the inefficient 
running of the firm or variation in growth options.  
Regarding Shleifer and Vishny’s prediction that undervalued firms become natural targets, Rhodes-
Kropf et al. (2005) shows that cash targets are undervalued while stock targets are overvalued. In parallel, 
Dong et al. (2006) find that cash bids are associated to bidders willing to acquire undervalued targets. 
In face of this finding, Dong et al. (2006) also examine and rationalize why target shareholders would 
sell if the target firm is undervalued. They propose that target management should be willing to cash out 
in cases of lower undervaluation. Although it is possible that target management is pressed to sell even 
if underpricing is significant. This can happen if shareholders are excited about the offer premium and 
eager to cash out or if they receive side payments by bidders or alternatively, if they are less informed 
that bidders about the true value of the firm. In this sense, Dessaint, Foucault, and Frésard (2016) gives 
support to the later as they show that managers are not always able to filter out noise in prices and to 
distinguish fundamental from no fundamental changes in stock prices. Dong et al. (2006) findings are 
open to two interpretations: that it is target mispricing that motivates acquisitions or that it is the 
undervaluation related to inefficient management. With our tests we aim to disentangle and distinguish 
among the interpretations more sharply and evaluate whether the mispricing interpretation is valid. 
An alternative approach used by Barraclough, Robinson, Smith, and Whaley (2013) and Borochin 
(2014) consists on using option prices to estimate synergies and information effects around mergers and 
acquisitions. While the main objective of these papers is to estimate synergies and value creation, their 
approach allows estimating whether acquisition announcements reveal news about the stand-alone value 
of bidders and targets. Specifically, Barraclough et al. (2013) find that M&A announcements reveal 
good news about targets and Borochin (2014) adds this is specially the case for cash bids. However, 
these papers do not evaluate which sort of news they may be at play or whether the reassessment of 
bidder and target value is simply and adjustment of valuation errors. Thought this approach could bring 
interesting insights in our case, we would need data on call prices which are not available in for a 
significant part of our sample.  
Last, Edmans et al. (2012) propose another method to evaluate whether undervaluation is related to 
increased takeover activity. Instead of measuring mispricing directly, they use mutual fund redemptions 
as an exogenous shock to stock prices and document that the resulting non-fundamental price fall 
translates in low target valuations and increases takeover probability.22  
                                                          
22 In a robustness check, they show that takeover probabilities increase more for financially driven acquisitions. 
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To go around the need to estimate fundamental value directly and the lack of option data, we directly 
focus on failed deals and study target prices to measure mispricing. Studying price reactions around 
failed deals allows pinning down mispricing as a motive in acquisitions because any price reaction or 
revaluation remaining after deal failure should only reflect a reassessment of the stand-alone value of 
the target firm.  
2.2.2. Failed deals and revaluation effects: sources of informational effects 
While returns around bid announcements factor in information about acquisition gains, the 
probability of success and a reassessment of stand-alone values of both the bidder and the target firm, 
target returns following failed deals result solely from the reassessment of the stand-alone value of the 
target firm thus providing an ideal set-up to examine informational effects. 
The early papers of Dodd and Ruback (1977) and Bradley (1980) document a permanent and positive 
revaluation of unsuccessful targets and attribute that revaluation to informational effects. Since then, the 
context of failed has been used and studied in several papers. Bradley et al. (1983) attribute target 
revaluation effects to the anticipation of future acquisition activity and therefore to premiums that target 
shareholders discount to have soon. Safieddine and Titman (1999) provide evidence that targets, 
following unsuccessful bids, engage in leverage increasing transactions and other corporate actions in 
the interest of shareholders who anticipate operational improvements. With these results, Safieddine and 
Titman (1999) attribute revaluation effects to the anticipation of operational improvements rather than 
purely informational effects. In contrast, Savor and Lu (2009) study bidder revaluation effects around 
failed deals and use it as a counterfactual in their tests. More recently, also in the context of fail deals, 
Malmendier et al (2016) find that only cash bids are subject to a revaluation while there is none around 
stock bids. They also rule out that the anticipation of future takeover activities or operational changes 
are responsible for these findings and attribute them solely to informational effects conveyed by the 
medium of exchange about undervaluation of the target. In contrast, Boyson, Gantchev, and Shivdasani 
(2017) find that there is no revaluation around fail bids for activism targets, but those targets experience 
long term abnormal returns that are associated to value-enhancing operational and financial policy 
changes.  
The above evidence shows that indeed revaluation effects may be the source of different forces at 
work and warns us that the use of fail bids as an ideal set-up to study informational effects is not absent 
of several challenges than will need to be carefully examined. We carefully do so latter in our study. In 
this sense, we also contribute to understand the drivers of revaluation gains around bid failure and, 
particularly, we expand on the sources of informational effects by evaluating to what extend the identity 
of the bidder plays a role. We hypothesize that the identity of the bidder matters as it conveys information 
to the market about the true value of the target. We also propose that the revelation of new information 
to the market is more relevant a) in the presence of information asymmetries and b) when the acquirer 
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has an information advantage. Information asymmetries are typically more prevalent is smaller firms. 
Thus, we use the size of the firm to proxy for the extent of information asymmetries and we conjecture 
that the revaluation effect attached to the presence of financial bidders will be larger the smaller is the 
target firm. Also, when the bidder is proximate to the target firm, he may enjoy an information 
advantage.23 To capture this idea, we posit that the information advantage of financial bidders will be 
larger when they are in the same country as target firms. In contrast with cross-border transactions, 
domestic transactions imply a closeness of the parties involved in a bid, not only in terms of physical 
proximity but also cultural, economic and institutional proximity. Financial bidders having a better 
knowledge of country characteristics such as language, fiscal policies, regulations, cultural and 
institutional dimensions will be able to better assess the extent of mispricing and their bid may be more 
informative about the stand-alone value of the target firm.24 In this set-up, cross-border transactions will 
benefit less from this information advantage and, consequently, the revaluation effect will be less 
prominent.  
2.3. Data 
2.1. Sample construction 
Our sample of failed acquisition bids comes from SDC Mergers and Acquisition database for the 
period 1980 to 2015. We collect bids with deal status “withdrawn”, “intention withdrawn”, 
“discontinued rumored” and “seek buyer withdrawn” and thus, we discard bids with deal status 
“completed” or “pending”.25 To start with, we include all bids regardless of the country of incorporation 
of the bidder and the target. We then retain bids that comply with the following restrictions. First, the 
target is a public firm for which we can obtain market prices and identify announcement and withdrawal 
dates.26 Second, the deal involves a bid of more than 50 percent and up to 100 percent of the target. This 
is to ensure a real change of ownership if the deal was completed.27 Furthermore, to filter noise posed 
by target insiders, we exclude bids by the target management or employees. And finally, we also exclude 
bids subject to a third party offer for the target while the original bid under analysis is pending. This 
choice allows us to reduce noise brought by any valuation effect related to a third party outbid. 
To identify the bidder type, financial or strategic, we look at bidders' 4-digit SIC code. Financial 
bidders have SIC codes between 6000 and 6900. Strategic bidders have SIC codes either below 6000 or 
                                                          
23 In the context of financial analysts, proximity has been shown to be a relevant factor explaining superior performance (Orpurt (2004), Malloy 
(2005), Bae et al. (2005).  
24 The location of the bidder is not critical for the extent of information asymmetries embedded into the market price but rather the location of 
the marginal investor.  
25 At this stage, these bids include “Withdrawn”, “Discontinued Rumoured”, “Seek Buyer Withdrawn”, and “Intention Withdrawn”. We note 
that 99 percent of our cleaned sample refers to “Withdrawn” and 1 percent to “Intention Withdrawn”.     
26 SDC considers firms with more than 50 percent free-float to be public firms. Thus, in this step we retain listed firms with more of 50% free 
float before the deal announcement and exclude all other firms. 
27 Tough the undervaluation hypothesis may also apply to minority interest bids, we use takeover bids for two reasons. First, a takeover bid 
catches much more market attention than a minority purchase and enables us to measure more clearly reactions in market prices from the 
announcement of the bid to its withdrawal. Second, the sample size of minority bid failures is too small to provide statistical significance once 
we require disclosure of the premium and public status of the targets.  
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over 6999. Once we have identified the type of bidder, we exclude financial services’ targets with SIC 
codes between 6000 and 6999. This choice allows us to rule out bids by financial bidders that could be 
motivated by operational synergies and allows us to focus on non-synergistic motives driving acquisition 
decisions.28 After that step, our sample includes 3’815 failed deals; that is, 1’277 involving financial 
bidders and 2’538 involving strategic bidders. 
Next, for every target firm involved in a deal, we obtain stock prices and financial data from 
Datastream and Worldscope databases for non-US firms and from CRSP and Compustat for US firms. 
To add price and financial data to our sample of failed deals we use as matching variables the Datastream 
code, the firm name, and the country of primary listing for non-US firms.29 Then, we use the 6-digit 
CUSIP and the firm name for US firms since the Datastream code for these firms in largely missing in 
the SDC database. Adding available price and financial data reduces our sample to 2’945 failed deals; 
that is 1’019 (1’926) involving financial (strategic) bidders. We then drop deals for which target stock 
price data is not available 275 days prior to the bid announcement date30 and deals where the offer price 
is lower than the market price. With this step, our sample shrinks to a total of 2’204 failed deals involving 
877 (1’327) failed deals by financial (strategic) bidders.  
To finalize our sample, we impose two last but relevant restrictions. Consistent with existing studies, 
we keep only deals with non-missing observations for key variables that can impact target revaluation 
as identified by previous literature. These are the medium of payment, the offer price, an indicator for 
hostile attitude, an indicator for tender offer and the target market capitalization.31 We then use these 
variables as control variables in the empirical analysis. Last following Officer (2003), we retain only 
bids when bid premiums, computed as offer price over target market capitalization, are positive and 
lower than 200%.32  
The medium of payment captures how an acquirer pays for the acquisition. Shleifer and Vishny 
(2003) predict that deals with an underpriced target are more likely to be paid in cash. Empirically, 
Malmendier et al. (2016) show that target revaluation upon deal failure is mostly driven by deals 
involving cash payments. To measure medium of payment we define 3 variables. Cash is the percentage 
of deal value to be paid in cash. Stock refers to the percentage of deal value to be paid in stock and Other 
refers to the percentage of deal value to be paid by other means. 
                                                          
28 In un-reported tests, we re-do all estimations including bids where targets are from the financial service sector and acquirers are strategic. 
Our results do not change. 
29 Datastream assigns different DS codes to cross-listed firms by stock exchange and issued security. Matching by DS code assigned to the 
primary stock exchange, we neglect trades on other stock exchanges. We note that his should not impact our measure of cumulative abnormal 
returns for a multiple-week event window because price parity deviation are only relevant in multi-market intraday trading (Gagnon and 
Karolyi, 2010). Datastream also assigns different DS codes for a single firm that issues multiple classes of shares, such as China. This has a 
bearing on only 1 percent of our sample, this again should not cause any big problem. 
30 With this step, our sample shrinks to 948 (1’458) failed deals by financial (strategic) bidders. 
31 We do not include deal value because it is highly correlated with target firm market capitalization, the key firm-level control variable in our 
regression. Previous studies (e.g. Malmendier et al., 2016) include deal value to gauge acquisition cost relative to bidders’ business scale by 
scaling deal value by bidder’s market capitalization. This is infeasible in our setting because most financial bidders are private.   
32 See for example, Officer (2003), Bates and Lemmon (2003), Moeller et al. (2004), etc. 
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The offer price, once announced, immediately sets a reference for other investors of the target value 
in the eyes of its bidder. Thus, it should also serve as a benchmark for price correction on prior-bid 
mispricing. We use the offer price over the target stock price four weeks before the bid announcement 
to compute the Premium that we then use in our tests. Karolyi and Liao (2017) and Malmendier et al. 
(2016) document a positive association between the premium and the short-run stock price reaction to 
the acquisition announcement and similarly, we expect a positive relation to the revaluation effect. 
We also construct an indicator for hostile attitude. Hostile is a dummy that equals one when the 
acquisition attempt is hostile. An hostile takeover bid, even if unsuccessful, can trigger market 
anticipation that target management would improve future operational performance after resisting the 
bid (Hirshleifer and Titman, 1990). In a similar vein, TenderOffer is a dummy that equals one when the 
bid is instrumented as a tender offer. A tender offer can build up market expectation that the target may 
end up receiving a premium from a subsequent offer (Jensen and Ruback, 1983).  
Finally, target market capitalization is the last key variable that we require to be non-missing. It 
refers to the total number of target shares outstanding times target stock price 4 weeks prior to the 
announcement of the bid and aims to measure target firm size and to control for information 
asymmetries. Our final sample of failed deals consists of a total of 789 deals, including 258 failed deals 
by financial bidders and 531 by strategic bidders.  
As discussed in introduction, we consider failed deals as a counterfactual to completed deals. That 
requires us to assess the comparability between failed and completed deals. To construct a comparable 
sample of completed deals, we collect deals with deal status “completed” in SDC database and we follow 
the same procedures just described above. The final sample of completed deals consists of a total of 
6’583 deals, including 1’283 completed deals by financial bidders and 5’300 by strategic bidders. 
2.2. Summary statistics 
Table 2.1, Panel A reports summary statistics for bids made by financial bidders and Panel B for 
bids made by strategic bidders. In both panels, we precisely report summary statistics for various deal-
level characteristics. Panel A shows that, both completed and failed bids issued by financial bidders, are 
similar regarding the medium of payment (Cash, Stock, Other), days between the announcement and the 
completion/withdrawal date (Days) , market-to-book value (MB), premium (Premium) and the size of 
the stake sought by the bidder (StakeSought). Panel B shows that, both completed and failed bids issued 
by strategic bidders, are similar in terms of market-to-book value (MB), premium (Premium) and the 
size of the stake sought by the bidder (StakeSought). However, completed and failed bids issued by 
strategic bidders are marginally different with respect to the medium of payment (Cash, Stock), and days 
between the announcement and the completion/withdrawal date (Days). Unsuccessful deal attempts by 
45 
 
strategic bidders tend to be resolved (withdrawn) faster than completed deals and there is a higher 
proportion of attempted deals to be paid with stocks that fail. 
Panel A and B also outline differences between completed and failed bids that are common to 
financial and strategic bidders. Failed bids tend to involve targets of bigger size (DealValue and 
TargetSize) when financial bidders are involved and of smaller size when strategic bidders are involved. 
For both financial and strategic bidders, failed bids are more likely to be hostile (Hostile), and less likely 
to be tender offers (TenderOffer), involve target fees in case of termination (TTerm), or hold a smaller 
block size prior to bid (Toehold) than completed bids. These findings are largely consistent with previous 
studies33 and these variables highly correlated with failure and eventually can be related to target price 
run-ups despite failure.34 For example, Hirshleifer and Titman (1990) argue that, while resisting a hostile 
bid, the target firm may also learn about and take actions to implement policies planned by the bidder 
and which in turn increases the target stock price. Thus, it is important to account for such effects in our 
tests, and for that, we will include these variables as controls in the regression setting described in 
Section 2.3.    
Table 2.1, Panel C evaluates whether there is any significant difference between bids issued by 
financial and strategic bidders both for completed and failed samples. The most relevant difference 
relates to the premium offered and to the medium of payment, regardless if a bid is completed or not. 
Financial bidders offer on average premiums that are 7.8 percent lower than those offered by strategic 
bidders.35 The lower premium can be explained by the absence of operational synergies.36 Moreover, 
financial bidders tend to pay all bids with cash while it is not the same for strategic bidders that often 
also use stock or a combination of stock and cash. Malmendier et al. (2016) shows that cash payments 
explain the revaluation effect at deal failure and therefore reveal prior-bid underpricing of the target 
firm. Thus, it is crucial for us to make sure that the identity of the bidders is not simply capturing the 
medium of payment she uses for acquisitions. More precisely, in our tests, we are careful that our 
indicator of financial bidder is not actually a proxy for cash payments. To account for that, we run our 
tests controlling for Cash and verify that all our results hold for a subsample composed only of cash 
deals.  
[Insert Table 2.1 Here] 
2.4. Empirical analysis 
By looking at failed deals, we aim to evaluate whether there is any revaluation effect. Market 
revaluation refers to the market reaction from the announcement to the failure of the bid. After the 
                                                          
33 See for example Bates and Lemmon (2003). 
34 In an unreported table, we confirm that they are determinants for failure in a logistic regression setting. 
35 Focusing on U.S. domestic completed bids where acquirers own 100 percent  stake, Bargeron et al. (2008) find the premium from financial 
bidders is around 12 percent lower than that from strategic bidders. 
36 See Bargeron et al. (2008) for alternative explanations. 
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announcement, prices incorporate deal specific information as the bid advances towards completion or 
failure. In the case of failure, prices should go back to their initial level unless there is revaluation. The 
presence of a revaluation effect can be attributed to undervaluation prior to the bid and just reflect a 
price correction. In that case, the bid per se conveys information to the market. However, a revaluation 
could also be the result of the anticipation of future takeovers or operational improvements. 
 In this section, first we aim to estimate whether there is any revaluation effect and then we perform 
additional tests to pin down its likely driver. 
2.4.1. Measuring market revaluation for target firms 
To estimate market revaluation, we conduct an event study on target firm stock returns around the 
announcement of the bid and of the withdrawal. The estimation window corresponds to the interval (-
275, -25) with respect to the bid announcement date. Following standard event study methodology as in 
Brown and Warner (1985), we compute daily abnormal returns as prediction errors from a market model 
using local market indices.37  Stock and local market index returns are expressed in home market 
currency. To account for illiquid stocks, we adjust abnormal returns following the "trade-to-trade" 
approach of Maynes and Rumsey (1993) and exclude bids where target firms are not traded for more 
than 225 out of 250 trading days (90 percent of the estimation window). 38  
Then we compute the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs (B-25,F+25)) from 25 days before the 
announcement of the bid to 25 days after the announcement of the withdrawal following Malmendier et 
al.  (2016). The choice of 25 days before the bid announcement allows us to capture price run-ups caused 
by rumors (Schwert, 1996). The choice of 25 days after bid failure allows us to incorporate the possibility 
that stock markets react slowly to bad (withdrawal) news (Chan, 2003).  
2.4.2. CARs summary statistics and univariate tests: Is there any revaluation effect? 
Figure 2.1 depicts the revaluation effect for both failed bids by financial and strategic bidders. It 
plots the evolution of target firm CARs (B-25,F+25) for the two subgroups.39 The solid line refers to 
target firm CARs for failed bids by financial bidders. And similarly, the dashed line for bids by strategic 
bidders. The first part of the graph, when we move from B-25 to B along the x-axis, captures price run-
ups prior to the bid. At B, we observe that the average market reaction around the bid is around 15 
percent. Surprisingly, it is only one third of the market reaction documented by previous studies with 
focus on completed acquisitions. But our results are similar to Malmendier et al. (2016) and are 
consistent with Bhagat, Dong, Hirshleifer, and Noah (2005) who explain that the price reaction also 
                                                          
37 In robustness check, we replace local market indices with Datastream value-weighted global market index in U.S. dollar and local market 
currency exchange rates to U.S. dollar. We also re-estimate CARs using a constant mean model. Our findings are qualitatively similar. 
38 With this restriction we exclude 20 (55) failed bids by financial (strategic) bidders. We also compute abnormal returns without adjusting for 
illiquid stocks. Our results do not change. 
39 To normalize the length between bid and failure, we follow the same approximation procedure as described in Malmendier et al. (2016). 
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factors in investors’ views on the probabilities of failure together with the premium expected for the 
deal. Thus, it is natural to observe a lower price reaction around failed bids because those deals may 
have a higher ex-ante probability of failure that deals that evolve to completion.  
The middle part of the graph, when we move from B to F along the x-axis, depicts how the stock 
market incorporates deal-specific information as the bid progresses towards failure in our case. The 
number of trading days from B to F is different for different bids and, for an easy representation, we 
standardize the period between B and F following the approach in Malmendier et al. (2016). In the 
absence of a revaluation effect, we would observe CARs falling back to zero after the announcement of 
the failure. This is what we observe for firms targeted by strategic bidders (the dashed line). In contrast, 
we observe a revaluation effect of about 10% for firms targeted by financial bidders because their CARs 
of do not revert to zero upon the announcement of failure but stay at around 10 percent. The gap between 
the two lines is wide and remarkable and it indicates that the revaluation effect is only prevalent in the 
presence of financial bidders. Finally, when we move from F to F+25, we observe how the target price 
settles after failure and to what extent it reverts to its preannouncement level.  
[Insert Figure 2.1 Here] 
[Insert Table 2.2 Here] 
Table 2.2 provides CARs summary statistics and univariate tests. We present CARs for the whole 
sample and by bidder type for all bids and for various subgrouping. Asterisks next to means indicate 
statistical significance using skewness-adjusted t-test. Asterisks next to medians indicate statistical 
significance using Wilcoxon sign-rank test. For the overall sample that we label “Main sample”, we 
observe a statistically significant revaluation effect of around 11 percent (median of 5.9 percent) for bids 
involving financial bidders. In contrast, we do not observe a significant revaluation effect around failed 
bids by strategic bidders (mean of 1.6% and median of 3.1% but no statistical significance). The 
difference in revaluation effect between the two types of bidders is statistically significant. Overall our 
results indicate that financial bidders are involved in failed deals that experience a revaluation effect, 
but it is not the case for strategic bidders. 
Failed bids by financial bidders may show a higher revaluation effect only because they tend to be 
paid in cash while strategic bidders frequently use also shares as a method of payment (see Table 2.1, 
Panel C). Existing literature (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004; and 
Malmendier et al., 2016) shows that it is important to separate stock and cash financed deals before 
making judgements on value effects specially for bidding firms but also for target firms. Specifically, 
Malmendier et al. (2016) show that cash bids reveal prior undervaluation of the target firm, but it is not 
the case for paid-in-stock bids. Thus, the inclusion of paid-in-stock bids may overshadow the impact 
that strategic bidders may have on the revaluation effect. To account for that possibility, we need to 
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further investigate whether our results are merely reflecting the method of payment that is frequently 
used by each type of bidder. To this end, we form subgroups based on the medium of payment and split 
our sample in deals involving only cash (PureCash) and those involving also some or only shares (Paid 
in Stock >0) and provide CARs by type of bidder. We observe that in our sample, while almost all 
financial bids would imply only a cash payment, around 50 percent of strategic bids would involve 
payment only in shares or a mixture of cash and shares. We focus on cash-only deals (PureCash), and 
we observe a statistically significant revaluation effect of around 12 percent (median of 5 percent) for 
bids involving financial bidders and a significant revaluation effect of 7.9%  (median of 9.7%) around 
failed bids by strategic bidders.40 Furthermore, there is no statistical difference between the two groups. 
As expected, bids that would involve shares as a means of payment are not subject to a significant 
revaluation for any type of bidder. These findings contrast with our previous results but are consistent 
with Malmendier et al. (2016) who show that the medium of payment plays a key role and conveys 
information to the market about prior undervaluation of the target.  
To further evaluate our hypothesis that a potential revaluation effect could be related to the amount 
of information asymmetry or to informational advantage. We split our sample in deals involving targets 
of different size and provide CARs by type of bidder. We use size as a proxy for the extent of information 
asymmetries because smaller firms seem to evolve in poorer information environments (Atiase, 1987). 
We rank targets by market capitalization, form quartiles and label quartiles Small(Q1), Q2, Q3, and  
Big(Q4) respectively. We also use the location of the bidder with respect to the target as a proxy for 
information advantage and create the dummies Domestic equal to one when both are in the same country 
and Crossborder equal to one if they are in different countries (Orpurt, 2004; Bae et al., 2005; Cooper, 
2013). 
Our results give support to our hypothesis that a revaluation effect should mostly be observed for 
firms subject to larger information asymmetries and targeted by financial acquirers. These firms 
experience a significant mean revaluation effect of around 35.6 percent (median of 24.3 percent), 
whereas there is no significant revaluation effect for small targets by strategic bidders. The difference 
between the two groups is statistically significant and confirms our prediction that only financial bidders 
exploit opportunities where mispricing is most likely to occur. We note that there is also a positive and 
significant revaluation effect for targets with size above the median (Q3) and when strategic bidders are 
involved, though the difference with that of financial bidders is only statistically significant at 10% level.  
Our results also support the notion that the revaluation effect is larger when bidders are in the same 
country as target firms because they enjoy an informational advantage. As expected, the coefficient on 
Domestic is positive and significant and higher than Purecash both for financial and strategic bids, 
                                                          
40 As discussed in Fu et al. (2013), to focus on pure cash or stock bids captures more clearly acquisition motives, while interpretation on hybrid 
payments might be arbitrary.  
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whereas there is no revaluation effect attached to Crossborder failed bids. These preliminary results 
show that both financial and strategic bidders seem to enjoy an information advantage, but it is 
economically and statistically relevant for financial bidders in a domestic setting and when the target 
firm is small.  
Put together, the univariate tests support our conjecture that, compared to strategic bidders, financial 
bidders are more skilled or better exploit prior mispricing when information asymmetry is severe or 
when they enjoy informational advantages. However, there is the need to further evaluate our hypothesis 
in a multivariate setting where we can explicitly control for other deal-level and firm-level 
characteristics that can be correlated with the revaluation effect that we try to explain. 
2.4.3. Multivariate tests 
To further evaluate our hypothesis while accounting for deal- and firm-level characteristics, we 
evaluate CARs in a cross-sectional regression setting. Our base model is: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛿𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖 + 𝛾𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝜑𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜃𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖 
(2.1) 
where i indicates the ith bid. 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 is the cumulative abnormal return for target firms from 25 days 
before the bid announcement to 25 days after bid withdrawal. 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖 is our variable of interest that 
represents the type of bidder. It equals one (zero) if the ith bid is initiated by a financial (strategic) 
bidders. Its coefficient,  𝛽 , captures any target revaluation effect associated with the bidder type 
“Financial” . We follow previous studies and control for other factors that may be related to the 
revaluation effect as measured by 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 . 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 is a vector of deal-level control variables, including 
Cash, Premium, Hostile, and TenderOffer.41 Target return regressions also typically control for other 
variables such as target size, but unlike in bidder regressions, the theoretical relevance of adding this 
control is not clear (Malmendier et al., 2016; Bargeron et al., 2008)42. Malmendier et al (2016) find that 
big targets have a lower revaluation effect. We measure target size with Log(TargetSize) the natural 
logarithm of the 2014 CPI-adjusted target market capitalization. Target size can affect valuation 
multiples and thus a restatement of those based on new information. If revaluation effects are larger 
when information asymmetries are more important we would expect to see higher revaluation effects 
for small firms. Without this control, if financial bidders tend to bid for smaller firms we may falsely 
attach a revaluation effect to bidder type when it is associated instead to the size of the target. Thus, it 
is important to add this control to rule out this possibility. Thus, keeping size constant, we aim to evaluate 
if financial bidders are associated with a higher revaluation effect than strategic bidders. Finally, 
                                                          
41 Cash is a dummy equal to one if more than 50% is paid in cash. In unreported robustness check, we use the percentage of payment in cash. 
Our results remain qualitatively the same.  
42 Andrade et al (2001) control for size (deal size) and find larger deals having smaller premia. Malmendier et al (2016) find negative coefficients 
and other papers  show insignificant coefficients . 
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Yeardummies and Industrydummies are dummies for bid announcement year and 1-digit SIC industries 
that control for macroeconomic conditions and regulation changes common to all buyers, target firms 
or certain industries.43  
Table 2.3 presents baseline regression results. Column 1 complements the graphical results shown 
in Figure 2.1 and shows that the revaluation effect around failed bids associated to financial bidders is 
significantly larger than that associated to strategic bidders. There is an average revaluation effect of 
9.7% around failed bids by financial bidders and a positive but insignificant 1.5% for failed bids by 
strategic bidders. The coefficient on Financial shows that the difference of 9.7 % is economically and 
statistically significant (t-statistic of 2.56). Column 2 and column 3 introduces year and industry 
dummies and a set of control variables. While the signs of coefficients on control variables are largely 
consistent with previous studies, we observe that the significance of the coefficient on Financial 
vanishes and does not bring additional explanatory power beyond the set of controls.44 This takes place 
especially when we add Cash and TenderOffer. In reported correlation analysis, and split regressions, 
we observe that the association of log(Targetsize) and TenderOffer with CARs depends on the identity 
of the acquirer and thus, it could be that the introduction of those variables in the regressions artificially 
attenuate the association of Financial and CARs. In addition, the rational to include Cash in the 
regressions as a control is that the choice of the method of payment conveys information to the market 
about the value of the bidder and the target. Yet this rational may well apply for strategic bidder because 
they do have the choice of how to pay for a deal, but it may apply less for financial bidders since often 
they do not have that choice and pay with cash. In other words, for financial bidders paying with cash 
may not send a signal to the market because they always do, but it is their nature and identity that makes 
the market update target valuations.  
To make sure that our inference is not misstated, we extend our analysis in several dimensions. First, 
if financial and strategic bidders are driven by different motives, have different choices when bidding 
for a target, or induce different market reaction, imposing the same slopes on all control variables, as 
we do in the basic specification, would be inadequate. To correct for that, we interact all control variables 
with Financial. Column 4 reports the results. Alternatively, in unreported results we interact this dummy 
with each control variable separately. We observe that, consistent with our main hypothesis, Financial 
is again positive and statistically significant indicating that there is an incremental revaluation associated 
to financial bidders. Thus, bids by financial bidders seem to convey information to the market about the 
stand-alone value of the target firm and this effect is particularly larger for smaller firms when 
information asymmetries are more prevalent. This finding reinforces our interpretation that the 
                                                          
43 We do not add target valuation measures as a control, such as the market-to-book, because by focusing on failed bids we would only expect 
such measures to be related to the revaluation effect if there is prior mispricing. Thus, such a control would be picking up the effect that we 
aim to capture with categorical variables. See for example Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, Viswanathan (2005), Dong et al., (2006), Edmans et al., 
(2012), and Fu, Lin, Officer (2013). 
44 Our estimation of the coefficient on Cash is 10 percent, similar to the estimation of Malmendier (2016) when both public and private acquirers 
are included. 
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revaluation effect is mainly reflecting informational effects. It is worthwhile to note that Cash is positive 
but becomes insignificant which contrasts with Malmendier et al (2016) conclusions.  
Second, we narrow our sample to cash-only bids and report results in columns 5-8. In this way, we 
can directly evaluate the identity of the bidder conveys information to the market about the stand-alone 
value of the target beyond the medium of payment. Consistent with univariate tests, columns 5-6 show 
that there does not seem to be larger revaluation effect associated to financial bidders. But when we 
control for the deal-level and firm-level variables and for the different relation they have with the type 
of bidder, we again observe that there is an incremental revaluation associated to financial bidders that 
is larger for smaller firms. Thus, the type of bidder seems to convey incremental information to the 
market about the stand-alone value of the target beyond what is transmitted by the medium of payment, 
the offer premium, hostile attitude, and tender offer. 
We also gain additional insights that are worth mentioning. The coefficient on TenderOffer is 
positive and significant for strategic acquirers but the effect is reversed and insignificant for financial 
acquirers. Thus, Bradley et al (1983) result that the effect of tender offers on CARs reflects the 
anticipation of future acquisition activity may only be valid in the case of bids by strategic bidders. 
Similarly, the association of log(Targetsize) and bidder type really depends on the type of bidder. For 
strategic bidders, there is a positive and significant association with target size. In contrast, this 
association is negative and significant for financial bidders. The effect attached to financial bidder type 
most likely stems from his ability to identify underpriced targets (due to skill or to focus on that activity) 
or to the possession of private information about the target rather than to the fact that he is using cash as 
a means of payment. 
[Insert Table 2.3 Here] 
2.4.4. Information asymmetry and information advantage 
Our baseline results show that the type of bidder is associated to the revaluation effect. Failed bids 
by financial bidders have associated a higher revaluation than bids by strategic bidders and this effect is 
larger the smaller is the target firm. Thus, financial bidders seem to exploit deviations between value 
and price and as such underpricing seems to be a motive guiding their acquisition activity.45 Next we 
aim to further explore the size effect and its relation to the identity of the bidder as well as the potential 
sources of financial bidders’ advantage to identify and exploit mispricing. 
Our previous results indicate that the revaluation effect is larger for small firms targeted by financial 
bidders where information asymmetries are likely to be more prevalent. To further examine this 
observation, we consider the variable Q1(Small) that equals one if the target market capitalization is in 
                                                          
45 In contrast, Edmans et al. (2012) show that a non-fundamental discount on stock price attracts both strategic and financial acquirers, but 
takeover probabilities seem to increase more for the later. 
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the lowest quantile and zero otherwise. By taking a categorical variable we can directly and alternatively 
examine to what extent the revaluation effect is particularly relevant for small firms. Table 2.4 shows 
the results. Column 1-3 refers to the main sample and column 4-6 to the sample including cash only 
bids. In column 1 and 4, we find that financial bidders are positively and significantly associated with 
CARs in the case of small firms. This result holds even after adding Log(Targetsize) in column 2 and 5. 
Adding jointly Q1(Small) and Log(Targetsize) represents a more stringent test. The finding that 
Q1(Small) plays a role for financial bidders beyond Log(Targetsize) reinforces our interpretation that 
informational effects are important in the case of small firms. In column 3 and 6, we present the results 
for the model specification that allows for different loadings on control variables by each type of bidder. 
We find that there is no incremental effect related to the sub-sample of very small firms Q1(Small) 
beyond the size effect captured by Financial×Log(Targetsize). Clearly in column 6, we observe a 
significant association between financial bidder type and the revaluation effect and, consistent with our 
hypothesis, this effect is larger for smaller firms. 
[Insert Table 2.4 Here] 
In unreported tests, we also include Q1(Small) and interact it with Strategic. We then evaluate 
whether informational effects can be detected in the case of small targets by strategic bidders. We find 
no evidence that CARs are either associated with strategic bidders or with small firms targeted by 
strategic bidders. 
In Table 2.5, we further explore the role of target size buy looking at other size quantiles and we do 
that both for financial and strategic bidders. For ease of interpretation, we report the full model with 
quantiles interacted first with Financial (column 1) and then with Strategic (column 2) as well as 
separate regressions for financial and strategic bidders. In all regressions, we drop Log(Targetsize) since 
it can be mechanically correlated with size quantiles. In unreported tests, we also include all bidder 
interactions with controls and find virtually the same results. Overall, we observe that the association of 
financial bidder type with the revaluation effect is mostly concentrated in small firms, but this pattern is 
not present in the case of bids by strategic bidders. Thus, the informational effect seems to be only 
attached to financial bidders. 46 
[Insert Table 2.5 Here] 
To evaluate the potential sources of financial bidders’ advantage that allow them to identify and 
exploit mispricing, we focus on the location of the bidder-target pair. It could be that financial bidder 
advantage stems from skill or from an informational advantage. If financial bidders benefit from 
informational advantage rather than skill (or focus) we can expect that the information advantage will 
                                                          
46 In Section 2.3, univariate tests suggest thin evidence that strategic bidders have slightly higher revaluation for targets of medium size. Thus, 
we replace the Small with Medium in the two interaction items and do not observe any significance, which indicates that the valuation effect 
is driven by other control variables. For reporting brevity, we do not tabulate a column for these two pairs. 
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be larger the more proximate is the bidder to the target. This is consistent with findings in existing 
studies in the context of financial analysts. To capture that possibility, we use Domestic a dummy that 
equals one for domestic transactions. Domestic transactions imply a closeness of the parties involved in 
the bid, not only in terms of physical proximity but also cultural, economic and institutional that can 
lead to an informational advantage. If information advantage is the driving force, domestic transactions 
will benefit more and should have therefore a larger relation to CARs. 
We report the corresponding results in Table 2.6. Based on location, our results indicate that it is 
rather skill than information advantage. 
[Insert Table 2.6 Here] 
Summing up, our results show that the revaluation effect is larger in the presence of financial bidders 
when information asymmetries are high. We also document the absence of a revaluation effect attached 
to bids by strategic bidders. We find that identity of the bidder seems to convey information to the 
market about the stand-alone value of the target firm beyond and to a larger extent than what is conveyed 
by the medium of payment. Financial bidders seem to consider underpricing as a driver of their 
acquisition choice while underpricing does not seem to be a driving force in acquisitions aimed at by 
strategic bidders. The magnitude of the revaluation unlocked by the identity of the bidder is significant 
and subsumes the effect of the medium of payment documented in Malmendier et al. (2016). Alternative 
interpretations of our findings such as anticipation effects are plausible. For those alternative 
explanations to be valid, they have to be more pertinent for the subsample of fail bids by financial 
bidders than for those by strategic bidders. We may also be concerned with selection into failure biases. 
We explore these possibilities and concerns next. 
2.4.5. Is selection into bid failure driving our findings? 
Our tests so far are subject to some challenges and require further examination. In our setup, we 
should be concerned with selection into bid failure, i.e. the cause of deal termination is related to the 
valuation of a target. For example, as a defense tactic, firms can release positive news to hype up stock 
price, squeeze the profit margin for bids, and drive away bidders.47  In this case, we equally observe a 
revaluation at bid failure but cannot conclude it is stand-alone firm value that is previously mispriced 
and then revealed by financial bidders. Therefore, the key to address selection into failure is to set apart 
bids by whether their failure reasons affect stock price. Specifically, we follow Savor and Lu (2009) and 
Malmendier et al. (2016) to collect detailed information on failure reasons and group them into 
exogenous ones, i.e. unrelated to firm stock price, and those endogenously related to firm stock price.48  
                                                          
47 Literature has long established evidence that firms consciously release news to influence stock price. See (Ahern and Sosyura, 2014) for 
recent evidences.   
48 We use three information sources, SDC deal synopsis, SDC event history and news from Nexis-Lexis. 
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Our objective to use this exogenous-endogenous classification is two-fold. On the one hand, we 
want to verify whether the differential results between small targets of financial bidders and the rest bids 
still hold for the exogenous group. On the other hand, we want to ensure that, even if selection into 
failure exists, its presence has similar distribution for small targets of financial bidders and the remaining 
bids. If the cause of failure makes the market to react, such stock price reaction should be larger the 
larger are information asymmetries, leading to an overproportion of small firm bids failing for a reason 
involving high revaluation. Furthermore, deals by financial bidder are more likely to fail than strategic 
ones because financial bidders do not enjoy synergies and their negotiation margins are thinner and more 
easily drop the bid, leading to an overproportion of financial bidder deals failing for a reason involving 
high revaluation. The two, putting together, imply that the greater revaluation of small firms targeted by 
financial bidders may simply be driven by over-presence of selection into failure for small firms and 
financial bidders. Alternatively, there could be an overproportion of deals involving strategic bidders 
failing due to negative news about the target and adversely affects target stock price, such as bidders 
withdrawing during due diligence.   
[Insert Table 2.7 Here] 
Table 2.7 summarize analysis results by failure categories. The very left column of Table 2.7 lists 
main failure categories. Categories from row (1) to (4) constitute our exogenous sample because they 
contain little additional information to the market that affects stock price. The first row is labeled (1) No 
more information because in those bids nothing but the date of bid withdrawal is found in public news 
resources. The next row,  (2) Term mutually disagree, contains bids with withdrawal news stating terms 
are modified but eventually both bidder and target agree to terminate negotiation. No further information 
is available on what term is modified or what drives both parties agree to drop. In those two categories, 
there is no more public information than the sheer fact that any value creation of bidder becoming a 
controlling shareholder is no longer there. In this sense, these two failure categories are the most 
exogenous to revaluation effect. We also consider two other categories as exogenous. One is (3) Bidder 
no financing, in which news explicitly states that bids are withdrawn because bidders have difficulties 
to finance the deal. The other is (4) Regulator reject, in which bids failed to obtain approval from target 
country regulatory authorities such as Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Federal 
Trade Commission in U.S., European Union, Office of Fair Trading or Competition and Markets 
Authority in U.K., etc. Those two causes of failure are unlikely to carry underlying information that 
affects investors' view about a target firm's governance, operation or growth prospect, apart from 
reversing anticipated value effect of a bid being completed. Putting together, the four failure categories 
are labeled as Strict sample in the last but one row.  
The next six categories, from (5) to (10), are considered endogenous because the cause of failure is 
likely to stimulate stock market reaction. (5) Bidder withdraw, refers to bids that are terminated by 
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bidders either during due diligence or at any other phase of the bid negotiation. A bid terminated in this 
way might signal that the bidder discovers the true but worse than expected situation of its target firm. 
Convinced by this signal, investors may reverse more than what to be added by the bid. In (6) Target 
released news, other news about the target is released around bid withdrawal, for instance earnings 
announcement or other accounting information, plans for new project, updates on court ruling, and so 
on. This category also includes bids in which bidders say they terminate because of recent released news 
about its target firm. Good or bad, these pieces of confounding news make it hard to distinguish price 
effect of bid failure. (7) Price too low covers bids where target board of directors decline the offer by 
arguing the offer price is inadequate. It also includes bids where bidders openly reject to sweeten their 
offer. (8) Tender failed contain bids where bidders fail to tender sufficient shares before offer expires. 
These two categories literally tell the market that shareholders and management of target firms believe 
the firm fair value should be higher than offer price. In this sense, it actually supports our underlying 
hypothesis. However, one might argue that the so-called fair price in the mind of target management 
and shareholders can only be attained if they could learn about and implement policies planned by the 
bidder. If outside investors are convinced that performance-improving policies are to be executed by 
target management in place of bidders, they would not reverse initial revaluation at bid announcement. 
This undermines our conclusion because the observed positive revaluation is in fact anticipation of 
future operational improvement. We are going to address this anticipation effect in the next section. For 
now, we simply regard the two categories as endogenous to target price effect. The last two categories, 
(9) Board reject and (10) Shareholder reject, stand for bids that are vetoed by target board or shareholders 
without explicitly stating it is due to inadequate offer price. These two failure causes may disperse 
market perception on firm value. While some can follow a similar line of thinking to the categories of 
Price too low or Tender failed, others might regard it as an indicator for stagnated board or dominant 
block holder whose interest conflicts with other shareholders.49 Despite diverse directions of price 
implications, the aforementioned six failure categories, from Bidder withdraw to Shareholder reject, all 
hinder us from cleanly draw conclusion on undervaluation hypothesis. Therefore, we classify them as 
endogenous failure sample.  
Having classified our sample by failure reasons, we further divide the sample into 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 × 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙, Other Financial, and Strategic. They refer to, respectively, small firms targeted by 
financial bidders, non-small firms targeted by financial bidders, all firms targeted by strategic bidders. 
Furthermore, we keep cash-only bids. N(% of N) indicates the number(fraction) of total observations 
for each of the three subgroups falling into each of the ten failure categories. In total, the main sample 
is divided into thirty subgroups. Then we regress CARs on each of these thirty subgroups by fully 
                                                          
49 Of course, Price too low or Tender Failed are not free from governance problems. For example, the former can be viewed as an excuse used 
by entrenched management. The latter can occur if a majority block holder refuses to tender and hurt minority shareholder interest. 
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controlling for Log(TargetSize), Premium, Hostile and TenderOffer. 50   Coefficient captures any 
revaluation effect loaded on each subgroup. It is left empty if there are insufficient observations to run 
regression.  
As results suggest, our two-fold objective is satisfied and our concern of selection into failure is 
alleviated. First, the distribution patterns of failed bids into each category are similar across the three 
subgroups, 𝑙 × 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 , Other Financial, and Strategic. Particularly, in the failure categories prone to 
endogeneity, i.e. (5)-(10), none of the three subgroups has significantly greater or lower presence. This 
mitigates our concern that a cluster into either good or bad compounding news drives our results. Second, 
all three subgroups have around 40 percent of their observations present in the Strict sample, the failure 
categories least contaminated by price-sensitive information. In this exogenous sample, the greater 
revaluation effect of 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 × 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 persists. In a word, our findings are unlikely to be driven by 
confounding factors related to both failure and target stock price. 
One possible criticism on the current failure categories is that our so-called robust results are mainly 
driven by (1) No more information. But no more information on the news does not exclude the 
possibility that investors with private information can trade and cause an increase in price. Accordingly, 
(1) No more information would not be a valid exogenous category. Even if investors with private 
information take new action between bid and failure, such new move would be likely to be triggered by 
financial bidders. In this sense, financial bidders’ role in revealing new information still holds. 
It is also worth noting that financial and strategic bidders have different revaluation effect for  (1) 
No more information and (8) Tender failed. Again, such discrepancy hints at different roles played by 
the two types of bidders. For this reason, in future versions of this work, we are going to investigate in 
depth to obtain additional insights on the bidder types. 
2.4.6. Is target revaluation driven by future takeover activities? 
The differential effect observed so far may be alternatively explained by future takeover activities 
Bradley et al. (1983). That is, the market believes small target firms of financial bidders have a greater 
probability to be acquired and hence a higher expected value. And this higher likelihood is further 
decomposed into two dimensions, shorter acquiring time or higher offer premium. For instance, a future 
bid to be realized within two years is to be valued more than one completed ten years later. Likewise, a 
30 percent premium is preferred to a 10 percent premium. We approach the two dimensions separately.  
To analyze the time until a successful acquisition, we conduct a survivor analysis.51 This method is 
originally used in biology to examine, for instance, whether certain factors accelerate death.  As an 
                                                          
50 We also estimate the coefficient without any control, or dropping collinear control variable such as TenderOffer for the failure category 
Tender failed. Estimated results remain the same. 
51 It suits better our setup than a logistic regression because the former accommodates both occurrence and timing, whereas the latter only 
examines the overall presence and absence of an event. See Allison (2010) for a more detailed discussion on survival analysis techniques.     
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analogue to it, we test whether a combination of three factors, bidder types as financial acquirers, small 
firm size and higher market revaluation predicts a shorter survival time to future acquisition.  Since our 
primary interest is the differential effect in revaluation, we focus on the marginal difference in time to 
acquisition between 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 × 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙  and the rest failed bids, instead of comparing to all un-
acquired firms in the history.52  
To begin with, we plot Kaplan-Meier survival curve to visualize the survival paths of 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 × 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙, and the rest. For each target firm in our sample, the observation period is measured 
as the time interval between the withdrawal date and the censoring date. The censoring date is the 
effective date on which a target firm is successfully acquired. In case no bid is completed, it is the date 
of officially delisted date. We take June 30 2016, the last trading date of our sample period, as the 
censoring date for companies stay listed and independent.  For each year, survival probability is 
calculated as the number of firms surviving divided by the number of firms at takeover risk. Firms that 
are delisted for other reasons are not included in the denominator.  
Figure 2.2 plot the cumulative survival ratios at each year end, calculated as the product of preceding 
probabilities of surviving a takeover risk in previous years. At first glance, the survivor ratio of small 
firms targeted by financial bidders drop faster than that of the other firms. For example, after two years 
following the initial bid failure, the subgroup 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 × 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 is taken over 1.4 times (35 percent 
vs. 25 percent) faster than the other three groups. Yet such seemingly lower survival ratio turns out to 
be statistically insignificant, suggested by the large p-value (0.403) of log-rank test on the four 
categories.  
[Insert Figure 2.2 Here] 
So far we show firms grouped by their size and the type of bidders share similar time to acquisitions. 
But what we are ultimately interested is whether the higher revaluation associated to 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 ×
𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙  reflects a higher completion speed. Thus, we switch to Cox proportional-hazard regression to 
accommodate continuous variables, such as revaluation (CARs), and multiple covariates. In fact, all 
control variables included to estimate revaluation effect would be subject to the same query as the 
indicator for subgroup of financial small, if the latter is doubted to be driven by the rate of future takeover 
activities. Using Cox regression to adjust for other covariates, we can set apart the marginal effect of 
higher revaluation on the rate of future takeover.  
Table 2.8 summarizes regression results. The dependent variable is the rate of subsequent takeovers 
following a bid failure. The explanatory variable of our primary interest is 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 × 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 ×
                                                          
52 Besides its thin relevance to our setting, to include all un-acquired firms in the history may induce a negative bias on the survivor ratio of 
our sample. As demonstrated by (Malmendier et al., 2016), the survival ratio of recipients of a unconsummated bid is persistently much lower 
than firms that share similar firm and industry characteristics but never receive an offer for a five-year period before bid announcement. This 
gap suggests the comparison of future survival in our setting should be conditioned on the set of takeover risks following the very recent bid 
event. 
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𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑠, the revaluation associated to small firms targeted by financial bidders around bid failure. Its 
coefficient represents a relative increase in the rate of future takeover for one unit increase in revaluation. 
If the positive revaluation documented in Table 2.4 reflects faster successful takeover in the future, we 
would observe a positive and statistically significant coefficient. However, as shown in Column 1, the 
coefficient is insignificant from zero. That means revaluation possessed by small targets of financial 
bidders reveals prior mispriced intrinsic value of a firm. Next, in Column 2 of Table 2.8, we add the 
same array of control variables as used for estimating revaluation effect in order to set apart the marginal 
effect of Financial Small Car. We see clearly that it remains insignificant. The cash coefficients, contrary 
to Malmendier et al. (2016), is significantly positive. But once we follow their sample filtering and 
restrict to domestic bids in U.S., the coefficient becomes insignificant from zero. This is consistent to 
Faccio and Masulis (2005) that an alternative role of cash as payment is to secure a bid, which reveals 
the true market for a targets’ shares and in turn reflect future takeover activities. Then in Column 3, we 
introduce a variable for average CARs and an indicator for financial bidder to further understand the role 
of revaluation and types of bidder respectively. Neither 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙  nor 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 × 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 ×
𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑠 possesses a significant coefficient. However, CARs become highly influential. For every one 
percent increase in revaluation, there is a 37.2 percent increase in takeover rate (HR=e.316=1.372). Once 
we decompose CARs by the type of bidders, i.e. the revaluation allotted respectively to financial and 
strategic bidders, we see in Column 4 that the significant effect is solely driven by strategic bidders. The 
strong link between revaluation of firms targeted by strategic bidders and faster future takeover extends 
(Bradley et al., 1983) that revaluation at bid failure reflects not only synergies brought in by a subsequent 
successful acquisition but also a shorter waiting time before it eventually happens. In contrast, absent of 
synergy, the higher revaluation of 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 × 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 is not related to a higher speed of future takeover 
activities.  
[Insert Table 2.8 Here] 
[Insert Table 2.9 Here] 
Next, we estimate whether this subgroup is related to a higher wealth created by future takeover. 
We proxy future wealth with the premium of the ultimately completed bid, measured by inflation-
adjusted deal value divided by target market capitalization. As a start, in Column 1 of Table 2.9, we 
regress this future wealth on 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 × 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 × 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑠 without any control. Then in Column 2-4, 
we account for the medium of payment, premium, bid attitude, and tender offer. The advantage to use 
the target market capitalization before bid failure to normalize future premium is to be aligned with 
other control variables in terms of time. Yet it leads us to imprecise measure for long-term stock return. 
Thus, we include the time it takes to be eventually acquired (Years) to partly control for the long period 
of estimation. As shown in Column 2-4, 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 × 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 × 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑠 does not carry any significant 
effect. This insignificance lasts when we narrow down the sample to initial cash-only bids.  All these 
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evidences demonstrate that future higher offer value is unlikely to drive the higher revaluation of small 
firms targeted by financial bidders. 
To sum up, neither the speed nor the offer price of future takeovers differs significantly between 
small firms targeted by financial bidders and the rest of firms. The greater revaluation of the former 
should derive from market correction for a prior underpriced intrinsic firm value. And financial bidders 
are capable of profiting from it. 
2.4.7. Is target revaluation driven by anticipation of future operation improvement? 
Another type of anticipation effect, i.e. expectation of future operation improvement, might drive 
financial bidders' higher evaluation on small firms and invalidate our conclusion. Hirshleifer and Titman 
(1990) point out the possibility for hostile bids that, after targets firms resist a bid, they could learn about 
and implement policies planned by the bidder. Predicting this change, stock market can increase their 
expectation of the firm's prospect. In our setting, one might conjecture that financial bidders could have 
better policy in mind than strategic bidders. So only those firms targeted by financial bidders preempt 
policies planned by bidder. If it is financial bidders’ superior management skills than strategic bidders 
that drive differential stock price reaction, we should see positive revaluation effect for all firms targeted 
by financial bidders. In reality, revaluation on larger firms dissipates at the news of bid withdrawal.  
One might also argue that target management, considering financial bidders as corporate raider, 
successfully resist takeover threat and become more disciplined to improve operation performance 
Safieddine and Titman (1999). This does not relate to financial bidders’ better know-how on corporate 
governance but can still affect investors’ expectation. If it is unwanted bids that wake target management 
up and make them more engaged, this channel should be most prominent in bids that are hostile or 
rejected by target board of directors.  In fact, financial bids on small firms rejected by directors are less 
than 10 percent and not associated with any significant positive revaluation, according to our 
investigation results on failure reasons reported in Table 2.7. Furthermore, when estimating financial 
bidders’ revaluation effect on small firms in Table 2.4, we have already controlled for hostile deal 
attitude. The positive revaluation effect persists in all specifications. As a matter of fact, less than 15 
percent of small firms targeted by financial bidders are hostile. In unreported column of Table 2.4, we 
drop those observations and check whether small firms targeted by financial bidders still obtain 
revaluation in friendly cash-only bids. Results show it is indeed the case.  
To sum up, the cases pertaining to future operation improvement are shown to be thinly present in 
our sample. Evidence overall does not support this anticipation effect. 
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2.4.8. Can target undervaluation motive be generalized to completed bids? 
Up to this point, we show our findings support undervaluation hypothesis and are not driven by 
unobservable factors associated simultaneously to failure and target price, or anticipation of future 
successful takeovers and operation improvement. Yet there is still another potential issue worth 
discussing. That is, using failed bids as main empirical specification would in fact hinder us from 
generalize our findings to completed deals, if bids driven by target undervaluation are only found in 
failed bids. In light of previous empirical evidences, this should not be a major concern. For example, 
Dong et al. (2006) show bids involving undervalued targets have a completion rate of 73.9 percent, only 
8.7 percent lower than the other targets. More recently, Edmans et al. (2012) provide evidence that target 
undervaluation not only attracts both financial and strategic bidders, but also remains a significant driver 
when they only keep completed bids in their analysis.53  In this regard, target undervaluation is neither 
restricted to a particular type of bidder nor exclusive to failed bids. 
2.5. Conclusion 
Acquisitions are attempts by biding firms to exploit not only synergies but other sources of potential 
gains. Specifically, we show that financial acquirers can exploit, among others, information advantages 
they may have regarding the true value of the target firm. When information is severely asymmetric, 
financial acquirers show an advantage over strategic acquirers and pocket a higher gain from mispriced 
targets. 
As the next step, we are going to distinguish whether this differential revaluation effect between 
bidder types is due to financial bidders’ better analytical skills or market segmentation, i.e. they are more 
specialized in the business of exploiting undervaluation opportunities than strategic bidders.  
A caveat of our empirical strategy is that we rely on stock price information. That means we are 
unable to accommodate private target firms, which are probably subject to severe information 
asymmetry. 
  
                                                          
53 See (Edmans et al., 2012) Internet Appendix Table IA6. 
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Figure 2.1: Revaluation effect on target firms 
This figure depicts the evolution of cumulative abnormal returns(CARs) for 258 financial failed bids (solid line) and 531 
strategic failed bids (dashed line), which constitute to our main sample. B is the date of bid announcement. F is the date of 
withdraw announcement. The first part, from B-25 to B along the x-axis, captures price run-ups prior to the bid announcement. 
The middle part, from B to F along the x-axis, depicts how the stock market incorporates deal-specific information as the bid 
progresses towards failure. For each bid, the length between B and F is standardized to 100 days.   The third part, from F to 
F+25 along the x-axis, shows how the target price settles after the date of withdraw announcement and to what extent it reverts 
to its preannouncement level.  
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Figure 2.2:  Kaplan-Meier survival estimates.  
This figure plots the conditional probability of firms surviving takeover threat over time. The pool of observations starting at 
Years=0 is out cash-only sample (218 financial failed bids and 237 strategic failed bids). The estimates adjust for right censoring 
such as firms remaining listed and independent at the end of observation period and firms delisted for reasons other than 
takeover, e.g., bankruptcy or regulator enforcement. 
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Table 2.1: Deal summary statistics 
(Continued) 
This table reports key deal-level characteristics for the main sample as described in Section3. Panel A displays bids issued by financial acquirers. Panel B displays those by strategic acquirers. 
Panel C compares, in groups divided by completed and failed, the difference of deal characteristics between financial and strategic acquirers. Cash(Stock/Other) is the percent of deal value to be 
paid in cash (stock/total value minus value paid in cash and stock). Days is the number of trading days between announcement date and effective/withdraw date. DealValue (TargetSize) is the 
transaction value (target market capitalization four calendar weeks prior to bid announcement) in millions of 2014 dollar using Consumer Price Index Conversion Factors. MB is the market-to-
book value of target's equity four calendar weeks prior to bid announcement. Premium is bidder's offer price divided by target's stock price four calendar weeks prior to bid announcement. It is 
truncated between zero and two. StakeSought is the percentage of common, or common equivalent, shares outstanding sought by the acquirer in this transaction. Toehold is the percent of common 
shares outstanding held by the acquirer as of the announcement date. Hostile, TenderOffer, TTerm and InvGroup equal one for bids in which the bidder's attitude is hostile, tender offer is involved, 
the target is liable to pay a termination fee to the acquirer upon withdrawal, or the acquirer is a group of multiple investors, respectively, and zero otherwise 
Panel A: Acquisition bids issued by financial bidders   
  
Completed bids  Failed bids 
  
Failed 
-
Completed 
  N 
Mea
n 
Medi
an 
Std.d
ev. 
Min Max   N Mean Median Std.dev. Min Max   
t-test 
p-value 
Cash 1,310 91 100 25 0 100  258 93 100 21 0 100  0.43 
Stock 1,310 4 0 19 0 100  258 4 0 17 0 100  0.64 
Other 1,310 4 0 16 0 100  258 3 0 13 0 81  0.51 
Days 1,310 94 78 63 0 357  258 100 80 80 0 365  0.21 
DealValue 1,255 220 101 275 0 1,635  247 275 142 344 0 2,127  0.01 
TargetSize 1,310 205 89 266 0 1,744  258 248 119 321 1 1,853  0.02 
MB 730 2 1 2 0 12  173 2 1 5 0 48  0.2 
Premium 1,310 41 32 32 0 125  258 40 31 34 0 200  0.57 
Premium1d 1,303 46 26 243 -89 7,936  257 31 25 32 -50 249  0.35 
Hostile 1,310 0 0 0 0 1  258 0 0 0 0 1  0 
TenderOffer 1,310 1 1 0 0 1  258 0 0 1 0 1  0.04 
StakeSought 1,309 87 100 22 0 100  255 89 100 18 3 100  0.12 
Toehold 367 28 29 14 0 80  107 18 15 14 0 64  0 
TTerm 1,310 0 0 0 0 1  258 0 0 0 0 1  0 
InvGroup 1,310 0 0 0 0 1   258 0 0 0 0 1   0.04 
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Table 2.2: Deal summary statistics 
(Continued) 
Panel B: Acquisition bids issued by strategic bidders   
  
Completed bids  Failed bids 
  
Failed 
-
Completed 
  N 
Mea
n 
Medi
an 
Std.d
ev. 
Min Max   N Mean Median Std.dev. Min Max   
t-test 
p-value 
Cash 5,399 60 100 46 0 100  531 51 55 47 0 100  0 
Stock 5,399 36 0 46 0 100  531 45 0 47 0 100  0 
Other 5,399 4 0 13 0 100  531 4 0 15 0 100  0.85 
Days 5,399 96 82 59 0 365  531 87 70 70 0 363  0 
DealValue 5,097 253 125 305 0 1,906  509 210 106 271 0 2,094  0 
TargetSize 5,399 223 101 287 0 1,968  531 192 79 275 0 2,155  0.02 
MB 3,761 3 2 2 0 12  378 3 1 6 0 48  0 
Premium 5,399 48 40 34 0 125  531 47 39 38 0 200  0.66 
Premium1d 5,398 93 100 17 2 100  529 96 100 13 4 100  0 
Hostile 924 24 25 16 0 88  84 16 14 12 1 52  0 
TenderOffer 5,399 0 0 0 0 1  531 0 0 0 0 1  0 
StakeSought 5,399 0 0 0 0 1  531 0 0 0 0 1  0 
Toehold 5,399 0 0 0 0 1  531 0 0 0 0 1  0 
TTerm 5,399 0 0 0 0 1   531 0 0 0 0 0   0.22 
InvGroup 5,399 60 100 46 0 100  531 51 55 47 0 100  0 
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Table 2.1: Deal summary statistics  
Panel C: Financial versus strategic bidders   
   
  Completed bids   Failed bids 
  
Financial 
- 
Strategic 
t-test  
p-value 
  
Financial 
- 
Strategic 
t-test 
p-value 
Cash 32 0  42 0 
Stock -32 0  -41 0 
Other 0 0.29  0 0.71 
Days -2 0.18  13 0.02 
DealValue -34 0  65 0 
TargetSize -18 0.04  57 0.01 
MB -1 0  -1 0.2 
Premium -7 0  -8 0.01 
StakeSought -7 0  -7 0 
Toehold 3 0  2 0.38 
Hostile 0 0.66  0 0.48 
TenderOffer 0 0  0 0 
TTerm 0 0  0 0.13 
InvGroup 0 0   0 0 
 
70 
 
Table 2.3: Revaluation: summary statistics and univariate tests 
This table reports summary statistics and univariate tests on absolute cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) from 25 trading days before bid announcement to 25 trading days after failure 
announcement. Daily abnormal returns are computed using a market model with parameters estimated over 250 trading days ending 25 trading days prior to the bid announcement. Financial bids 
(Strategic bids) contain only bids initiated by a financial(strategic) bidder. Paid in stock > 0 is the subsample in which a bid is to be paid, either partly or fully, in stock shares. Pay in cash = 100% 
is the subsample in which a bid is to be paid fully in cash. In Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4, bids are ranked by target market capitalization and divided into four groups: in the lower quartile, between 25 
percent to 50 percent, between 50 percent to 75 percent, and in the upper quartile. Domestic(Crossborder) is the subsample in which both acquirer and target are(not) domiciled in the same country. 
To test whether the cumulative absolute abnormal returns are significantly different from zero as well as between financial and strategic acquirers, we compute skewness-adjusted t-statistic (t-test) 
and z-statistic of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test (Wilcoxon-test).  ***, **, and * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significance respectively 
  Financial and Strategic bids   Financial bids   Strategic bids   Strategic - Financial 
  N Mean Median   N Mean Median   N Mean Median   t-test Wilcoxon-test 
Main sample 789 0.046** 0.036***  258 0.112*** 0.059***  531 0.015 0.031  -2.56** -1.76* 
Pay in stock > 0 281 -0.044 -0.015  16 -0.039 0.069  265 -0.045 -0.018  -0.03 -0.71 
Pay in cash = 100% 455 0.099*** 0.076***  218 0.121*** 0.050***  237 0.079** 0.097***  -0.94 -0.09 
             
In the subsample of pay in cash =100%             
Q1 86 0.204*** 0.156***  41 0.356*** 0.243***  45 0.065 0.073  -2.26** -2.28** 
Q2 130 0.036 -0.002  130 0.036 -0.002  130 0.036 -0.002  -0.73 0.01 
Q3 126 0.103*** 0.100***  59 0.033 0.013  67 0.164*** 0.168***  1.72* 1.87* 
Q4 113 0.087** 0.064***  68 0.090* 0.020*  45 0.084 0.098*  -0.07 0.26 
Domestic 321 0.125*** 0.101***  164 0.138*** 0.065***  157 0.112*** 0.118***  -0.49 0.5 
Domestic Q1 69 0.199*** 0.155**  35 0.351*** 0.233***  34 0.042 0.039  -2.25** -2.21** 
Cross border 134 0.035 0.015  54 0.069 0.007  80 0.013 0.015  -0.67 -0.64 
Cross border Q1 17 0.225 0.303   6 0.388 0.493   11 0.135 0.162   -0.72 -1.01 
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Table 2.4: Revaluation: baseline regression 
This table reports OLS regression on absolute cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) form 25 days before bid announcement to 
25 days after failure announcement. Financial is a dummy variable equal to one for bids by financial acquirers and zero 
otherwise. Log(TargetSize) is the natural logarithm of target market capitalization in millions of 2014 dollar four calendar 
weeks prior to bid announcement. Cash is a dummy equal to one for bids that more than half of deal value is paid in cash. 
Premium is bidder's offer divided by target's market value of equity four calendar weeks prior to bid announcement and 
truncated between zero and two. Hostile and TenderOffer are dummy variables indicating a bid in which the bidder's attitude 
is hostile and tender offer is involved, respectively. Year fixed effect is based on the announcement year. Industry fixed effect 
is based on 1-digit SIC codes. Column(1)-(3) contain the main sample. Column (4)-(6) examine the subgroup of bids to be paid 
fully in cash. Heteroskedasticity-robust t statistics are in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
significance respectively. 
  Main sample   Pay in cash = 100% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Financial 0.097** 0.078** 0.044 0.604**  0.042 0.028 0.046 0.825*** 
 [2.56] [2.06] [1.10] [2.34]  [0.94] [0.61] [1.03] [3.92] 
Financial × 
Log(TargetSize)    -0.103***     -0.141*** 
    [-3.26]     [-3.68] 
Financial × Cash    0.036      
    [0.25]      
Financial × Premium    -0.001     -0.002 
    [-0.50]     [-1.10] 
Financial × Hostile    0.044     0.177 
    [0.47]     [1.61] 
Financial × TenderOffer    -0.226***     -0.200** 
    [-2.92]     [-2.37] 
Log(TargetSize)   0.009 0.043**    0.002 0.074*** 
   [0.54] [2.16]    [0.09] [2.60] 
Cash   0.090* 0.074      
   [1.93] [1.48]      
Premium   0.002*** 0.003***    0.002** 0.003** 
   [3.19] [3.20]    [2.25] [2.26] 
Hostile   0.130*** 0.116**    0.116** 0.042 
   [2.89] [2.28]    [1.97] [0.63] 
TenderOffer   0.136*** 0.215***    0.116** 0.201*** 
   [3.28] [4.14]    [2.47] [3.23] 
Constant 0.015 0.028 -0.271* -0.429***  0.079** -0.031 -0.275 -0.659*** 
 [0.62] [0.25] [-1.95] [-2.98]  [2.53] [-0.19] [-1.42] [-3.38] 
Observations 789 789 789 789   455 455 455 455 
Adjusted R-squared 0.006 0.040 0.093 0.114  -0.000 0.041 0.080 0.124 
Year dummies N Y Y Y  N Y Y Y 
Industry dummies N Y Y Y   N Y Y Y 
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Table 2.5: Revaluation: information asymmetry by target firm size 
This table reports OLS regression on absolute cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) form 25 days before bid announcement to 
25 days after failure announcement. Financial(Strategic) equals one for bids initiated by financial(strategic) acquirers and zero 
otherwise. Q1 equals one for the subsample of bids in which the target market capitalization is ranked in the lower quartile. 
Log(TargetSize) is the natural logarithm of target market capitalization in millions of 2014 dollar four calendar weeks prior to 
bid announcement. Cash equals one for bids in which more than half of deal value is paid in cash. Premium is bidder's offer 
divided by target's market value of equity four calendar weeks prior to bid announcement and truncated between zero and two. 
Hostile and TenderOffer equal one if the bidder's attitude is hostile or tender offer is involved, and zero otherwise. Year fixed 
effect is based on the announcement year. Industry fixed effect is based on 1-digit SIC codes. Column(1)-(6) contain the main 
sample. Column (7)-(12) examine the subgroup of bids to be paid fully in cash. Heteroskedasticity-robust t statistics are in 
brackets. ***, **, and * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significance respectively. 
  Main sample   Pay in cash = 100% 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Financial 0.002 -0.018 0.426  0.001 -0.026 0.663*** 
 [0.06] [-0.45] [1.52]  [0.01] [-0.55] [2.69] 
Financial × Q1 0.222** 0.293*** 0.142  0.239** 0.334*** 0.143 
 [2.37] [2.79] [1.20]  [2.48] [2.88] [1.09] 
Financial × Log(TargetSize)   -0.074**    -0.112** 
   [-2.00]    [-2.47] 
Financial × Cash   0.057     
   [0.38]     
Financial × Premium   -0.001    -0.002 
   [-0.45]    [-1.07] 
Financial × Hostile   0.038    0.170 
   [0.40]    [1.53] 
Financial × TenderOffer   -0.228***    -0.199** 
   [-2.95]    [-2.35] 
Log(TargetSize)  0.027 0.043**   0.036 0.074** 
  [1.55] [2.14]   [1.47] [2.58] 
Cash 0.093** 0.095** 0.074     
 [2.00] [2.03] [1.47]     
Premium 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003***  0.002** 0.002** 0.003** 
 [2.98] [3.42] [3.19]  [2.13] [2.30] [2.25] 
Hostile 0.136*** 0.122*** 0.116**  0.118** 0.098* 0.041 
 [3.13] [2.76] [2.28]  [2.10] [1.70] [0.62] 
TenderOffer 0.129*** 0.134*** 0.215***  0.111** 0.112** 0.201*** 
 [3.15] [3.27] [4.14]  [2.38] [2.43] [3.23] 
Constant -0.208** -0.345** -0.432***  -0.231 -0.421** -0.664*** 
 [-1.96] [-2.50] [-3.01]  [-1.52] [-2.30] [-3.43] 
Observations 789 789 789   455 455 455 
Adjusted R-squared 0.102 0.105 0.114  0.099 0.105 0.125 
Year dummies Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Industry dummies Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
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Table 2.6: Revaluation: robustness check on target firm size 
This table reports OLS regression on absolute cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) form 25 days before bid announcement to 25 days after failure announcement. Financial(Strategic) equals one 
for bids initiated by financial(strategic) acquirers and zero otherwise. Q1, Q2, and Q3 equal one respectively for the subsamples of bids in which the target market capitalization is ranked in the 
lower quartile, between 25th and 50th percentile, or be-tween 50th and 75th percentile, and zero otherwise. Cash equals one for bids in which more than half of deal value is paid in cash. Premium 
is bidder's offer divided by target's market value of equity four calendar weeks prior to bid announcement and truncated between zero and two. Hostile and TenderOffer equal one if the bidder's 
attitude is hostile or tender offer is involved, and zero otherwise. Year fixed effect is based on the announcement year. Industry fixed effect is based on 1-digit SIC codes. Column(1)-(4) contain 
the main sample. Column (5)-(8) examine the subgroup of bids to be paid fully in cash. Heteroskedasticity-robust t statistics are in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent significance respectively 
  Main sample   Pay in cash = 100% 
 
Financial and strategic 
bids  
Financial 
bids  
Strategic 
bids  
Financial and strategic 
bids  
Financial 
bids  
Strategic 
bids 
  (1) (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) (6)   (7)   (8) 
Financial 0.015       0.015      
 [0.31]       [0.27]      
Financial × Q1 0.209**   0.197*    0.225**   0.219**   
 [2.11]   [1.91]    [2.14]   [1.99]   
Financial × Q2 -0.037   -0.040    -0.024   0.004   
 [-0.46]   [-0.44]    [-0.27]   [0.04]   
Financial × Q3 -0.010   -0.003    -0.022   -0.009   
 [-0.17]   [-0.05]    [-0.32]   [-0.12]   
Strategic  -0.055       -0.037     
  [-1.03]       [-0.53]     
Strategic × Q1   -0.020    -0.012   -0.108    -0.069 
  [-0.27]    [-0.17]   [-1.08]    [-0.67] 
Strategic × Q2  -0.028    -0.026   -0.061    -0.073 
  [-0.45]    [-0.40]   [-0.74]    [-0.83] 
Strategic × Q3  0.078    0.082   0.107    0.131 
  [1.34]    [1.39]   [1.20]    [1.35] 
Control variables and constant variables are not reported here due to limitation of space.    
Observations 789 789  258  531  455 455  218  237 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.100 0.095  0.160  0.083  0.095 0.090  0.136  0.077 
Year dummies Y Y  Y  Y  Y Y  Y  Y 
Industry dummies Y Y   Y   Y   Y Y   Y   Y 
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Table 2.7: Revaluation information asymmetry by target-bidder geographic proximity 
This table reports OLS regression on absolute cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) form 25 days before bid announcement to 25 days after failure announcement. Financial(Strategic) equals one 
for bids initiated by financial(strategic) acquirers and zero otherwise. Q1 equals one for the subsample of bids in which the target market capitalization is ranked in the lower quartile. 
Domestic(Crossborder) is the subsample in which both acquirer and target are(not) domiciled in the same country Log(TargetSize) is the natural logarithm of target market capitalization in millions 
of 2014 dollar four calendar weeks prior to bid announcement. Cash equals one for bids in which more than half of deal value is paid in cash. Premium is bidder's offer divided by target's market 
value of equity four calendar weeks prior to bid announcement and truncated between zero and two. Hostile and TenderOffer equal one if the bidder's attitude is hostile or tender offer is involved, 
and zero otherwise. Year fixed effect is based on the announcement year. Industry fixed effect is based on 1-digit SIC codes. Column(1)-(6) contain the main sample. Column (7)-(12) examine the 
subgroup of bids to be paid fully in cash. Heteroskedasticity-robust t statistics are in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significance respectively. 
 
Main sample   Pay in cash = 100% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (6)   (7) (8) (9) (10) (12) 
Financial 0.580** -0.017 0.033 0.021 -0.008 
 
0.785*** 0.035 0.071 0.095 0.044  
[2.20] [-0.10] [0.20] [0.13] [-0.04] 
 
[3.54] [0.34] [0.67] [1.11] [0.42] 
Financial × Domestic 0.023 0.039 0.007 
 
0.036 
 
0.036 0.066 0.036 
 
0.064  
[0.35] [0.59] [0.10] 
 
[0.53] 
 
[0.48] [0.89] [0.47] 
 
[0.86] 
Financial × Q1 
 
0.310*** 
     
0.339*** 
   
  
[2.95] 
     
[2.85] 
   
Financial × Domestic × Q1 
  
0.279** 0.296*** 0.287** 
   
0.288** 0.316*** 0.301**    
[2.46] [2.62] [2.53] 
   
[2.40] [2.61] [2.50] 
Financial × Crossborder × Q1 
   
0.262 0.287 
    
0.273 0.316     
[1.09] [1.16] 
    
[0.86] [0.97] 
Financial × Log(TargetSize) -0.102*** 
     
-0.138*** 
    
 
[-3.23] 
     
[-3.62] 
    
Financial × Cash 0.036 0.076 0.059 0.073 0.073 
      
 
[0.24] [0.50] [0.39] [0.48] [0.48] 
      
Financial × Premium -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
-0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  
[-0.51] [-0.11] [-0.01] [-0.06] [-0.09] 
 
[-1.12] [-0.61] [-0.52] [-0.54] [-0.59] 
Financial × Hostile 0.042 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.001 
 
0.177 0.128 0.127 0.123 0.123  
[0.45] [0.05] [0.04] [0.04] [0.01] 
 
[1.60] [1.16] [1.15] [1.10] [1.11] 
Financial × TenderOffer -0.221*** -0.211*** -0.209*** -0.215*** -0.207*** 
 
-0.192** -0.179** -0.178** -0.190** -0.177**  
[-2.80] [-2.67] [-2.61] [-2.77] [-2.59] 
 
[-2.22] [-2.05] [-2.02] [-2.22] [-2.01] 
Log(TargetSize) 0.043** 0.029* 0.024 0.027 0.028 
 
0.074** 0.038 0.027 0.033 0.034  
[2.16] [1.67] [1.40] [1.55] [1.56] 
 
[2.58] [1.49] [1.05] [1.25] [1.28] 
Cash 0.074 0.074 0.073 0.073 0.074 
      
 
[1.49] [1.48] [1.47] [1.47] [1.48] 
      
Premium 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 
0.003** 0.003** 0.003* 0.003* 0.003*  
[3.20] [2.97] [2.89] [2.94] [2.93] 
 
[2.26] [1.99] [1.93] [1.95] [1.96] 
Hostile 0.116** 0.123** 0.125** 0.124** 0.125** 
 
0.042 0.061 0.066 0.064 0.065  
[2.29] [2.42] [2.45] [2.44] [2.44] 
 
[0.64] [0.93] [0.99] [0.96] [0.97] 
TenderOffer 0.215*** 0.211*** 0.210*** 0.211*** 0.211*** 
 
0.202*** 0.202*** 0.203*** 0.203*** 0.203***  
[4.14] [4.06] [4.04] [4.05] [4.05] 
 
[3.23] [3.25] [3.26] [3.24] [3.24] 
Constant -0.430*** -0.385*** -0.362*** -0.373*** -0.375*** 
 
-0.658*** -0.515*** -0.464** -0.486** -0.488**  
[-2.98] [-2.78] [-2.61] [-2.69] [-2.70] 
 
[-3.37] [-2.72] [-2.40] [-2.52] [-2.53] 
Observations 789 789 789 789 789   455 455 455 455 455 
Adjusted R-squared 0.112 0.109 0.105 0.107 0.106 
 
0.122 0.109 0.099 0.102 0.101 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table 2.8: Revaluation: failure categories 
This table reports OLS regression on absolute cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) form 25 days before bid announcement to 
25 days after failure announcement using the same specification as in the column of cash-only bids in Table 2.3 by failure 
categories for the subgroups of, Financial × Small, Other Financial, and Strategic after controlling for premium, target size, 
hostile and tender offer. N(% of N) reports the number(fraction) of observations for the corresponding subgroup falling into 
each failure category. Coefficient is the revaluation effect loading on each subgroup and left blank if observations are too few.  
***, **, and * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significance respectively. 
  Financial × Small   Other financial   Strategic 
  N 
% of 
N 
Coefficient   N 
% of 
N 
Coefficient   N 
% of 
N 
Coefficient 
(1)No more information 17 38.64 0.38***  51 29.31 0.09  75 31.65 -0.19** 
(2)Term mutually 
disagree 
0 0   1 0.57   2 0.84 0 
(3)Bidder no financing 0 0   3 1.72 0  0 0  
(4)Regulator reject 2 4.55 0.34  13 7.47 0.27  18 7.59 -0.27 
(5)Bidder withdraw 1 2.27   8 4.6 -0.12  10 4.22 -0.02 
(6)Target released news 0 0   0 0   1 0.42  
(7)Price too low 1 2.27   9 5.17 0.24*  14 5.91 -0.23* 
(8)Tender failed 16 36.36 0.42***  61 35.06 -0.19**  53 22.36 0.01 
(9)Board reject 4 9.09 0.11  22 12.64 -0.13  38 16.03 0.08 
(10)Shareholder reject 3 6.82 0.59*   16 9.2 -0.25   18 7.59 0.06 
Strict sample (1)-(4) 19 43.18 0.38***  67 38.51 0.1  95 40.08 -0.19*** 
Full sample (1)-(10) 44 100 0.36***   174 100 -0.04   237 100 -0.07 
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Table 2.9: Frequency of future takeovers 
This table reports Cox proportional-hazard regression results. It estimates the marginal effect of variables on the rate of 
subsequent takeovers following a bid failure. Financial(Strategic) is a dummy variable equal to one for bids by 
financial(strategic) acquirers and zero otherwise. Small indicates the group of bids in which the target market capitalization is 
ranked in the lower quartile. CARs are the absolute cumulative abnormal returns form 25 days before bid announcement to 25 
days after failure announcement. Log(TargetSize) is the natural logarithm of target market capitalization in millions of 2014 
dollar four calendar weeks prior to bid announcement. Cash is a dummy equal to one for bids that more than half of deal value 
is paid in cash. Premium is bidder's offer divided by target's market value of equity four calendar weeks prior to bid 
announcement and truncated between zero and two. Hostile and TenderOffer are dummy variables indicating a bid in which 
the bidder's attitude is hostile and tender offer is involved, respectively. Year fixed effect is based on the announcement year. 
Industry fixed effect is based on 1-digit SIC codes. Column(1)-(4) contain the main sample. Column (5)-(6) examine the 
subgroup of bids to be paid fully in cash. z-statistics is in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent significance respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Financial × Small × Cars 0.041 0.207 -0.026 0.089 -0.116 -0.633 -0.276 
 -0.16 -0.66 (-0.07) -0.19 (-0.29) (-1.34) (-0.51) 
Financial × Small   -0.018 -0.021  0.115 0.13 
   (-0.06) (-0.07)  -0.36 -0.41 
CARs   0.316***   0.507***  
   -2.59   -2.76  
Financial × CARs    0.2   0.153 
    -0.74   -0.49 
Strategic × CARs    0.341**   0.661*** 
    -2.57   -3.14 
Log(TargetSize)  0.066* 0.061 0.062 0.004 -0.015 -0.008 
  -1.72 -1.5 -1.53 -0.07 (-0.24) (-0.14) 
Cash  0.276** 0.256** 0.259**    
  -2.38 -2.18 -2.21    
Premium  0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002 
  -1.06 -0.56 -0.54 -1.24 -0.8 -0.68 
Hostile  0.300** 0.274* 0.277* 0.261 0.221 0.24 
  -1.99 -1.81 -1.83 -1.34 -1.12 -1.21 
TenderOffer  -0.383*** -0.433*** -0.435*** -0.188 -0.26 -0.271* 
  (-3.16) (-3.53) (-3.55) (-1.20) (-1.63) (-1.70) 
Observations 789 789 789 789 455 455 455 
Year FE N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table 2.10: Value of future takeovers 
This table reports OLS regression of the deal value (log in millions of 2014 US dollar) that a target firm eventually receives 
from a successful takeover after initial failed bid. Financial(Strategic) is a dummy variable equal to one for bids by 
financial(strategic) acquirers and zero otherwise. Small indicates the group of bids in which the target market capitalization is 
ranked in the lower quartile. CARs are the absolute cumulative abnormal returns form 25 days before bid announcement to 25 
days after failure announcement. Cash is a dummy equal to one for bids that more than half of deal value is paid in cash. 
Premium is bidder's offer divided by target's market value of equity four calendar weeks prior to bid announcement and 
truncated between zero and two. Hostile and TenderOffer are dummy variables indicating a bid in which the bidder's attitude 
is hostile and tender offer is involved, respectively. Year fixed effect is based on the announcement year. Industry fixed effect 
is based on 1-digit SIC codes. Column(1)-(4) contain bids from main sample that are ultimately acquired. Column (5)-(6) 
examine bids from the subgroup of failed cash-only bids that are ultimately acquired. z-statistics is in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* indicate 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significance respectively. ***, **, and * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent significance respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Financial × Small × Cars 0.003 -0.673 -0.929 1.183 -1.342 -3.22 -1.354 
 [0.00] [-0.57] [-0.81] [0.59] [-0.81] [-1.46] [-0.75] 
Financial × Small   -0.228 -0.291  0.501 0.583 
   [-0.15] [-0.19]  [0.31] [0.36] 
CARs   0.583   1.842  
   [0.98]   [1.32]  
Financial × CARs    -1.485   0.016 
    [-1.07]   [0.01] 
Strategic × CARs    1.145   2.86 
    [1.46]   [1.29] 
Cash  -0.505 -0.561 -0.501    
  [-0.76] [-0.85] [-0.78]    
Premium  2.335*** 2.184*** 2.206*** 2.694* 2.284* 2.256* 
  [3.05] [2.88] [2.83] [1.93] [1.84] [1.79] 
Hostile  0.963 0.857 0.862 2.741 2.54 2.602 
  [0.74] [0.70] [0.70] [1.18] [1.17] [1.18] 
TenderOffer  0.252 0.214 0.169 0.741 0.605 0.557 
  [0.46] [0.41] [0.33] [0.75] [0.69] [0.65] 
Years between  0.379*** 0.387*** 0.383*** 0.458** 0.479** 0.488** 
  [2.75] [2.75] [2.78] [2.18] [2.16] [2.15] 
Constant 2.025*** -0.235 -0.209 -0.352 -2.3 -1.165 -0.678 
 [5.96] [-0.24] [-0.21] [-0.33] [-0.73] [-0.48] [-0.32] 
Observations 311 311 311 311 189 189 189 
Adjusted R-squared) -0.003 0.114 0.109 0.114 0.177 0.178 0.181 
Year FE N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Chapter 3: Is productivity a source of bargaining power in cross-border acquisitions? 
3.1. Introduction 
For the past 30 years, ownership of over USD10 trillion of assets has been transferred from local 
targets to foreign acquirers via cross-border acquisitions. While a growing literature uncovers when and 
why foreign acquirers are interested in buying ownership of local targets, surprisingly little is known 
about who has more bargaining power in the negotiation process. To this end, this study focuses on 
examining one plausible source of bargaining power: country-level productivity in a global value chain.  
A global value chain is where different countries specialize in different stages of a sequential 
production process and each country contributes to the total value to a final product. Those who add 
more value are more productive. Local firms in those countries present higher country-level productivity 
for they have exclusive access to sources of productivity that spill over locally such as factor 
endowments, technology, institutional strength, and so on. To access those sources of productivity, 
foreign firms could buy local firms’ ownership. But the latter can leverage their exclusive access and 
demand a high selling price because they know foreign firms do not have equally good outside options: 
they cannot find another target country that is equally productive in conducting same economic activity. 
As a result, foreign firms must either agree to the high price or – if they do not want to overpay – let 
local firms retain majority ownership. Accordingly, I argue that the likelihood of foreign corporate 
control decreases with local firms’ country-level productivity in global value chains, all else being equal. 
To test this hypothesis, I use a sample of 21,264 cross-border acquisitions between 2004 and 2010 
with a total value of USD 2.20 trillion. I use the value-added-adjusted revealed comparative advantage 
index calculated in Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2014) to measure relative productivity among countries 
in a value chain. Conventionally, relative productivity is computed as the share of a sector of a country's 
total gross exports relative to the world average of the same sector in world exports. Given countries' 
participation in global value chains, using gross exports to compute revealed productivity is subject to 
double counting of value added embedded in intermediate goods along the production sequence. For 
this reason, Koopman, et al. decompose gross exports into (1) domestic value added ultimately 
consumed by foreign countries, (2) domestic value added eventually returning to home country, (3) 
foreign value added returning to foreign countries, (4) and pure double counting of intermediate goods 
that cross the border more than once. And country-sector productivity in a global value chain is based 
on Item (1): domestic value added in exports. 
I find strong supporting evidence for the hypothesis. Foreign control is less common in target 
countries with higher relative productivity in global value chains. A one-unit increase in productivity 
decreases the probability of foreign control by approximately 2.5 percent. This mean marginal effect 
increases to 4.4 percent if target countries have an obvious advantage in their position of the value 
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chains. Results are consistent in both forward and backward vertical acquisitions. This negative relation 
between foreign control and target country relative productivity is robust after controlling for the listed 
status of targets and acquirers, the sector-level interdependence between acquirers and targets, 
ownership concentration and minority investor protection. The results also persist after controlling for 
drivers of cross-border acquisition flows, such as differences in market valuation and currency 
appreciation across countries.  
Another reasonable concern is that unmeasurable acquirer heterogeneity induces a self-selection 
bias: some acquirers may only invest in a minority equity stake and crowd in target countries with high 
productivity for unknown reasons other than lower bargaining power. To control for this acquirer 
heterogeneity, I conduct an analysis on a refined sample composed of acquirers that have made both 
minority and majority acquisitions over the sample period. The findings remain unchanged. An 
alternative explanation for the negative relation between foreign control and target country-level 
productivity is that, to gain control over more product targets, acquirers must make a series of minority 
investments before takeover, whereas they can directly buy control rights of less productive targets.  To 
address this concern, I narrow the sample to targets that have only been invested once by the same 
foreign acquirer over the sample period. Again, main findings remain the same. Furthermore, 
government protection can be an alternative driver for non-controlling acquisitions. Therefore, I re-
examine the relation on the sample that contains only non-strategic sectors, which should be less prone 
to government protection. The negative effect of target country productivity on foreign control stays 
significant for non-strategic sectors. This indicates that non-controlling acquisition is not solely driven 
by government protection.  
First, this work directly contributes to the literature on mergers and acquisitions. To my knowledge, 
this study is among the first to explore bargaining power and the negotiation outcome of cross-border 
acquisitions, whereas existing literature focuses on the drivers of acquisition flows across countries 
(Baker, Foley, and Wurgler, 2009; Huizinga and Voget, 2009; Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Bris and Cabolis, 
2008; Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar, 2010; Erel, Liao, and Weisbach, 2012; Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi, 
2015; Karolyi and Taboada, 2015; Frésard, Hege, and Phillips, 2017). This chapter also complements 
Ahern (2012). While Ahern identifies sector-level vertical relatedness as a source of bargaining power, 
this work provides supporting evidence that productivity in global value chains is another source of 
bargaining power. In terms of acquisition type and its link to product market, this study is closely related 
to Frésard, Hege, and Phillips (2017), which also explores how global product market characteristics 
affect firm decisions regarding global organization. They focus on horizontal acquisitions and horizontal 
specialization, whereby countries present different degrees of advantage in producing final products. 
My work complements theirs by investigating vertical acquisitions and accounting for a rising feature 
in the globalized product market: that of vertical specialization where countries have different 
advantages at different stages of a final product’s production process. Furthermore, my work extends 
81 
 
Ouimet (2013) by uncovering cross-country determinants on the choice between full and partial 
integration at global scale, including variation in corporate governance among target countries as well 
as relative stock market valuation and temporary purchasing power between acquirer and target 
countries.  
Second, this study builds on a growing research effort to assess the impact of vertical specialization. 
Yi (2003) focuses on vertical specialization’s role in trade cost and ultimately, economic growth. 
Costinot, Vogel, and Wang (2013) examine how vertical specialization influences country 
interdependence. Several other studies investigate how vertical specialization alter conventional wisdom 
on international trade based on gross trade data (Bems, Johson, and Yi, 2011; Koopman, Wang, and 
Wei, 2014; Patel, Wang, and Wei, 2017). This work shows that the impact of vertical specialization goes 
beyond international trade, reaching out to the international market for corporate control by empowering 
local firms to stay independent from foreign capital flows if they are in countries that have greater 
advantage in adding value to global value chains. 
Third, this work sheds new light on the literature on the distributional effects of globalization. 
Existing literature focus on the distribution of gain between government and firm shareholders (Col, 
Liao, and Zeume, 2016), between employees across different categories (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007; 
Feenstra, 2008; Bustos, 2011; Amiti and Davis, 2012; Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen, 2016), between 
customers across different income levels (Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal, 2016), and between countries 
along global value chains (Timmer, Erumban, Los, Stehrer, and De Vries, 2014). This study focuses on 
a pertinent but relative unexplored pie-splitting mechanism – local firms versus foreign firms.  
3.2. Related literature and hypothesis development 
This work builds on a growing research effort to understand cross-border acquisitions. Existing 
literature focuses on identifying drivers of acquisition flows across borders, such as cross-country 
differences in taxation (Huizinga and Voget, 2009), in bilateral trade, stock market valuation and 
currency appreciation (Erel, Liao, and Weisbach, 2012), in regulation (Karolyi and Taboada, 2015), in 
culture (Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi, 2015), and in industry specialization (Frésard, Hege, and 
Gordon, 2017). While these studies uncover when and why foreign acquirers are interested in buying 
ownership of certain local targets, little is known about which party has more bargaining power.   
3.2.1. Productivity in global value chain as a source of bargaining power 
This study develops a hypothesis based on the idea that customer-supplier relations affect bargaining 
outcome of acquisitions. For example, Ahern (2012) shows that, for a sample of U.S. domestic 
acquisitions between local suppliers and customers, sector-level vertical relatedness affects the 
bargaining power. As for cross-border acquisitions, foreign acquirers and local targets are related as 
supplier and customer through global value chains where different countries specialize at different stages 
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of a final product’s sequential production process (Hummels, Ishii, Yi, 2001; Yi, 2003; Johnson and 
Noguera, 2012). Whether a production stage is worth vertical integration depends on its relative position 
along the global value chain and its neighbor stages’ relative contractibility, and the final product’s 
elasticity of demand (Antràs and Chor, 2013; Alfaro, Antràs, Chor, and Conconi, 2017). After deciding 
which productions stage to integrate, foreign acquirers negotiate with potential target firms that 
participate at that particular production stage.  
In negotiating with foreign acquirers, target firms would have more bargaining power if they are 
from countries that are more productive than other countries participating in that production stage.  This 
is because country-level relative productivity is determined by factor endowments, technology, and 
institutional strengths that are only accessible to local firms (Chor, 2010; Costinot, 2009). With 
exclusive access to sources of high productivity, local firms induce foreign acquirers to compete for 
them. Competing foreign acquirers become local firms’ valuable alternatives to reaching an agreement 
with any foreign acquirer. The existence of an outside option affects bargaining outcome only if opting 
out is credible, as predicted by bargaining theory (see for example Osborne and Rubinstein (1990)). 
Bargaining theory further predicts that, while the extent to which a credible outside option translates 
into a gain depends on features of bargaining procedures, the party with a credible outside option can 
gain at least as much as the value of his outside option. In line with this thinking, when local targets’ 
productivity is relatively high, to opt out and terminate a negotiation is a credible threat to foreign 
acquirers, from which local targets can gain.  This study focuses on examining the positive relation 
between local targets’ productivity and bargaining power and leaves whether and how negotiation 
strategies and tactics adopted in bidding process affect bargaining outcome for future research.  
3.2.2. Extent of ownership as a bargaining outcome  
The extent of control reflects bargaining power between foreign acquirers and local targets. 
Williamson (1979) suggests that the optimal degree of control is a trade-off between acquirers’ 
efficiency gain from acquisition and their commitment of resources to obtain such efficiency. More 
productive local targets can manifest their superior bargaining power by demanding a higher price for 
the transfer of control rights. Acquirers would not pay if the price is higher than the efficiency gain of 
acquisition; consequently, local targets retain majority ownership. Alternatively, Grossman and Hart 
(1986) predict that when two parties discuss the possibility of integration, control rights go to the party 
with higher proprietary content in relationship-specific investments to preserve investment incentives. 
More productive local targets pose a credible threat of productivity loss to foreign acquirers if the targets 
lose the incentive to invest after control rights are transferred to acquirers. To avoid such incentive 
distortion, foreign acquirers would choose not to buy majority ownership from local targets. Both are 
under the view that the observed degree of control reflects the bargaining power between acquirers and 
targets. 
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Ahern (2012) measures bargaining outcome with targets’ share in total cumulative abnormal return 
around acquisition announcement and shows that the party with more bargaining power obtains the 
larger slice. Though conceptually consistent with the impact of credible outside option, this proxy might 
capture deals where acquirers overpay and obtain negative acquisition gain but exclude cases where 
acquirers refuse to overpay. In addition, this proxy requires sufficient stock price information for both 
acquirers and targets, while cross-border acquisitions mainly involve private targets which do not have 
stock price information. For those two reasons, this study chooses to use the extent of control to measure 
bargaining outcome.  
Combining predictions on bargaining power and outcome, I propose the following testable 
hypothesis.  
Baseline hypothesis: The likelihood of foreign control decreases with the target countries’ 
productivity in global value chains, all else being equal. 
3.3. Data and Methodology 
3.3.1. Productivity in global value chains 
I use the value-added-adjusted revealed comparative advantage index calculated in Koopman, 
Wang, and Wei (2014) to measure relative productivity among countries at each production stage of a 
value chain. Conventionally, relative productivity is computed as the share of a sector of a country's 
total gross exports relative to the world average of the same sector in world exports. When the ratio 
exceeds one, the country is considered to have a revealed comparative advantage in that economic 
activity (Balassa, 1965). Given countries' participation in global value chains, using gross exports to 
compute revealed productivity is subject to double counting of value added embedded in intermediate 
goods along the production sequence. For this reason, Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2014) decompose 
gross exports into (1) domestic value added ultimately consumed by foreign countries, (2) domestic 
value added eventually returning to home country, (3) foreign value added returning to foreign countries, 
(4) and pure double counting of intermediate goods that cross the border more than once. Koopman, 
Wang and Wei calculate country-sector revealed comparative advantage based on Item (1): domestic 
value added in exports.  
The index calculation involves three main steps. First, Koopman et al. collect data on annual flows 
of goods and services at country-sector level for the entire world economy from the Global Trade 
Analysis Project database (GTAP, version 7). This dataset covers 129 countries and 41 sectors for the 
base year 2004. Second, they aggregate the 129 countries into 26 countries and regions. The full lists of 
sectors and countries/regions are reported in Appendices A. Finally, they use those data to construct a 
world input-output table. This describes the sale and purchase relationships between suppliers and 
customers in the world economy by showing flows of final and intermediate goods and services at the 
84 
 
country-sector level. Each of the 41 GTAP sectors represents one global value chain and each of the 26 
countries/regions within that sector is a participant along the chain. 
This 2004 revealed comparative advantage index is going to be used to analyze cross-border 
acquisitions from 2004 to 2010. I assume that country-sector ranking in the index does not change for 
the six-year period. This assumption is reasonable because sources of country-level relative productivity 
– technology, factor endowments and institutional strength – change slowly over time. In future versions 
of this work, I am going to expand the sample by using GTAP version 9. This dataset covers 129 countries 
and 57 sectors for three base years: 2004, 2007, and 2011. It will allow me to extend acquisition sample 
to 2016. Specifically, I am going to use country-level productivity in global value chains at year 2004 
for cross-border transactions in the sub-periods of 2004 to 2006, year 2007 for 2007 to 2010, and year 
2011 for 2011 to 2016.  
[Insert Table 3.1 Here] 
Table 3.1 Panel A presents descriptive statistics on country-level relative productivity in global value 
chains. Due to space limitations, I report the top 12 sectors ranked by total deal value (in U.S. dollars) 
of cross-border vertical acquisition. These nine sectors represent 75 percent of the total transaction value. 
I describe the data collection on acquisitions in the next section. For each GTAP sector, I report the top 
three and bottom three countries ranked by their productivity. For example, Hong Kong has high relative 
productivity in business services and trade but presents low productivity in sectors that require rich 
natural resources, such as oil and gas. Most importantly, there is not a single country that consistently 
dominates a top or bottom ranking across sectors. This feature is desirable because it ensures that the 
relation between productivity and extent of control is unlikely to be driven by a subset of countries. 
Next, I perform an analysis to verify that country-level relative productivity is an important 
component of target firm relative productivity. Specifically, I collect from Worldscope the accounting 
measure earnings before interest expenses and taxes scaled by book value of total assets (ROA) as a 
proxy for firm productivity. Then, I aggregate this measure at the country-sector level, which are 
matched to GTAP country-sector pairs classified by Koopman et al. Next, I regress ROA on country-
level productivity. Table 3.1 Panel B presents the estimation results. Clearly, for both target and acquirer 
countries, there is a positive and statistically significant association between the two variables. This 
association is robust after controlling for country and year fixed effects, meaning the association prevails 
across country-sector pairs. 
3.3.2. Cross-border acquisitions 
I collect mergers and acquisitions transactions from the Security Data Corporation (SDC) announced 
between 2004 and 2010. I drop transactions where acquirers have an SIC code between 6000 and 6999 
but targets do not have an SIC code between 6000 and 6999 to ensure that transactions in my sample 
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are motivated by product market synergies. I keep transactions that are labeled as cross-border, mergers, 
acquisitions of majority interests, acquisitions of partial interests, and acquisitions of assets. Among 
these transactions, I keep those where acquirers do not own a stake equal or greater than 50 percent prior 
announcement. The extent of control is measured as the percentage of stake owned by acquirers after 
acquisitions. If it is less than 50 percent, the acquisition is labeled as a purchase of non-controlling 
interest. If it is greater than 50 percent, the acquisition is labeled as a purchase of controlling-interest. 
To better contrast bargaining power between acquirers and targets, I drop mergers of equal, i.e. acquirers 
owning exactly 50 percent after acquisition. Till this step, the sample contains 56,725 acquisitions. 
I match the 41 GTAP sectors to three-digit standard industry classifications (SIC) provided by SDC 
for each target and acquirer. Then I match the 26 GTAP countries/regions to target and acquirer countries 
provided by SDC. SDC record target and acquirer countries according to their location of operation. For 
example, if the U.S. branch of Nestlé acquirers an Italian branch of Danone, the acquirer country will 
be marked as U.S. and that of target marked as Italy. Therefore, the match of country correctly reflects 
country-level productivity and value chain relations between acquirers and targets. I retain transactions 
where both acquirer and target have non-missing measures of country-level productivity. At this step, 
the sample has 52,547 acquisitions. 
To identify the vertical relatedness between acquirers and targets, I follow Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Mitton (2009) and use the vertical relatedness index computed by Fan and Lang (2000). The 
computation of vertical relation is based on the U.S. input-output table reported in 1992 by U.S. Bureau 
of Economic Analysis (BEA). The input–output table classifies the U.S. economy into 498 six-digit 
input-output code levels (IO code) and report the dollar value of input used to produce the output of 498 
sectors. To use U.S. sector vertical relatedness to describe world economy, I assume that the U.S. input-
output tables provide a standardized measure of input requirements internationally. As noted by 
Acemoglu et al., the U.S. input-output tables should be informative on input flows across sectors to the 
extent that these are determined by technology.  
To identify vertical acquisition, I follow Ahern (2012) and drop input-output sector pairs that share 
the same IO code. Then I keep pairs where vertical relatedness is non-missing and non-zero. As the final 
step, I match IO codes to four-digit SIC codes using the concordance table provided by the BEA. Till 
now, my final sample contains 21,264 vertical cross-border acquisitions.  
[Insert Table 3.2 Here] 
Table 3.2 reports the summary statistics of cross-border acquisitions for the period between 2004 
and 2010. In Panel A, the column – Total– includes all acquisitions, whereas the columns under the tag 
– Vertical – contains the relevant sample for this study. The column – Control – (– Non-control–) 
consists with vertical acquisitions in which greater (less) than 50 percent is transferred from targets to 
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foreign acquirers. The first row indicates the number of transactions. In 40 percent of acquisitions from 
2004 to 2010, acquirers and targets have unambiguous vertical relation in international product market. 
While foreign acquirers typically seek controlling stake, there are 20 percent of transactions in which 
local targets retain control rights.  In unreported table, I find this 20-80 difference a stable pattern 
throughout the sample period. The second row indicates the deal value in trillion US dollars after 
adjusting for inflation based on 2015 Consumer Prices Index. It appears that economic significance of 
non-controlling acquisition decreases to 14 percent, compared to that of controlling acquisitions. 
However, it is worth noting that purchases of non-controlling stake are often through private negotiation. 
Also, news on minority investment catches less attention. For those two reasons, I cannot exclude the 
possibility that this seemingly drop in economic significance is due to less deal value information on 
minority acquisition than on controlling acquisitions.  
Panel B of Table 3.2 presents summary statistics of the sector-level supplier-customer relatedness 
between acquirers and targets for the sample of vertical acquisitions. Acquisitions are characterized as 
forward acquisitions if acquirers sell more to targets more than buy from targets, and as backward if 
acquirers buy more from targets than sell to targets. Following this identification rule, I identify 10,194 
forward acquisitions and 11,070 backward acquisitions. As shown in the Column – Mean –  , in forward 
acquisitions, targets use averagely 3.46 cents worth of goods from acquirers to produce one-dollar worth 
of goods, but their goods are seldom used by acquirers for production, indicating by a mean as low as 
0.27. The opposite relations hold for backward acquisitions.  
Panel C of Table 3.2 lists the 15 most active GTAP sector pairs for cross-border acquisitions between 
2004 and 2010 and experienced 60 percent of the full sample. Approximately 20 percent of vertical 
acquisitions take place in the same GTAP sectors mainly because GTAP sectors are highly aggregated. 
Though such aggregation limits a more precise ranking on country-level productivity beneath GTAP 
sector level, it should not pose any major bias in subsequent analysis for two reasons. First, I have 
already reduced the presence of horizontal acquisitions at six-digit IO code level. Second, relative 
productivity should be positively correlated among sub-sectors under each GTAP sector, to the extent 
that sources of productivity are transferrable among them. Nevertheless, to ensure robustness, I exclude 
acquisitions where acquirers and targets share the same GTAP sector, replicate the empirical analysis in 
Section 3.4., and reported replication results in Appendix 3.2-4.  In fact, replicated results are not only 
consistent with but even stronger than main analysis results listed in Section 3.4..   
3.3.3. Model 
I use the following probit regression to test the hypothesis: 
Pr(𝑌𝑐,𝑖,𝑡=1|𝑃c,i,s ,𝑃c',i',s, 𝑋𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑋𝑐′,𝑖′𝑡 , 𝑿𝒄,𝒄′,𝒕, 𝑽𝒊,𝒊′)=Φ(𝛼 + 𝛽𝑃c,i,s+𝜃𝑃c',i',s + γ𝑋𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑐′,𝑖′,𝑡 + 𝜼′𝑿𝒄,𝒄′,𝒕  + 𝑽𝒊,𝒊′), 
 (3.1) 
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where Pr denotes the probability and Φ(⋅) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal 
distribution. The dependent variable 𝑌𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 is a binary variable equal to one (zero) if the average transfer 
of ownership from local targets in country c, sector i, and year t to foreign acquirers is greater than 
(lower than) 50 percent.54  It means I test the choice between majority and minority acquisitions. 
Minority acquisitions can be an optimal bargaining outcome when the value of local targets’ outside 
option is lower than staying fully independent of foreign acquirers but no lower than retaining majority 
interests. For example, a financially constrained target would be better off accepting a minority 
acquisition by foreign acquirers so that foreign acquirers can certify and facilitate future capital raise of 
targets (Liao, 2014). I do not test the likelihood of majority acquisitions against that of firms not being 
targeted by any foreign acquirers because this approach cannot distinguish greenfield investment from 
no integration. Since the analysis of this work is to be conducted at country-sector level, the pair of 
targeted firms versus non-targeted firms is an inaccurate proxy for integration decision unless there is 
complete information on greenfield investment in the same destination country-sector pair. On the 
contrary, examining the choice between majority and minority acquisition circumvents the trouble to 
account for all factors that affect the choice of entry mode.  
The variable of interest, 𝑃c,i,s, measures the productivity of target country c in sector i and year s, 
where s indicates the most recent year with non-missing observation of  𝑃 (i.e. s≤t). In other words, s 
indicates 2004, and t indicates years from 2004 to 2010. As explained in Section 3.3.1., sector i 
represents one value chain. Given my hypothesis, 𝛽 should be negative and indicate to what extent 
higher productivity deter foreign control.    
The rest of the variables on the left-hand side of Model (3.1) are control variables that may affect 
the likelihood of foreign acquirers buying majority ownership. First, I control for acquirers’ country-
level relative productivity. This is because more productive acquirers are more likely to afford high price 
of control stake for they have higher capacity to amortize fixed costs of full integration (Alfaro et al., 
2017).  Then, I consider the stock-listing status of targets and include in the vector 𝑋𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 the average 
percentage of listed targets in country c, sector i, and year t. Unlike unlisted targets, listed targets can 
learn about themselves from information reflected in their stock market prices (Foucault and Frésard, 
2012). As a result, it is more difficult for foreign acquirers to persuade listed targets to agree to a lower 
offer. Also, as Ouimet (2013) suggests, acquirers avoid buying majority ownership in targets to preserve 
the incentive of target managers if target firms are listed and managers are compensated by stock options 
prior to acquisition.  
Furthermore, higher ownership concentration and poorer minority investor protection could deter 
acquisitions of non-controlling stake and lead to an over-presence of controlling stake purchases in 
                                                          
54 Mergers of equal or transactions where the transfer of ownership is equal to 50 percent are dropped from my sample.  
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certain target country-sector pairs. To attenuate this potential bias, I use the percentage of closely-held 
shares to proxy ownership concentration and anti-director rights index to measure minority investor 
protection. Closely-held shares are extracted from Datastream and then aggregated from firm level to 
country-sector level.  Anti-director rights index is taken from Spamann (2010). These two governance-
related control variables are also in the vector 𝑋𝑐,𝑖,𝑡.  
Next, I control for the stock-listing status of acquirers because they have easier access to external 
financing and hence higher capability to make a top offer for target majority ownership. 𝑋𝑐 ′,𝑖′,𝑡 is the 
average percentage of listed acquirers in country c’, sector i’, and year t.  
Additionally, Erel, Liao and Weisbach (2012) show that appreciation in acquirer countries’ wealth 
relative to that of target countries facilitates acquirers’ cross-border deals. Similarly, such relative 
purchasing power could enable acquirers to make a better offer for target majority ownership. Thus, I 
control for differences in stock market valuation and currency appreciation between target and acquirer 
countries. Those two variables are in the vector 𝑿𝒄,𝒄′,𝒕. Specifically, I download stock prices, exchange 
rates, and consumer price indices from Datastream database to compute differences between target and 
acquirer countries in buy-and-hold inflation-adjusted stock market returns and exchange rate returns 
from 275 trading days to 25 trading days prior to the announcement.  
The vector 𝑽𝒊,𝒊′ includes dummies of GTAP sector pairs between targets and acquirers. As discussed 
in Section 3.2.1., previous studies show characteristics of production stages relations affect extent of 
control. By holding vertically related sector pairs constant, I remove influence of production stages on 
choice between majority and minority acquisition. In doing so, I ensure that 𝑃c,i,s is a clean rank of 
country productivity within the same vertical integration relations.   
3.4. Empirical results 
3.4.1. Univariate results 
Table 3.3 reports summary statistics of key variables and their mean differences between controlling 
and non-controlling acquisitions. Controlling acquisition commonly involves an ownership stake over 
90 percent. Non-controlling acquisitions tend to involve the transfer of a sizeable stake in the target firm, 
with a mean of 25.2 percent and a median of 21.2 percent.  
The next ten rows report differences across country-sector pairs. Target-country relative productivity 
(Pc.i) is lower in controlling acquisitions, on average, than that of non-controlling acquisitions. This 
observation aligns with the prediction in the baseline hypothesis. Compared to the target side, the 
difference of acquirer-country relative productivity (Pc’.i’) is smaller between controlling acquisitions 
and non-controlling acquisitions. Listed targets are rarely involved in control acquisitions, indicated by 
a presence as low as five percent (Listed Target). Its presence is higher in non-controlling acquisitions 
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but still significantly less frequent than unlisted firms. On the contrary, listed companies account for 
most acquirers in both controlling and non-controlling acquisitions (Listed Acquirer). As expected, non-
controlling acquisitions are more common in countries with better investor protection (ADRIc), though 
the difference to controlling acquisition is small. Non-controlling acquisitions is associated with a lower 
degree of shareholder concentration (CHSc,j), which alleviates the potential bias of closely held firms 
crowded in target country-sector pairs with high relative productivity. Non-controlling acquisitions are 
more common when the target country stock market is valued higher than the acquirer country stock 
market (MktRetc,c’) and when the acquirer country experiences a larger local currency appreciation 
(FXc,c’). Non-controlling acquisitions are more common when it is suppliers acquiring customers 
(Forward) and less common when it is customers acquiring suppliers (Backward). 
Table 3.3 also presents two deal-level variables. Relative size is estimated as deal value relative to 
the acquirer's market capitalization 25 trading days prior to the deal announcement. Non-controlling 
acquisitions are associated with smaller mean relative size ratios than are majority acquisitions. Premium 
is the offer price scaled by target stock price four weeks prior to the announcement date. Though smaller 
than controlling acquisitions, acquirers tend to pay a considerable premium for a non-controlling stake. 
As mentioned above, cross-border vertical acquisitions involve mainly unlisted target firms. That is why 
deal information based on stock price is scarce and the sample size shrinks dramatically. 
[Insert Table 3.3 Here] 
3.4.2. Multivariate results 
Table 3.4 presents baseline estimation results based on Model (3.1). Coefficients are marginal effects 
on the likelihood of controlling acquisition. Column 1 complements the univariate results and shows 
that target country-level relative productivity (Pc,j) has a negative effect on the choice to buy controlling 
stake. And this effect is economically and statistically significant (z-statistics of 8.14). A one-unit 
increase in productivity decreases the probability of takeover by approximately 2.5 percent. Column 2 
and Column 3 introduces year and GTAP sector pair dummies and a set of control variables. The signs 
and significance of target country productivity are largely unchanged. Some of coefficients on control 
variables are consistent with previous studies. Target firms being listed reduces the chance of foreign 
control by 26 percent, whereas acquirers’ listed status does not seem to matter. High ownership 
concentration does not affect foreign acquirers’ choice, but a better protection for minority investors 
does encourage foreign acquirers to buy non-controlling stake.  Notably, coefficients on stock market 
valuation and purchasing power reveal new insights. When foreign acquirers experience a relative higher 
valuation and currency appreciation than local targets, foreign acquirers tend to buy non-controlling 
stake. This suggests that, while to take advantage of financial arbitrage generally promotes cross-border 
acquisition flows (Erel, Liao, and Weisbach, 2012), it is the minority interest acquisition that benefits 
the most. Furthermore, acquirers’ country-level relative productivity appears to have no effect on the 
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bargaining outcome between a controlling and non-controlling stake.  This is not necessarily against the 
notion that productive firms are more likely to integrate global production (Alfaro et al., 2017). It could 
be that highly productive firms are overall more likely to internalize production at global scale, but to 
have higher capacity to amortize high integration costs might not matter much for the choice between 
full and partial integration. Alternatively, it is possible that the true effect of acquirer productivity is 
masked by the mixed directions of vertical acquisitions. I examine in the next subsection these two 
alternative explanations by separating forward and backward acquisitions.   
Next, I narrow the sample to those where target countries have an advantage in each production 
stage, i.e. relative productivity is no less than one, and report results in Columns 4-6. I expect that targets 
would be in an even better negotiation position when their countries have established an obvious 
advantage. Consistent with this line of thinking, the difficulty for foreign acquirers to get a control on 
targets with obvious productive advantage is now doubled. Changes on coefficients of control variables 
are also worth mentioning. Compared to results on main sample, acquirers being listed starts to matter 
for getting control rights on highly productive targets. This is consistent with my expectation that 
acquirers with easier external financing have a higher chance to afford high purchasing price for control 
rights. Coefficients of capital market valuation and currency appreciation continue to have the same sign 
but lose statistical significance here.  
To reinforce the intuition of estimated coefficients, Figure 3.1 plots predictive marginal effect of 
target country productivity based on the specification in Column 3 of Table 3.4. The curve shows how 
the likelihood of foreign control is going to change if target relative productivity increases by 0.5 at a 
step from one to eight while other covariates are held fixed. The vertical lines on each dot indicates the 
95 percent confidence interval. The plot indicates that, for example, a country that is eight times as 
advantageous as another country in providing crops, firms located in the former country have 50 percent 
less chance (0.9-0.4=0.5) that those located in the latter country of being fully integrated along value 
chains, all else being equal.  
[Insert Table 3.4 Here] 
[Insert Figure 3.1 Here] 
 
3.4.3. Do vertical and backward acquisitions receive different effects?  
Table 3.5 presents estimates of Model (3.1) for forward and backward vertical acquisitions 
separately. Now that acquisition directions are explicit and separated, I introduce vertical relatedness as 
an additional control. In this way, I isolate the role of target country-level relative productivity in 
capturing sources of superior productivity – technology, institutional strength, labor, etc. – from its role 
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in capturing interdependence between acquirers and targets. The effect of target productivity on foreign 
control is largely consistent between forward and backward acquisitions. And its effect appears to be 
slightly more pronounced in forward acquisitions.   
More interestingly, I obtain additional new insights on the control variables from this analysis. First, 
acquirer country-level productivity now becomes statistically significant and has opposite effect on 
forward and backward acquisitions. It settles the puzzle mentioned in previous section: acquirer 
productivity does matter for the extent of control, but the sign and magnitude of its effect depends on 
the direction of vertical acquisitions. While its effect in forward acquisitions is consistent with the 
prediction of Alfaro et al. (2017), that in backward acquisitions lacks theoretical prediction.  
Second, there is also a marked difference in the impact of vertical relatedness on the bargaining 
outcome. The relatedness between acquirers and targets does not seem to matter in forward acquisitions 
but significantly and negatively affects acquirers’ bargaining position in backward acquisitions. More 
specifically, the more important targets function as supplier to foreign acquirer in international product 
market, the less likely foreign acquirers would be able to obtain control rights over targets. This result 
complements that of Ahern (2012), which finds that relative gain of targets in backward acquisitions is 
unrelated to product market relations. My findings suggest that product market relations matter for 
bargaining in backward acquisitions, but their effects are reflected in the extent of control instead of in 
the division of acquisition gains. Results here reinforce the view of this work that the observed extent 
of control is a valid proxy for bargaining outcome and complements the division of total acquisition 
gain in scenarios when stock price information is unavailable or acquirers are unwilling to strive for 
overpriced control rights and settle for a minority stake.   
Finally, the slightly positive effect of listed acquirers found in previous section turns out to be 
stronger and solely from backward acquisitions. The other relevant control variables continue to have 
consistent signs between forward and backward acquisitions, though their economic and statistical 
significances are largely higher in forward than in backward acquisitions.  
Taken as a whole, the baseline hypothesis of this work receives consistent and supporting evidence. 
But there is more to learn about why effects of certain control variables change when the direction of 
vertical acquisition changes. Future versions of this work are going to investigate those questions in 
depth.   
[Insert Table 3.5 Here] 
3.4.4. Robustness tests  
So far, I have used control variables to ensure that it is target country-level productivity that reduces 
foreign control. However, results can still be undermined by unmeasurable acquirer heterogeneity. More 
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specifically, some acquirers might only invest in minority equity stakes and others only conduct 
takeovers. If the former type of acquirers has a disproportionately high presence in target countries with 
higher relative productivity, it would be unclear whether the effect on foreign control comes from target 
country productivity or acquirer heterogeneity. To address this issue, I conduct an analysis on a refined 
sample composed of acquirers that have made between 2004 and 2010 both controlling and non-
controlling acquisitions overseas. Results are reported in Table 3.6 Column 1 and 2. The findings remain 
unchanged. 
An alternative explanation for the negative relation between foreign control and target country-level 
productivity is that, to gain control over more product targets, acquirers must make a series of minority 
investments before takeover, whereas they can directly buy control rights of less productive targets.  To 
reduce the impacts of serial acquisitions, I narrow the sample to targets that have only been invested 
once by the same foreign acquirer over the sample period.55 Table 3.6 Column 3 and 4 present robustness 
test results.  Again, main findings remain the same.  
To further check for robustness, I examine whether results are biased by regulatory protection 
against foreign ownership. Dinc and Erel (2013) provide evidence that, for mergers across EU countries, 
local governments take measures to prevent foreign acquirer from taking control of ‘national champions’. 
In the current version, I address this issue by looking into GTAP sectors that are not commonly regarded 
as strategic ones. I therefore drop coal, oil and gas, minerals, petroleum and coal products, mineral 
products, electricity, gas manufacture and distribution, water, air transportation, communication 
(including telecommunication), financial services, public admin, public defense, education, and health. 
Estimates on the rest of GTAP sectors are reported in Table 3.6 Column 5 and 6. Notably, coefficient 
of target country-level productivity loses its significance in the main sample. That means strategic 
sectors do have less foreign control. However, once I restrict the sample to targets that have an obvious 
advantage, the negative effect of target country productivity on foreign control is restored for non-
strategic sectors.  That suggest that the negative relation is not solely driven by government protection 
but also driven by target country-level productivity. 
This approach does not account for the fact that sectors of national interest may vary across countries 
and over time. Also, government intervention could deter foreign acquirers in the future. Thus, in future 
version of this work,  I construct a more refined measure of propensity for government intervention than 
a country-year invariant dummy on strategic sectors. To do this, I follow Dinc and Erel (2013) and 
search news about government intervention in the top ten cross-border acquisitions by deal value per 
target country per calendar year from 2003 to 2016. Then I sort target countries according to their 
propensity for government intervention a year before the acquisition announcement. If coefficient of 
target country-level productivity stays negative and statistically significant in subsamples less prone to 
                                                          
55 I use both 2004-2010 and 2014-2016 periods to detect subsequent acquisitions by the same acquirer. Results stay the same. 
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government intervention, results should reinforce findings documented here and support the hypothesis 
of bargaining power.  
[Insert Table 3.6 Here] 
3.5. Conclusion 
This chapter explores the role of target productivity in vertical cross-border acquisitions. I find 
foreign control is less common in targets countries with higher productivity in global value chains. This 
finding suggests that target country productivity in global value chains is an important determinant of 
the extent of control transferred from local firms to foreign firms. I interpret it as supporting evidence 
that one source of bargaining power for targets vis-à-vis foreign acquirers in the international market of 
corporate control is a country’s relative position in international product market.  
This work also obtains new insights on how determinants of cross-border acquisitions flows 
documented in previous studies can further affect the choice between controlling and non-controlling 
stake size. And such effects may have opposite signs in forward and backward vertical acquisitions. To 
better understand reasons behind such opposite effects, it is worth investigating further into the structure 
and characteristics of international product market. 
A caveat in this version is the sample period is short and the aggregation of countries is high. Because 
of such limitations, I am unable to generalize findings beyond the year of 2010 or test my hypothesis on 
cross-border acquisitions within EU. Therefore, an expansion on dataset awaits in future versions of this 
work.     
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Table 3.1: Country-level relative productivity 
This table reports descriptive statistics of country relative productivity in global value chains. Panel A. reports top three and 
bottom three countries ranked by productivity for the most significant sectors in terms of total deal value in 2015 U.S. dollar. 
Panel B. presents the association between country productivity as explanatory variable for the proxy for fir-level productivity 
(operating income over total assets ROA). ROA is aggregated at country-sector level. Data on operating income and total assets 
are from Worldscope. Coef, t-stat, N, Controls, and Adj-R2 are estimated coefficients on country relative productivity,  its t-
statistics, sample size, the dummies on year and country, adjusted R-squared. *, **, and *** indicate coefficients significantly 
different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
Panel A.          
Business Services  Financial Services  Chemical, Rubber& Plastic 
1 SGP 1.86  1 BRA 2.21  1 SGP 2.19 
2 E15 1.62  2 TWN 1.94  2 TWN 1.36 
3 HKG 1.57  3 USA 1.64  3 USA 1.32 
24 PHL 0.19  24 ROW 0.45  24 SSA 0.27 
25 MET 0.08  25 PHL 0.32  25 XEA 0.23 
26 IDN 0.06  26 MET 0.11  26 HKG 0.19 
Electronic Equipment  Machinery & Equipment  Motor Vehicles and Parts 
1 PHL 7.03  1 KOR 1.89  1 MET 2.81 
2 MYS 5.29  2 JPN 1.60  2 JPN 2.60 
3 MET 3.88  3 USA 1.45  3 CAN 2.22 
24 ZAF 0.56  24 HKG 0.19  24 HKG 0.14 
25 RUS 0.09  25 XEA 0.18  25 SGP 0.12 
26 SSA 0.03  26 SSA 0.06  26 SSA 0.04 
Minerals  Transportation Equipment  Communication 
1 AUS 5.88  1 USA 2.24  1 ZAF 1.74 
2 IDN 4.52  2 BRA 1.97  2 AUS 1.64 
3 ZAF 4.03  3 KOR 1.65  3 E12 1.33 
24 MET 0.15  24 RUS 0.25  24 THA 0.71 
25 JPN 0.10  25 HKG 0.14  25 RUS 0.37 
26 SGP 0.04  26 ZAF 0.13  26 MET 0.33 
Trade  Paper Products & Publishing  Construction 
1 HKG 3.85  1 CAN 2.42  1 RUS 2.20 
2 ZAF 1.54  2 MET 1.61  2 USA 1.83 
3 SSA 1.49  3 USA 1.37  3 E12 1.65 
24 KOR 0.42  24 VNM 0.28  24 XEA 0.24 
25 MET 0.20  25 SSA 0.24  25 PHL 0.21 
26 VNM 0.17  26 PHL 0.22  26 CHT 0.17 
 
Panel B.      
  Coef. t-stat N Controls Adj-R2 
Target ROA 0.007*** 7.37 12,238 Country-Year 0.13 
Acquirer ROA 0.065*** 4.56 14,170 Country-Year 0.02 
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics of cross-border vertical acquisitions 
This table reports summary statistics of cross-border acquisitions between 2004 and 2010. I include all cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions that are labeled as mergers, acquisitions of majority interests, acquisitions of partial interests, and acquisitions 
of assets. Among these transactions, I keep those where acquirers do not own a stake equal or greater than 50 percent prior 
announcement. Panel A reports the proportions of transactions across cross-border, vertical, control, and non-control deals in 
the whole sample in terms of the number of deals and the dollar value adjusted for inflation. Panel B presents summary statistics 
of vertical acquisitions. Vertical relatedness is provided by Fan and Lang (2000) based on BEA 1992 input-output table and is 
the fraction the input industry contributes in added-value to the output industry. Vertical acquisitions (forward, backward) are 
those in which the acquirer and target do not share the same BEA IO industry code and either the acquirer sell (more, less) to 
the target than the target sell to the acquirer and the target buys (more, less) inputs from the acquirer than the acquirer buys 
from the target. Panel C reports the 15 vertically related GTAP sector pairs with the most cross-border acquisitions during the 
sample period in descending order. GTAP sectors are matched to three-digit SIC codes. BEA IO codes are matched to four-
digit SIC codes. 
Panel A.           
  Total   Vertical 
   Sub-total  Control  Non-control 
    % of total    % of sub-total   % of sub-total 
Number of deals 52,547  21,264 40%  17,106 80%  4,158 20% 
Deal value 
(in trillion USD) 5.934   2.196 37%   1.893 86%   0.303 14% 
 
Panel B.         
        Percentile 
  N Mean Std. Dev. 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Forward acquisition         
Forward relatedness(%) 10,194 3.46 7.05 0.08 0.35 1.27 3.28 7.28 
Backward relatedness(%) 10,194 0.27 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.36 0.95 
         
Backward acquisition         
Forward relatedness(%) 11,070 0.26 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.19 0.95 
Backward relatedness(%) 11,070 3.69 7.03 0.09 0.34 1.62 3.82 8.15 
  
Acquirer GTAP sector Target GTAP sector 
All vertical 
acquisitions   Forward   Backward 
N %   N %   N % 
Business Services Business Services 2,027 10%  1,199 41%  828 59% 
Financial Services Financial Services 1,738 8%  687 60%  1,051 40% 
Financial Services Business Services 1,646 8%  554 66%  1,092 34% 
Communication Business Services 1,041 5%  635 39%  406 61% 
Electronic Equipment Business Services 946 4%  466 51%  480 49% 
Trade Chemical, Rubber & Plastic 833 4%  376 55%  457 45% 
Trade Electronic Equipment 633 3%  263 58%  370 42% 
Machinery & Equipment Business Services 562 3%  211 62%  351 38% 
Machinery & Equipment Machinery & Equipment 552 3%  265 52%  287 48% 
Trade Business Services 546 3%  241 56%  305 44% 
Trade Motor Vehicles & Parts 498 2%  136 73%  362 27% 
Minerals Minerals 477 2%  289 39%  188 61% 
Water Transportation Transportation Equipment 460 2%  130 72%  330 28% 
Communication Communication 426 2%  225 47%  201 53% 
Chemical, Rubber & Plastic Chemical, Rubber & Plastic 422 2%  243 42%  179 58% 
          
Total 15 GTAP pairs  12,807 60%  5,920   6,887  
Total sample   21,264 100%   10,194     11,070   
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Table 3.3: Univariate results 
This table reports summary statistics of key variables used in empirical analysis. Column 2-5 (6-9) are controlling acquisitions (non-controlling acquisitions), defined as stake owned after acquisition 
is greater (less) than 50 percent. The last column reports p-value of t-test between the controlling and non-controlling subsamples. Stake size (%) is the percentage of targets' stock shares that 
acquirers owns after acquisition. Pc,i (Pc,i) is target (acquirer) country-level relative productivity. Listed target (Listed acquirer) are dummies equal to one if the target (acquirer) is listed in stock 
exchange, and zero otherwise. ADRIc is the Antidirector Rights Index. CHSc,i (%) is closely held shares in a firm aggregated at country-industry level. MktRetc,c’ is the target-acquirer country pair 
differences in buy-and-hold inflation-adjusted stock market return from 275 trading days to 25 trading days before announcement. FXc,c’ is the difference of annual inflation-adjusted bilateral U.S. 
dollar exchange rate return of the target country and acquirer country from 275 trading days to 25 trading days. Relative size is estimated as deal value relative to the acquirer's market capitalization 
25 trading days prior to the deal announcement. Premium is the offer price over target stock price four weeks before deal announcement date. 
  
Acquisition  
of  
controlling stake 
  
Acquisition 
 of  
non-controlling stake   
Difference  
of 
group mean 
  N Mean Median Std.dev.   N Mean Median Std.dev.   p-value 
Stake size (%) 16,695 94.7 100 13.52  3,388 25.2 21.2 17.07  0.00 
Pc,i 17,106 1.19 1.15 0.77  4,158 1.33 0.99 1.28  0.00 
Pc',i' 17,106 1.17 1.18 0.65  4,158 1.14 0.97 0.75  0.02 
Listed target 17,106 0.05 0 0.23  4,158 0.32 0 0.47  0.00 
Listed acquirer 17,106 0.57 1 0.49  4,158 0.51 1 0.5  0.00 
ADRIc 13,966 3.87 4 1.1  2,888 4.06 4 0.94  0.00 
CHSc,i (%) 12,290 8.77 3.15 15.03  2,884 7.42 2.32 12.93  0.00 
MktRetc,c' (%) 16,261 1.59 0.9 18.04  3,844 3.08 2.2 22.14  0.00 
FXc,c' (%) 14,177 -6.69 -0.48 64.48  2,979 -9.29 -1.26 50.88  0.04 
Forward 17,106 0.47 0 0.5  4,158 0.51 1 0.5  0.00 
Backward 17,106 0.53 1 0.5  4,158 0.49 0 0.5  0.00 
Relative size 3,050 0.02 0 0.07  751 0 0 0.01  0.00 
Premium (%) 413 42.4 32.79 34.92   308 28.8 17.3 33.51   0.00 
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Table 3.4: Multivariate results 
This table reports marginal effects of probit regression, where dependent variable equals one if the acquisition is for a 
controlling stake, and zero if the acquisition is for a non-controlling equity stake. The sample is vertical cross-border 
acquisitions between 2004 and 2010. Pc,i (Pc,i) is target (acquirer) country-level relative productivity. Listed target (Listed 
acquirer) are dummies equal to one if the target (acquirer) is listed in stock exchange, and zero otherwise. ADRIc is the 
Antidirector Rights Index. CHSc,i (%) is closely held shares in a firm aggregated at country-industry level. MktRetc,c’ is the 
target-acquirer country pair differences in buy-and-hold inflation-adjusted stock market return from 275 trading days to 25 
trading days before announcement. FXc,c’ is the difference of annual inflation-adjusted bilateral U.S. dollar exchange rate return 
of the target country and acquirer country from 275 trading days to 25 trading days. *, **, and *** indicate coefficients 
significantly different from zero at the 0.1 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. 
  Main sample   Pc,i ≥ 1 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Pc,i -0.025*** -0.021*** -0.025***  -0.061*** -0.044*** -0.044*** 
 [-8.14] [-6.97] [-6.76]  [-19.61] [-11.98] [-9.52] 
Pc',i'   0.002    0.007 
   [0.26]    [1.01] 
Listed target   -0.260***    -0.226*** 
   [-28.65]    [-21.10] 
Listed acquirer   0.011    0.013* 
   [1.64]    [1.77] 
CHSc,i    0.000    0.000 
   [1.64]    [0.50] 
ADRIc   -0.018***    -0.012*** 
   [-4.66]    [-2.62] 
MktRetc,c'    -0.069***    -0.042 
   [-2.89]    [-1.49] 
FXc,c'    -0.016**    -0.011 
      [-2.36]       [-1.43] 
N 21,264 21,264 11,268  11,941 11,941 7,432 
Pseudo R2 0.004 0.064 0.181  0.036 0.104 0.216 
Year dummies Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Sector-pair dummies Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
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Figure 3.1:Predictive marginal effect of target country productivity on the likelihood of foreign corporate control 
This figure plots the marginal effect of target country relative productivity on the likelihood of controlling acquisitions by 
foreign acquirers, estimated based on probit regression. The sample size is composed by cross-border vertical acquisitions from 
2004 to 2010. In the probit regression, the dependent variable equals one if the acquisition is for a controlling stake, and zero 
if the acquisition is for a non-controlling stake. The blue dots plot the evolution of mean marginal effect of target country-level 
relative productivity if it increases from one to eight with 0.5 unit per time. The vertical lines on each dot indicates the 95 
percent confidence interval. 
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Table 3.5: Results by subsamples of forward and backward acquisitions 
This table reports marginal effects of probit regression for forward and backward acquisitions separately. The dependent 
variable equals one if the acquisition is for a controlling stake, and zero if the acquisition is for a non-controlling equity stake. 
The sample is vertical cross-border acquisitions between 2004 and 2010. Pc,i (Pc,i) is target (acquirer) country-level relative 
productivity. Vertical relatedness is provided by Fan and Lang (2000) based on BEA 1992 input-output table and is the fraction 
the input industry contributes in added-value to the output industry. Forward (backward) indicates the direction of selling to 
(buying from) between two sectors.  Listed target (Listed acquirer) are dummies equal to one if the target (acquirer) is listed 
in stock exchange, and zero otherwise. ADRIc is the Antidirector Rights Index. CHSc,i (%) is closely held shares in a firm 
aggregated at country-industry level. MktRetc,c’ is the target-acquirer country pair differences in buy-and-hold inflation-adjusted 
stock market return from 275 trading days to 25 trading days before announcement. FXc,c’ is the difference of annual inflation-
adjusted bilateral U.S. dollar exchange rate return of the target country and acquirer country from 275 trading days to 25 trading 
days. *, **, and *** indicate coefficients significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. 
  Forward acquisition   Backward acquisition 
 
Main 
sample 
Main 
sample Pc,i ≥ 1  
Main 
sample 
Main 
sample Pc,i ≥ 1 
  (1) (2) (3)   (3) (4) (5) 
Pc,i -0.032*** -0.026*** -0.055***  -0.024*** -0.018*** -0.046*** 
 [-6.71] [-5.30] [-10.11]  [-4.48] [-2.96] [-8.25] 
Pc',i' 0.029*** 0.023** 0.029***  -0.015* -0.015* -0.006 
 [3.08] [2.56] [2.70]  [-1.92] [-1.82] [-0.62] 
Forward relatedness -0.106 0.126 -0.038     
 [-1.45] [1.47] [-0.46]     
Backward relatedness     -0.314*** -0.260*** -0.269*** 
     [-5.27] [-3.26] [-3.87] 
Listed target -0.301*** -0.271*** -0.265***  -0.262*** -0.244*** -0.227*** 
 [-22.61] [-20.12] [-16.68]  [-21.49] [-19.46] [-15.93] 
Listed acquirer 0.006 0.001 0.010  0.023*** 0.021** 0.025** 
 [0.64] [0.07] [0.84]  [2.68] [2.33] [2.54] 
CHSc,i  0.000 0.000 -0.000  0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 [0.67] [0.44] [-0.20]  [0.69] [1.20] [-0.48] 
ADRIc -0.027*** -0.025*** -0.025***  -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.001 
 [-4.44] [-4.17] [-3.46]  [-3.22] [-2.90] [-0.24] 
MktRetc,c'  -0.098*** -0.081** -0.076*  -0.073** -0.068** -0.035 
 [-2.68] [-2.30] [-1.76]  [-2.21] [-2.09] [-0.92] 
FXc,c'  -0.028*** -0.022** -0.028**  -0.019** -0.016* -0.013 
  [-2.78] [-2.15] [-2.26]   [-2.19] [-1.76] [-1.21] 
N 5,341 5,326 3,475  5,940 5,843 3,981 
Pseudo R2 0.172 0.220 0.225  0.129 0.175 0.146 
Year dummies Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Sector-pair dummies N Y N   N Y N 
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Table 3.6: Robustness tests 
This table reports marginal effects of probit regression for subsamples. Dual-acquirer indicates the subsample of acquisitions 
where acquirers have conducted both controlling and non-controlling acquisitions between 2004 and 2010. Non-serial 
acquisitions indicated acquisitions in which the same targets only received one investment from the same acquirer between 
2004 and 2010. Non-strategic sectors indicate acquisitions take place in GTAP sectors other than coal, oil and gas, minerals, 
petroleum and coal products, mineral products, electricity, gas manufacture and distribution, water, air transportation, 
communication (including telecommunication), financial services, public admin, public defense, education, and health. The 
dependent variable equals one if the acquisition is for a controlling stake, and zero if the acquisition is for a non-controlling 
equity stake. The sample is vertical cross-border acquisitions between 2004 and 2010. Pc,i (Pc,i) is target (acquirer) country-
level relative productivity.  Listed target (Listed acquirer) are dummies equal to one if the target (acquirer) is listed in stock 
exchange, and zero otherwise. ADRIc is the Antidirector Rights Index. CHSc,i (%) is closely held shares in a firm aggregated at 
country-industry level. MktRetc,c’ is the target-acquirer country pair differences in buy-and-hold inflation-adjusted stock market 
return from 275 trading days to 25 trading days before announcement. FXc,c’ is the difference of annual inflation-adjusted 
bilateral U.S. dollar exchange rate return of the target country and acquirer country from 275 trading days to 25 trading days. 
*, **, and *** indicate coefficients significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively 
  Dual-acquirer   Non-serial acquisitions   Non-strategic sectors 
 
Main 
sample Pc,i ≥ 1  
Main 
sample Pc,i ≥ 1  
Main 
sample Pc,i ≥ 1 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Pc,i -0.045*** -0.063***  -0.021*** -0.039***  0.006 -0.029*** 
 [-4.10] [-4.09]  [-5.85] [-8.71]  [0.91] [-3.80] 
Pc',i' 0.023 0.029  -0.003 -0.000  0.002 0.001 
 [1.15] [1.06]  [-0.56] [-0.03]  [0.22] [0.09] 
Listed target -0.299*** -0.290***  -0.235*** -0.200***  -0.215*** -0.176*** 
 [-11.12] [-8.60]  [-25.95] [-18.95]  [-22.95] [-16.15] 
Listed acquirer 0.030 0.020  0.013** 0.017**  0.010 0.012 
 [1.15] [0.61]  [1.98] [2.35]  [1.53] [1.61] 
CHSc,i  0.001 0.000  0.000* 0.000  0.000** 0.000* 
 [0.83] [0.06]  [1.94] [0.50]  [2.01] [1.75] 
ADRIc -0.006 -0.003  -0.017*** -0.012***  -0.020*** -0.011*** 
 [-0.47] [-0.20]  [-4.55] [-2.60]  [-5.05] [-2.64] 
MktRetc,c'  -0.246*** -0.200**  -0.061*** -0.035  -0.054** -0.026 
 [-3.39] [-2.07]  [-2.62] [-1.31]  [-2.12] [-0.90] 
FXc,c'  -0.020 -0.038  -0.014** -0.010  -0.018*** -0.015* 
  [-0.87] [-1.26]   [-2.15] [-1.29]   [-2.74] [-1.96] 
N 2,176 1,401  10,791 7,118  8,361 5,979 
Pseudo R2 0.123 0.148  0.172 0.207  0.146 0.125 
Year dummies Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Sector-pair dummies Y Y   Y Y   Y Y 
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Appendix 3.1:Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP2004) country and sector lists 
Country 
code   Description   
Country 
code   Description 
AUS  Australia  PHL  Philippines 
BRA  Brazil  ROA  Rest of Americas 
CAN  Canada  ROH  Iceland,Liechtenstein,Norway,Switzerland 
CHT  China  ROW  Rest of the world 
E12  EU-12(May.2004 - Jun.2013)  RUS  Russia 
E15  EU-15(Nov.1993 - Apr.2004)  SGP  Singapore 
HKG  Hong Kong  SSA  Rest of South Asia 
IDN  Indonesia  THA  Thailand 
IND  India  TWN  Taiwan 
JPN  Japan  USA  United States 
KOR  South Korea  VNM  Vietnam 
MET  Mexico  XEA  Rest of East Asia 
MYS  Malaysia  ZAF  South Africa 
       
Sector 
code  Description  
Sector 
code  Description 
1  Crop Production  22  Motor Vehicles and Parts 
2  Animal Husbandry  23  Transportation Equipment 
3  Forestry  24  Electronic Equipment 
4  Fishing  25  Machinery and Equipment 
5  Coal  26  Manufactures 
6  Oil and Gas  27  Electricity 
7  Minerals  28  Gas Manufacture and Distribution 
8  Meat and Dairy  29  Water 
9  Food Products  30  Construction 
10  Beverages and Tobacco  31  Trade 
11  Textiles  32  OtherTransportation 
12  Wearing Apparel  33  Water Transportation 
13  Leather Products  34  Air Transportation 
14  Wood Products  35  Communication 
15  Paper Products and Publishing 36  Financial Services 
16  Petroleum and Coal Products  37  Insurance 
17  
Chemical, Rubber and Plastic 
Products 38  Business Services 
18  Mineral Products  39  Recreational and Other Services 
19  Ferrous Metals  40  
Public Admin and Defense, Education and 
Health 
20  Non-Ferrous Metals  41  Dwellings 
21   Finished Metal Products         
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Appendix 3.2: Baseline results – without acquisitions in the same GTAP sector 
This table reports marginal effects of probit regression, where dependent variable equals one if the acquisition is for a 
controlling stake, and zero if the acquisition is for a non-controlling equity stake. The sample is vertical cross-border 
acquisitions between 2004 and 2010. Pc,i (Pc,i) is target (acquirer) country-level relative productivity. Listed target (Listed 
acquirer) are dummies equal to one if the target (acquirer) is listed in stock exchange, and zero otherwise. ADRIc is the 
Antidirector Rights Index. CHSc,i (%) is closely held shares in a firm aggregated at country-industry level. MktRetc,c’ is the 
target-acquirer country pair differences in buy-and-hold inflation-adjusted stock market return from 275 trading days to 25 
trading days before announcement. FXc,c’ is the difference of annual inflation-adjusted bilateral U.S. dollar exchange rate return 
of the target country and acquirer country from 275 trading days to 25 trading days. *, **, and *** indicate coefficients 
significantly different from zero at the 0.1 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. 
  Main sample   Pc,i ≥ 1 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Pc,i -0.038*** -0.023*** -0.026***  -0.070*** -0.050*** -0.050*** 
 [-11.47] [-6.62] [-5.71]  [-19.87] [-11.63] [-8.36] 
Pc',i'   -0.008    0.005 
   [-1.05]    [0.52] 
Listed target   -0.284***    -0.239*** 
   [-24.78]    [-17.53] 
Listed acquirer   0.005    0.006 
   [0.59]    [0.65] 
CHSc,i    0.000    -0.000 
   [0.62]    [-0.18] 
ADRIc   -0.020***    -0.015** 
   [-4.09]    [-2.53] 
MktRetc,c'    -0.070**    -0.041 
   [-2.31]    [-1.13] 
FXc,c'    -0.025***    -0.021** 
      [-2.98]       [-2.10] 
N 14244 14236 7702  8246 8224 5126 
Pseudo R2 0.004 0.064 0.181  0.036 0.104 0.216 
Year dummies Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Sector-pair dummies Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
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Appendix 3.3: Results by subsamples of forward and backward acquisitions – without acquisitions in the same GTAP sector 
This table reports marginal effects of probit regression for forward and backward acquisitions separately. The dependent 
variable equals one if the acquisition is for a controlling stake, and zero if the acquisition is for a non-controlling equity stake. 
The sample is vertical cross-border acquisitions between 2004 and 2010. Pc,i (Pc,i) is target (acquirer) country-level relative 
productivity. Vertical relatedness is provided by Fan and Lang (2000) based on BEA 1992 input-output table and is the fraction 
the input industry contributes in added-value to the output industry. Forward (backward) indicates the direction of selling to 
(buying from) between two sectors.  Listed target (Listed acquirer) are dummies equal to one if the target (acquirer) is listed 
in stock exchange, and zero otherwise. ADRIc is the Antidirector Rights Index. CHSc,i (%) is closely held shares in a firm 
aggregated at country-industry level. MktRetc,c’ is the target-acquirer country pair differences in buy-and-hold inflation-adjusted 
stock market return from 275 trading days to 25 trading days before announcement. FXc,c’ is the difference of annual inflation-
adjusted bilateral U.S. dollar exchange rate return of the target country and acquirer country from 275 trading days to 25 trading 
days. *, **, and *** indicate coefficients significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. 
  Forward acquisition   Backward acquisition 
 
Main 
sample 
Main 
sample Pc,i ≥ 1  
Main 
sample 
Main 
sample Pc,i ≥ 1 
  (1) (2) (3)   (3) (4) (5) 
Pc,i -0.043*** -0.033*** -0.069***  -0.026*** -0.024*** -0.048*** 
 [-7.18] [-5.07] [-9.42]  [-4.21] [-3.11] [-7.44] 
Pc',i' 0.020 0.029** 0.021  -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.012 
 [1.62] [2.35] [1.36]  [-3.17] [-3.17] [-1.12] 
Forward relatedness -0.176 -0.087 -0.255     
 [-1.31] [-0.41] [-1.17]     
Backward relatedness     -0.357*** -0.295** -0.265** 
     [-4.22] [-2.09] [-2.23] 
Listed target -0.327*** -0.314*** -0.281***  -0.263*** -0.249*** -0.214*** 
 [-18.55] [-17.29] [-13.07]  [-17.88] [-16.76] [-12.61] 
Listed acquirer 0.005 -0.004 0.006  0.012 0.015 0.014 
 [0.38] [-0.31] [0.37]  [1.21] [1.48] [1.26] 
CHSc,i  0.000 0.000 -0.000  -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 [0.68] [0.13] [-0.25]  [-0.65] [0.09] [-0.90] 
ADRIc -0.035*** -0.033*** -0.038***  -0.016*** -0.015** -0.004 
 [-4.24] [-4.01] [-3.72]  [-2.75] [-2.40] [-0.61] 
MktRetc,c'  -0.147*** -0.106** -0.068  -0.048 -0.043 -0.047 
 [-2.97] [-2.23] [-1.12]  [-1.23] [-1.14] [-1.05] 
FXc,c'  -0.047*** -0.039*** -0.040**  -0.025** -0.017* -0.018 
  [-3.50] [-2.92] [-2.32]   [-2.41] [-1.68] [-1.48] 
N 3405 3389 2166  4312 4252 2986 
Pseudo R2 0.186 0.237 0.241  0.135 0.183 0.150 
Year dummies Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Sector-pair dummies N Y N   N Y N 
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Appendix 3.4: Robustness tests – without acquisitions in the same GTAP sector 
This table reports marginal effects of probit regression for subsamples. Dual-acquirer indicates the subsample of acquisitions 
where acquirers have conducted both controlling and non-controlling acquisitions between 2004 and 2010. Non-serial 
acquisitions indicated acquisitions in which the same targets only received one investment from the same acquirer between 
2004 and 2010. Non-strategic sectors indicate acquisitions take place in GTAP sectors other than coal, oil and gas, minerals, 
petroleum and coal products, mineral products, electricity, gas manufacture and distribution, water, air transportation, 
communication (including telecommunication), financial services, public admin, public defense, education, and health. The 
dependent variable equals one if the acquisition is for a controlling stake, and zero if the acquisition is for a non-controlling 
equity stake. The sample is vertical cross-border acquisitions between 2004 and 2010. Pc,i (Pc,i) is target (acquirer) country-
level relative productivity.  Listed target (Listed acquirer) are dummies equal to one if the target (acquirer) is listed in stock 
exchange, and zero otherwise. ADRIc is the Antidirector Rights Index. CHSc,i (%) is closely held shares in a firm aggregated at 
country-industry level. MktRetc,c’ is the target-acquirer country pair differences in buy-and-hold inflation-adjusted stock market 
return from 275 trading days to 25 trading days before announcement. FXc,c’ is the difference of annual inflation-adjusted 
bilateral U.S. dollar exchange rate return of the target country and acquirer country from 275 trading days to 25 trading days. 
*, **, and *** indicate coefficients significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively 
  Dual-acquirer   Non-serial acquisitions   Non-strategic sectors 
 
Main 
sample Pc,i ≥ 1  
Main 
sample Pc,i ≥ 1  
Main 
sample Pc,i ≥ 1 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Pc,i -0.054*** -0.071***  -0.023*** -0.044***  0.003 -0.042*** 
 [-3.75] [-3.54]  [-5.00] [-7.70]  [0.35] [-4.24] 
Pc',i' 0.006 0.021  -0.010 -0.003  -0.003 -0.005 
 [0.22] [0.58]  [-1.44] [-0.31]  [-0.40] [-0.49] 
Listed target -0.285*** -0.275***  -0.263*** -0.215***  -0.250*** -0.199*** 
 [-7.71] [-6.01]  [-22.70] [-16.03]  [-20.90] [-14.38] 
Listed acquirer -0.012 -0.012  0.008 0.011  0.011 0.013 
 [-0.32] [-0.25]  [1.03] [1.19]  [1.35] [1.42] 
CHSc,i  -0.000 -0.001  0.000 -0.000  0.000 0.000 
 [-0.16] [-0.58]  [1.19] [-0.07]  [1.62] [1.62] 
ADRIc -0.014 -0.032  -0.020*** -0.016***  -0.023*** -0.015*** 
 [-0.77] [-1.40]  [-4.31] [-2.82]  [-4.66] [-2.76] 
MktRetc,c'  -0.309*** -0.235*  -0.073** -0.044  -0.063** -0.032 
 [-3.03] [-1.77]  [-2.47] [-1.27]  [-2.02] [-0.91] 
FXc,c'  -0.023 -0.052  -0.025*** -0.023**  -0.025*** -0.025*** 
  [-0.69] [-1.25]   [-3.15] [-2.37]   [-3.01] [-2.61] 
N 1248 829  7387 4915  5837 4145 
Pseudo R2 0.151 0.170  0.184 0.224  0.156 0.133 
Year dummies Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Sector-pair dummies Y Y   Y Y   Y Y 
 
 
